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 CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
 Aspiring and significant regional powers have long played important roles, as in pre-revo-
lutionary Iran’s role in the U.S Nixon Doctrine to assist the United States in carrying out its mili-
tary commitments and to protect U.S interests in the Persian Gulf. After the Cold War and with 
the end of superpower rivalry, regional powers have come into more prominence in emerging 
complex conflict situations, such as those involved with destabilizing civil wars in Asia and Africa, 
and regional developments have gained increasing importance. International Relations has seen a 
resurgence of interest in the study of regional powers and IR scholars have been paying attention 
to regional powers as they have important roles in world politics by affecting international-political 
dynamics and outcomes. The central assumption behind this literature is that regional powers in-
fluence the interactions taking place at the regional level, involving both global powers and small 
regional neighbors, and provide for regional order and thereby contribute to the stability of global 
order. 
 The existing literature on regional powers focuses either on types, roles and foreign policy 
strategies of regional powers (Neumann 1992; Katzenstein 2005; Destradi 2010; Nabers 2010; 
Prys 2010) or regional structures, and security-related issues in the regional context (Lake and 
Morgan 1997; Buzan & Waever 2003; Acharya and Johnston 2007; Hurrell 2007; Lake 2009; 
Nolte 2011). More recently scholars have also started to focus on secondary and tertiary states, 
those positioned as “middle powers” (able not so much individually but in concert with a small 
enough number of states to affect the system with their resources) and small powers (not individ-
ually but with a large number of states able to impact the system) in the regional hierarchy along 
with their responses to the regional hegemon (Jesse, Lobell, and Williams, 2012; 2015). When 
applying hegemonic stability theory (HST) to the regional level, for example, political scientists 
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have been interested more in an economic dimension rather than security policy, international or-
ganizations and cooperation (Liu and Ming-Te, 2011). 
 Given the increasing importance of regional systems with the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, which reduced systemic power competition that affected international outcomes and high-
lighted the importance of regions as relevant stages for the generation of system-level political 
dynamics (Buzan & Waever 2003; Acharya 2007), this dissertation will study regional distribu-
tions of power and regional hegemons and regional great powers’ strategic tendencies and moti-
vations in conflict and cooperation in the regional system. This study aims to offer an empirical 
answer, for example, to the question of whether there are similarities in behaviors and motivations 
of regional hegemons and global hegemon(s) in comparable situations, such as conflict and coop-
eration. I argue that even though regional systems operate under the global or extra-regional inter-
national system as a whole, and regional power hierarchy operates differently than the global 
power hierarchy, still regional powers would be expected to show similar strategies and behaviors 
in regional conflict and cooperation with global hegemons. The first step in this comparative anal-
ysis is to specify how hegemonic behavior and strategies are in general treated in the literature. 
Overview of the Literature 
 To show how my research- focused on regional power behavior and motivations to under-
stand regional hegemons’ and regional great powers’ strategies and behaviors in regional war and 
peace by comparing them to global power behavior- contributes to the current literature and what 
is missing in the existing literature, I will provide a brief discussion of existing literature on power 
structure effects and hegemony’s behaviors and strategies. 
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The Debate on Power Structure and Effects on Conflict and Cooperation 
 The topic of distribution of power and how structure affects the international outcome (con-
flict or cooperation) have long been studied in international relations literature. Power hierarchies 
have been studied in terms of conflict and cooperation at the regional level, and system-level the-
ories have been applied to sub-system levels. Lemke (2010) has addressed the issue of cooperation 
and conflict in regions and developed regional-level hypotheses from well-established IR theories 
(power transition theory and HST) while undertaking statistical analysis to test his hypotheses. He 
hypothesizes that the stronger a regional power, the fewer international conflicts it will have at the 
regional level. He also hypothesizes that the greater the share of capabilities held by a regional 
power, the greater the number of regional international organizations that region will enjoy. The 
reasoning behind this assumption is based on hegemonic stability theory (Organski 1958, Kindle-
berger 1973, Gilpin 1981, Keohane 1984) and both Realist and Liberal assumptions which claim 
that creation and maintenance of institutions are more likely with the existence of disproportion-
ately powerful states since those states will lead the creation and maintenance of benefits and at 
the same time costly institutions. There are two subfields within the HST literature. One subfield 
of the theory focuses primarily on international economy (Kindleberger 1973, Ikenberry 2014) 
while the other subfield focuses on the implications of hegemonic governance in increasing stable 
cooperation in the international system (Keohane and Nye 1977; Gilpin 1983, 2001).  
Gilpin (1983) proposes hegemonic governance as a broad theoretical notion and focuses on its 
security implication. He argues that the existence of a hegemon fosters stability and peace. In 
constructing his statistical analyses, Lemke (2010) uses independent variables based on regional 
power’s share of hard power resources in the region: demographic share, economic share and mil-
itary share. His dependent variables are number of military interstate disputes in the region and 
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number of international organizations in the region. His statistical analysis shows that the regional 
distribution of power strongly influences the amount of conflict the region have and also helps to 
predict the number of regional international organizations in the region. These results support both 
PTT and HST at the regional level.  
Regional conflict and cooperation also have been studied per se by scholars whose studies 
do not focus on distribution of power or power hierarchies. For instance, Solingen (2001) focuses 
on the transition of Southeast Asian countries from conflict to cooperation during and after the 
Cold War. She chooses Southeast Asian states as his case study because, she argues, despite South-
east Asia including a highly heterogeneous set of countries in terms of ethnicity, religion, language 
and nationality, and also even though the region had economic and political crisis in the late 1990s, 
still the region had a dramatic economic rise. Solingen’s study examines cooperation under a re-
gional institution, ASEAN. 
The Debate on Strategies of Global Hegemons 
In hegemonic power literature, Charles Kindleberger’s study has an important place as a 
starting point for other scholars to build on and develop explanations for the behavior of hegemonic 
powers. Kindleberger (1973) refers to hegemony as the leadership position of a single country and 
argues that single country provides public goods (or collective goods) to sustain stability of the 
international system. Following hegemonic stability theorists (Kindleberger 1973; Keohane, 1980; 
Gilpin, 1981), scholars have focused on different strategies such as economic sanctions, military 
intervention, and foreign aid or military support, as pursued by hegemons to assert control over 
other states and alter their incentives. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990a; 1990b) argue that there are 
two basic ways of exercising hegemonic power: coercion and normative persuasion. In a coercion 
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model of hegemonic power, a hegemonic nation exercises power through the manipulation of ma-
terial incentives, which is “the use of threats and promises to alter preferences of leaders in sec-
ondary nations” (1990a, 283). According to this view, power is exercised through material re-
sources, and by using promises of reward or threats punishment, hegemons alter the political and 
economic incentives of other states and ensure that other states prefer cooperation to non-cooper-
ation. The normative persuasion model, on the other hand, is based on socialization, which can 
contribute to cooperation between the dominant state and secondary states through getting the 
foreign elites “to buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore 
pursue policies consistent with the hegemony’s notion of international order” (1990a, 283). In this 
vein, both hard and soft power can be utilized for control.1 
 While pursuing the broad range of strategies available to them, hegemonic nations can, 
therefore, exercise their power in benevolent or coercive forms. Cohn (2015) distinguishes three 
models of hegemonic strategic form. (1) The benevolent form in which hegemon pursues general 
benefits and absolute gains rather than its own benefits and relies on rewards rather than threats to 
achieve its goals; (2) the mixed model where hegemons focus on both general as well as personal 
benefits (both absolute and relative gains) and uses the combination of threats and rewards to en-
sure compliance of the secondary states; and (3) the exploitative (coercive) model in which 
hegemon pursues only its self-interests as well as relative gain and relies on coercion to enforce 
the cooperation of other states (63-65). 
                                                 
1 In one of his recent studies, in Future of Power (2011), Nye provides a full definition of 
soft power and defines it as “the ability to affect others throughout the co-optive means of framing 
the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes” (20-21). 
Basically, soft power is the ability to persuade others to do what one wants through attraction and 
co-option rather than through coercion and inducements. 
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James and Lake (1989) who heavily focus on economic dimensions of hegemonic strategies, ad-
dress the question of ‘how hegemonic leaders construct and maintain a liberal and open interna-
tional economy’. They begin with the distinction between benevolent and coercive hegemony and 
claim that “benevolent hegemony assumes that states share similar free trade preferences and are 
stymied only by a collective action dilemma [while] coercive hegemony posits states with different 
and often conflicting commercial interests” (4). They focus on coercive hegemony strategies since 
constructing and maintaining a free trade regime is more difficult in a coercive hegemony than in 
benevolent one, and they propose three separate strategies of hegemonic leadership, which they 
call three faces of coercive hegemony. In the first face of coercive hegemony, similar to Ikenberry 
and Kupchan’s (1990a, 1990b) argument, power is exercised through the hegemon’s use of posi-
tive and negative sanctions to influence foreign governments’ choice of policies, which might in-
clude military intervention or trade embargo. The second face focuses on the hegemon’s use of 
international market power. Here, hegemon influences decisions in foreign countries by influenc-
ing consumer preferences and altering the constellation of interests and political power within 
foreign countries in ways favorable to its own interests. The third face emphasizes the hegemon’s 
use of ideas and ideology to influence public opinion and the political agenda in third countries 
(4).  
 In addition to benevolent or coercive forms, hegemons can also exercise their power in 
unilateral and multilateral forms. In this respect, the debate between unilateralists and multilater-
alists has important place on hegemonic power literature. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2011) 
argue that “the process of multilateralism is one in which states view the solutions to problems as 
requiring joint consultation, deliberation and decision” (182) while they define unilateralism as “a 
formulation of policy without collective input” (184). In his article, Ikenberry (2003) distinguishes 
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multilateralism from bilateralism and unilateralism. Accordingly, multilateralism is different from 
other types of interstate relations in three ways. 
First, because it [multilateralism] entails the coordination of relations among a group of 
states, it can be contrasted with bilateral, “hub and spoke”, and imperial arrangements. 
Second, the terms of a given relationship are defined by agreed-upon rules and principles—
and sometimes by organizations—so multilateralism can be contrasted with interactions 
based on ad hoc bargaining or straightforward power politics. Third, multilateralism entails 
some reduction in policy autonomy, since the choices and actions of the participating states 
are—at least to some degree—constrained by the agreed-upon rules and principles. (534) 
HST scholars, reflecting a liberal perspective, propose that hegemonic powers are most 
likely to favor institution-building and maintenance while realist scholars argue that institutions 
are either manipulated by hegemons or lead to hegemon’s loss of autonomy. In his influential essay 
“Power and Weakness”, unilateralist Robert Kagan (2003) posits that a hegemon will seek to max-
imize its freedom of action by pursing a unilateral diplomacy, while militarily weak countries will 
seek refuge in multilateral diplomacy to constrain the power of the strong.  
The Debate on Strategies of Regional Hegemon 
 Recently, there has been a growing interest in the study of regional powers’ strategies, 
which they adopt in relationships with their neighboring states within their respective regions; 
these studies stimulate the question of whether regional power behavior is similar to that of global 
powers. Pedersen (2002) proposes four possible strategies that regional great powers adopt: uni-
lateral hegemony (strong realist elements, low degree of institutionalism); co-operative hegemony 
(medium-level of realist elements, high degree of institutionalism); empire (strong realist elements 
and high degree of institutionalization) and concert (soft realist strategy). In his study, Pedersen 
mainly focuses on co-operative hegemony, which he proposes as the most plausible strategy for 
regional powers (682).  
A general distinction among hegemonic strategies at the regional level is proposed by 
Destradi (2010) who labels these different types of hegemonic strategies as: hard, intermediate and 
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soft hegemony (918). Consistent with Ikenberry and Kupchan's (1990b) coercion model of global 
hegemonic power and Pedersen’s (2002) unilateral hegemony model, hard hegemony is based on 
overt and subtle coercion in which the hegemon mainly seeks to satisfy its own interest while 
depicting them as common interests with other states. In this type of hegemony, sanctions, non-
military threats and political pressure are used to make secondary states comply. Intermediate he-
gemony, on the other hand, is more consistent with HST since in this type of strategy, hegemon 
provides material benefits and reward to secondary states and uses hard persuasion tools to ensure 
compliance by them. Intermediate hegemony is consistent with what Klaus Knorr (1975) calls 
reward power in which hegemon ensures compliance of secondary states by rewarding their com-
pliance rather than punishing them for noncompliance. Lastly, soft hegemony is based on cooper-
ation rather than coercion or inducement. In this type of hegemonic strategy, as in the other two 
types, hegemon’s aims and own interests are the forefront. Destradi (2010) defines soft hegemonic 
strategy, consistent with Ikenberry and Kupchan’s (1990b) normative persuasion model, as “one-
sided non-coercive influence aimed at modifying and reshaping the norms and values of subordi-
nate states (920); what we have come to know as soft power (Nye 2004), for example, attraction 
by values, lifestyles, and culture, fits hegemonic style. 
 Regional powers frequently have interest in creating and maintaining regional organiza-
tions, and as Flemes (2008) puts it “the leader’s regional influence will depend on its ability to 
determine the cooperation agenda, which can be achieved either through a cooperative or unilateral 
hegemonic strategy of leadership or one of co-operative hegemony” (103). Strategies in promoting 
regional institutionalization and comparison between co-operative and unilateral strategies are the 
main focus in Pedersen’s study. Pedersen (2002) studied the reasons major regional states pursue 
the strategy of cooperation and developed the notion of “co-operative hegemony”. Co-operative 
9 
 
 
hegemony focuses on comparatively weak or declining regional big powers and formative phases 
of regional institutionalization. According to the theory, militarily weak major powers will nor-
mally adopt co-operative hegemony in order to stop the process of decline and regain their influ-
ence in world affairs. In addition to militarily weak major powers, this approach is also viable as 
a counter-strategy in a global international system where a dominant state holds sway. With the 
co-operative hegemony theory, Pedersen attempts to explain regional institutionalization linked to 
a long-term strategy of major regional powers by highlighting the importance of power and secu-
rity elements rather than economic factors in the formative phase of co-operative arrangements. 
Regional hegemons’ capacity of power sharing is one of the necessary preconditions for a great 
power to adopt the approach and to be successful with the strategy. Pedersen defines power sharing 
as “a [regional] big power’s capacity to share power with its neighbors on a durable basis within 
common institutions with significant competences” (Pedersen 2002, 689). In co-operative hegem-
ony, other member states within regional institutions have a voice and also the cooperation in-
cludes checks on the hegemonic power; Ethiopia’s role through the 1960s and 80s speaking for 
and organizing negotiations in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) seemed to reflect many 
of these strategies. A different strategy which is consistent with ‘co-operative hegemony’ (Peder-
sen 2002) and ‘soft hegemony’ (Destradi 2010) is ‘consensual hegemony’ proposed by Burges 
(2008). In his study, Burges draws on Gramsci’s suggestion of ‘predominance by consent’ instead 
of domination by coercion or imposition. The concept of consensual hegemony, which is proposed 
as a leadership strategy by Burges “privileges the creation of consensus through the constructive 
inclusion of potentially competing priorities and the shaping of common positive outcomes” (81). 
In his study, Burges references to Brazil’s post-Cold War foreign policy, which, according to him, 
pursued consensual hegemony but failed to form a stable consensual hegemony. Both Pedersen 
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and Burges define the concept of regional hegemony based on the interaction between material 
and ideational power resources.  
What is Missing in the Literature? 
 While the regional power literature has extensive single-case studies on regional conflict 
and cooperation, studies analyzing regions comprehensively are limited. Different than existing 
studies on cooperation and conflict within regions, my study will both analyze aggregate data 
trends and discuss different cases to show not only similarities and differences but also reasons for 
contrasts. The framework that will be presented in this dissertation will allow the readers to iden-
tify cases in terms of similar and different strategies and behaviors of regional hegemons and re-
gional great powers in cooperative and conflict situations within different regions and power struc-
tures. 
 Moreover, building on Lemke’s study, this dissertation will test HST hypotheses at the 
regional level by adding independent variables to Lemke’s statistical test as well as by making 
conceptual and theoretical improvements to Lemke’s study. This study is an attempt to fill the gap 
that is pointed out by Lemke. According to him, the statistical relationships of HST exist at the 
regional level, but do not indicate much about predicted circumstances when these theories break 
down or about regional powers’ behavior in crisis or conflict situations. Also little attention has 
been paid to the behavior or impacts of various types of regional powers, ranging from those with 
capabilities strictly in their vicinity or sub-region, to those with strong interests and influence 
across an entire region or indeed beyond one region into another.  
 In addition to region-level analysis of conflictive and cooperative behaviors, this study is 
also an attempt to compare regional power behaviors to global power behaviors since only few 
have attempted to make this comparison systematically (Lemke 2002). Lake and Morgan (1997) 
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note that region level analysis does not necessarily need unique theories, rather “the task is to 
incorporate regional politics into our existing approaches and theories” (7). Departing from there, 
this study will also draw conclusions in terms of applicability of a system-level theory to regional 
level. 
 In a nutshell, the purpose of this project is to address the issue that is not addressed in 
previous studies by offering a coherent explanation of behaviors and strategies of various types of 
regional powers by using post-Cold War cases in military, security, and economic issues and com-
paring them to global powers. To develop such an explanation, this dissertation will study the 
region-level effects of the presence of regional great powers or regional hegemon(s) and attempt 
to answer three interrelated questions: first, how can we characterize behaviors of regional powers? 
Second, as an attempt to understand conflictive and cooperative, e.g., coalitional, behaviors of 
regional powers, is system-level HST applicable to regional-level analysis? And third, what factors 
affect behaviors and dominance patterns of regional great powers? There are sub-questions of these 
main questions, which will be raised throughout the study, as well. 
Theoretical Framework 
 In this study, I will use a well-established IR theory- HST. In dealing with global/regional 
hierarchy consequences for global/regional stability, HST enjoys an accepted place framework. 
HST (Kindleberger 1974; Keohane 1980) deals with power hierarchies and shows how distribution 
of power affects international outcomes (cooperation and conflict). The main premise of this the-
ory is that the international system needs a hegemonic power, who will set the systemic rules of 
the behavior for all other states, to promote peace or stability. As a term, HST was invented by 
Robert Keohane (1984) while the original thesis of the theory was put forward by Kindleberger 
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(1973). In his study, Kindleberger argues that Great Britain was the global hegemon in the nine-
teenth century who stabilized the economic regime and set the rules of a liberal economic system, 
which all other states followed. According to him, the outcome of 1929 Great Depression was the 
instability of the international economic system because Great Britain was too weak to stabilize 
the international system, and the U.S was unwilling to do so. Kindleberger claims that “for the 
world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer” (305). According to 
him (1973), a hegemon can stabilize the system by organizing and carrying out five functions: 
“maintaining a relatively open market for distress goods, providing countercyclical, or at least 
stable, long term lending, policing a relatively stable system of exchange rates, ensuring the coor-
dination of macroeconomic policies, acting as a lender of last resort by discounting or otherwise 
providing liquidity in financial crisis” (Kindleberger 1986, 289). He argues that stability can be 
assured only if hegemon bears the cost of providing public goods and extracts the support of others.  
Keohane (1980) in developing Kindleberger’s thesis, argues that “hegemonic structures of power, 
dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international 
regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed” (132). Accordingly, this order is con-
stituted by the creation of international regimes and the provision of collective goods. Gilpin 
(1975; 1981) also associates the existence of a hegemon with the stability of the world economy 
arguing that a hegemon is necessary to assure an open and stable world economy. In his later study, 
Gilpin (2001) focuses on the hegemon’s tasks and role by arguing that “there can be no liberal 
international economy unless there is a leader that uses its resources and influence to establish and 
manage an international economy based on free trade, monetary stability, and freedom of capital 
movement” (97-98).  
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Gilpin (1983) also focuses on the implications of hegemonic governance in increasing sta-
ble cooperation in the international system. He proposes hegemonic governance as a broader the-
oretical notion by focusing on its security implications. Gilpin argues that the existence of 
hegemon fosters stability and peace. As in his latter study (2001), he focuses on hegemony and 
cooperation by highlighting the centrality of hegemony in promoting international cooperation. 
Regional predominant powers can follow institutional foreign policy strategies at a regional level 
as they can do so at different systemic levels and lead the creation and maintenance of regional 
organizations as we witness in cooperative relationship patterns in Southern Africa under the lead-
ership of South Africa and development of institutions such as South African Development Com-
munity (SADC). 
 In this study, I will attempt to combine variables from realist (unilateralism, manipulation, 
causes of war) and liberal (multilateralism, institutionalism, conditions for peace) school of 
thoughts by focusing on regions as the main level of analysis. Moreover, to compare behaviors of 
regional powers to global powers, I will also use global system as a level of analysis in combination 
with regional system or subsystem. While imposing system-level theories on regions, openness of 
regional settings will be also considered in case studies. As Lake and Morgan (1997) argue when 
we apply global-level theories to regional settings, we should consider substantial modifications. 
For example, when we consider balance of capabilities in global level, we basically look at re-
sources of superpowers while in regional settings outside support and resources of alliances are 
factors that affect regional powers’ capabilities (10). 
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Key Concepts 
Hegemony  
 The concept of hegemony has been used to refer to different shades of meaning in several 
different disciplines and still there is no general consensus on the definition or usage of the term. 
As Prys and Robel (2011) argue, many applications of the concept of hegemony still reflect the 
lack of conceptual coherence and comprehensiveness (256). By definition, a hegemon must pos-
sess a predominance of power capabilities compared to other actors within the international system 
and also be willing to exercise leadership. Some studies highlight the importance predominance of 
states’ material capabilities to refer to the distribution of power in international power hierarchies, 
while in other literature scholars note that supremacy in material capabilities is not enough, and 
hegemony requires predominance in multiple spheres such as ideological/cultural, political/ dip-
lomatic, economic, as well as institutional power to persuade others to accept the rules and norms 
of the status quo that is largely designated and operated by the hegemon and its allies (Florig 2010; 
Brown 2013). 
 Gilpin (1981) defines hegemony as “the leadership of one state over other states in the 
system” (Gilpin 1981, 116). Nabers (2010) argues that “the connection between leadership and 
hegemony is one of co-constitution. Leadership is necessarily based on hegemony, while hegem-
ony can only be sustained through leadership” (931). Oran Young (1991) introduces a typology of 
leadership (structural, entrepreneurial, intellectual) in which he explains different capabilities 
needed for effective leadership. He defines those leadership strategies as: 
structural leader works to structural leader works to translate power in the material sense 
into bargaining leverage focused on the issue at hand, the entrepreneurial leader uses ne-
gotiating skills to cast issues in ways that facilitate integrative bargaining and to broker 
interests so as to build consensus around the choice of a preferred institutional arrangement. 
Intellectual leaders provide systems of thought that offer a coherent analytical framework 
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within which to think about the formation of regimes to deal with international problems. 
(Young 1994, 45) 
 
Layne (2006) adds the focus on ‘will’ to Gilpin’s power and control based definition of 
hegemony and argues that “hegemony is about will. A hegemon purposefully exercises its over-
whelming power to impose order on the international system” (Layne 2006, 11). In assessing the 
distribution of power in the Post-Cold War era, even though the United States has faced a relative 
decline in many key aspects of capabilities and getting what it wants after 2008, it still has an 
overarching dominance within the international system and still is designated, by will, determina-
tion and capability, and default as global hegemon (Ikenberry 2004, 630). And as Layne (2006) 
puts it, “precisely because the United states is a hegemon, there is a marked asymmetry of influ-
ence in its favor” (Layne 2006, 12); US hegemony might, of course, be increasingly challenged by 
the likes of Russia and China both in particular regions and globally in the coming years. 
 As distinct from global hegemons, although much has been written on regional powers, 
still there is no consensus on the definition and characteristics of what might be termed a regional 
hegemon or, more broadly, a regional power. Nolte (2010) argues that this is perhaps because the 
terms are composed of two concepts “-region and power- that are conceptualized quite differently 
in IR theory, with great variation with regard to their meaning” (Nolte 2010, 883). The term ‘re-
gional powers’ usually is used interchangeably with other terms such as regional great power, 
major regional powers, and regional leaders with emphasis on the most powerful states within the 
given region (Osterud, 1992; Huntington, 1999; Schoemann and Alden, 2003) such as Brazil, 
China, India, and South Africa. At this point, it is necessary to make a conceptual classification. 
As Nolte (2010) points out, we need to distinguish between various terms, such as regional power, 
regional great power, and regional hegemon, with the latter term also denoting not just the country 
size and regional reach, but its ability to dominate in the region. 
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 In one of the first attempts to develop a definition of regional great powers in the IR liter-
ature, Osterud (1992) defines regional great power “as a state which is geographically a part of the 
delineated region; a state which is able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the 
region; a state which is highly influential in regional affairs; a state which, contrary to a ‘middle 
power’ might also be a great power on a world scale in addition to its regional standing” (12). 
Huntington (1999) calls major regional power that which Osterud labeled regional great power 
and argued that major regional powers are prominent in areas of the world even beyond their “own” 
region, but cannot project their interests and capabilities as universally as a global hegemon like 
the United States. According to his classification, major regional powers are Germany and France 
in Europe; Russia in Eurasia; China and potentially Japan in East Asia; India in South Asia; Iran 
in Southwest Asia; Brazil in Latin America; and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. Hinnebusch 
(2013), on the other hand uses the term ‘regional power’ to define states within a sub-system, 
“those that have interests and capabilities sufficient to play a major role in regional governance 
and even to aspire to hegemony over a particular geographical region” (Hinnebusch 2013, 75). 
According to him, these states should possess a combination of economic and military power re-
sources enough to intimidate rivals and provide incentives to allies. He defines outcome indicators 
of regional power status as “regional spheres of influence and a sufficient deterrent capability to 
resist a coalition of other regional states or even a global great power over regional issues” (Hinne-
busch, 2013, 76). At this point, he distinguishes between regional powers and regional hegemon 
and argues that soft power is needed for regional hegemony to create “a common regional identity, 
an attractive model of governance, creating or leading regional institutions, or delivering regional 
public goods. A main indicator of a regional hegemon is its ability to unite its region behind it in 
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the global power struggle” (Hinnebusch 2013, 76). In addition to Hinnebusch, the concept ‘re-
gional hegemony’ has been used by Myers (1991), Mearsheimer (2001) and Elman (2004) in des-
ignating the place of states within a sub-system hierarchy. Myers (1991) proposes a general defi-
nition of regional hegemony by claiming that regional hegemons are ‘states that possess sufficient 
power to dominate subordinate state systems” (Myers 1991, 3). Here, Myers highlights the degree 
of dominance and material preponderance in defining regional hegemony. In her study, Prys 
(2008) makes distinction between regional hegemony and global hegemony and argues that re-
gional hegemony is, in combination with material preponderance, constituted by three dimensions: 
perception, provision, and projection. By doing so, she also differentiates hegemony from other 
types of hierarchical relationships: domination and imperialism. The dimension of perception in-
cludes both the self-perception of the regional hegemon for the regional role and the perception of 
other states in the region that neighboring states accept regional hegemon has a special role. The 
second dimension is provision, which simply refers to provision of regional public goods as sug-
gested by Kindleberger (1986). Lastly, the dimension of projection is the relationship between 
regional hegemon and secondary states and projection of its values and interests. She defines heg-
emonic projection as “the specific activities of the hegemon that promote its own vision and values 
for the region, such as the establishment of institutions and agenda-setting within those institutions; 
mediation in conflicts; and financial assistance and, if relevant, conditions attached to it” (10). She 
also takes into account specificity of region-level analysis and adds a conditional variable: the 
effect of regional openness on regional dynamics. Prys (2010) claims that “in contrast to the global 
hegemon, the United States, regional powers have to operate within an overarching international 
system determined by the global distribution of power and by international institutions” (482). 
Accordingly, external impacts have the ability to limit behaviors of regional powers or provide 
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opportunities for them to pursue external interactions, such as partnerships which can alter regional 
dynamics. 
In this study, theory of regional hegemony by Prys (2008) will be used since it takes into 
account material (hard power capability) and ideational power resources (willingness, leadership 
as well as provision of public goods) as well as external influences.  
 For the purpose of this study, therefore, a state will be called ‘regional hegemon’ when it 
is the single great power within its respective region, and as Mearsheimer (2001) argues, “no other 
state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it” (40); such a power   makes 
and enforces rules throughout the system and assumes the role of a leader in the subordinate state 
system. Indicators for the claim of regional leadership would be looking at three dimension of 
power as proposed by Prys. The term “dual-hegemony” will be used when there are two regional 
hegemons within the region and material power of both members of dual hegemony significantly 
outweighs those of others within their region. The term regional “great power” will be considered 
a state or states whose hard power capability share in the region, in terms of military, economic, 
demographic outweighs those of other actors in their region but which is not the dominant or heg-
emonic state(s) in its region; such states would not have the predominant unrivaled leadership role 
within the given region. The term “regional powers” will be used for countries that possess suffi-
cient hard power capabilities to project power and exert influence on a regional scale. States that 
dominate a sub-regional area but do not qualify as a region wide hegemon or great power will be 
termed “limited regional powers”. This term can also include states with considerable muscle in 
one or more areas of hard power, such as great petroleum reserves, but which do not qualify as 
regional great powers across the spectrum of power attributes (size, military etc.). All of these 
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rankings and ratings will be sustained by operational measures of shares of regional power, to be 
described in the next chapter. 
Region 
 Regional politics literature has defined the concept of region by focusing upon geograph-
ical proximity (Mansfield and Milner, 1997; Lemke, 2002), pointing to the increasing interdepend-
ence and organization at the regional level in broad political and economic terms (Hettne, 2003; 
Soderbaum 2003; Solingen, 2008; Nel and Stephen ,2010), and by focusing on security interde-
pendence as the defining attribute of the region (Lake and Morgan ,1997; Buzan and Wæver, 2003; 
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, 2012). Thompson (1973) reviews work of twenty-two scholars pub-
lished in the time period of 1958-1971 and creates a regional subsystem attributes list based on 
criteria, which have been used by those scholars to identify a regional subsystem. Based on his 
review, Thompson concludes that there are four necessary and sufficient conditions for defining 
regions and regional subsystems within them: geographical proximity, patterns of interactions (the 
degree of regularity and intensity of interactions), the recognition of the regional subsystem as a 
distinctive area or theatre of operation, and membership threshold of at least two and more.  
 In his study, Lemke employs three separate designations of regions and their state mem-
berships. His first designation lists seven regions defined by the Correlates of War Project: Western 
Hemisphere, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Asia (Central, East, 
South, and Southeast) and Australia Pacific. His second designation is based on Lemke’s (2002) 
own definition based on his previous study in which he develops militarily-defined regions he 
refers as “Regions of War and Peace Regions” (RoW&P Regions). He defines regions based on 
proximity and the ability to interact. Accordingly, states are members of the same region only if 
they can interact militarily and can move their own military troops within reach of each other’s 
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capital cities. Lemke’s earlier study (2002) analyzed seventeen such regions while his latter study 
(2010) reports twenty regions. Lemke’s third designation list defines regions based on the presence 
of regional powers: Brazil’s Region, South Africa’s region, Iran’s Region, China’s Region and 
India’s Region. 
 Thompson’s conditions to identify a regional subsystem are closely related to the concept 
of regional security complex proposed by Buzan (1991) and later expanded by Buzan and Wæver 
(2003). Buzan and Wæver (2003) define regions in terms of security interdependence in their re-
gional security complex theory (RSC). RSC is defined as “a set of units whose major processes of 
securitization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be 
reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 491). The main 
structural feature of this theory is specifying the interactions of anarchy with geographical aspects. 
Accordingly, geographically proximate neighboring states are connected within a distinct regional 
dynamic: a continuum of conflict and cooperation. Based on RSC, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 
(2012) attempt to identify regional powers and explore how these regional powers affect security 
orders. In order to do so, they develop a framework, which is called Regional Powers and Security 
Framework (RPSF). While they define regions and memberships based on RSC, they propose a 
new list of regions and memberships (44-45).  
 In this study, I will define regions based on RPSF by focusing on geographical contiguity 
and security interdependence. Basically, a state should be geographically located within a region, 
in order to be considered as a member of that given region. Moreover, there should be intercon-
nectedness among the key national security interests of states to be considered as memberships of 
the same regions. I will also consider countries that might be interconnected to more than one 
region in terms of both geography and security and might be a member of more than one region 
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or regional system. These countries will be termed overlapped members. While neither Buzan and 
Wæver nor Lemke or COW allow for such overlapping, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) also 
consider overlapping memberships.  
 In their study, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) do not consider Oceania as a distinct 
region. On the contrary, they consider some of Oceanian countries such as Australia, New Zealand, 
and Papua New Guinea as Southeast Asian countries. In this study, I will consider Oceania as a 
distinct region by considering some Oceanian countries as overlapped members of other regions. 
Other than that, I will adopt Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012)’s designation of regions and 
memberships. As Table 1.1 presents, I will designate thirteen regions: North America, South 
America, Europe, Central Eurasia, West Africa, Central Africa, Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, 
Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania. 
       Table 1.1. Memberships in Regions, 2010 
Regions Membership 
North America 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, United States 
of America 
South America 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  Ec-
uador, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, 
Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
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Europe 
Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, It-
aly, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Ro-
mania, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
Portugal, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Ukraine, Yugoslavia 
Central Eurasia 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan, Uzbekistan 
West Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Central Africa 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Uganda 
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Horn of Africa Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia 
Southern Africa 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Middle East and North Africa 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, 
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara, 
Yemen 
South Asia 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Northeast Asia 
China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Ko-
rea, Taiwan 
Southeast Asia 
Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thai-
land, Vietnam 
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Oceania 
Australia, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Fiji, New 
Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
Nauru, Northern Marina Islands, Palau, American 
Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pit-
cairn Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Wallis and Futuna 
 
Source: Adapted from Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 45. 
Layout of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. In the introductory chapter of this study, I 
provided an in-depth review of power structure and its effects on cooperation and conflict, as well 
as the strategies of global and regional hegemons. I also introduced the theoretical framework of 
the study, HST, and defined the key concepts of the study: hegemony and region. The proceeding 
chapters unfold as follows. 
  In Chapter 2, I introduce a set of questions to consider and state propositions drawn from 
the theory, which includes ‘how can we characterize behaviors of regional hegemons and regional 
great powers?’, ‘to what extent is system-level HST applicable to regional-level analysis to under-
stand conflictive and cooperative, e.g., coalitional, behaviors of regional powers?’, and ‘what are 
factors that affect behaviors and dominance patterns of regional hegemons, and regional great 
powers?’. In this chapter, I also introduce and detail the methodology model used to answer the 
research questions of the study, which is a combination of the aggregate data analysis and the 
method of structured and focused case comparison proposed by George and Bennett (2005). I 
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suggest a typology of regional powers based on their alliance with the global hegemon (alliance 
factor) and their security interdependence in another region (overlapped membership). Based on 
my suggested typology, I introduce cases from different regional structures and regional power 
hierarchies: Brazil (in South America, an allied and non-overlapped case), South Africa (in South-
ern Africa, an un-allied and non-overlapped case); and India (in South Asia, an un-allied and over-
lapped case), Germany (in Europe, an allied and non-overlapped case), and Iran (in the Middle 
East and North Africa, an un-allied and overlapped case). I conclude the chapter with the opera-
tionalization of variables in the statistical analysis and dataset.  
In Chapter 3, I define and determine types of regional powers in regional hierarchies based 
on regional powers’ hard power capability- military, economic, and demographic. I also determine 
regional structures by categorizing regions as unipolar, bipolar and multipolar. In this chapter, I 
provide an overview of regional dynamics of each region for the post-Cold War era by providing 
figures for relative national power capabilities and regional shares of hard power sources. 
Chapter 4 presents an aggregate data analysis by restating the propositions of the study and 
describes the findings for each proposition. In this chapter, I present the results of the testing of 
each proposition by taking into account regional size. Chapter 5 presents a brief assessment of 
selected case studies. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section covers selected cases 
of regional hegemons: Brazil, South Africa, and India while the second section analyzes selected 
cases of regional great powers, Germany and Iran. Each section examines the position of the re-
gional hegemon/great power in a given regional hierarchy and its role in regional conflict and 
cooperation. At the end of each section, a brief comparison among cases is provided. 
In Chapter 6, I briefly summarize the study by reminding the theoretical framework, the 
main research question of the study, the design of the study and the methodology model. I also 
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discuss the important findings in an aggregate data analysis and cases. The last section of the study 
concludes with a discussion of the observed patterns in the motivations, strategies and behaviors 
of regional hegemons/great powers. Based on these findings, this study also raises issues for future 
study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
CHAPTER 2-RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study seeks to address and answer a specific set of questions: 
1. How can we characterize behaviors of regional hegemons and regional great powers? 
 a. Do they behave similarly to global powers on various dimensions and in comparable 
situations? 
 b. What is unique about motivations, strategies and behaviors of regional powers? 
 c. Do regional powers vary in these patterns in one region as compared to another region? 
2.  To what extent is system-level HST applicable to regional-level analysis to understand con-
flictive and cooperative, e.g., coalitional, behaviors of regional powers? 
3.  What are factors that affect behaviors and dominance patterns of regional hegemons and re-
gional great powers? 
 a. Is there any power above these regional actors, such as extra-regional or global powers 
or allies, which affect their behavior patterns in predictable ways? 
 b. Do regional hegemons and great powers with significant interests and involvements in 
more than one region (e.g., India or Iran) behave systematically differently than powers confined 
largely to one region (e.g., Brazil or Germany)? 
 c. Do variations of their regional conditions and material capabilities affect their behav-
ior? 
 d. Does regional system structure affect their behavior? (e.g., regional unipolarity, bipo-
larity, multipolarity) 
Based on these research questions and HST, I have devised a set of eight working propo-
sitions grouped into four sets. In each set, one proposition deals with regional organizations while 
another one deals with militarized interstate disputes as is mentioned above in more detail. 
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Propositions 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter under theoretical framework, this study will use HST, 
which enjoys an accepted place in IR literature. One subfield of the theory focuses primarily on 
international economy (Kindleberger 1973; Deudney and Ikenberry 1999) while the other subfield 
focuses on the implications of hegemonic governance in increasing stable cooperation in the inter-
national system (Keohane and Nye 1977; Gilpin 1983; 2001). Gilpin (1983) proposes hegemonic 
governance as a broader theoretical notion and focuses on security implication of hegemonic gov-
ernance. He argues that the existence of hegemon fosters stability and peace. As in his latter study, 
Gilpin (2001) focuses on hegemony and cooperation by highlighting centrality of hegemony in 
promoting international cooperation. Regional predominant powers can follow institutional for-
eign policy strategies at regional level as they can do so at different systemic levels and lead the 
creation and maintenance of regional organizations as we witness cooperative relationship patterns 
in Southern Africa by the leadership of South Africa and establishment of institutions such as 
South African Development Community (SADC). Following Gilpin’s argument and applying to 
regional level, I predict that the regional predominant power plays an important role in encouraging 
regional cooperation and will involve in the formation of the regional organizations.2 
 
                                                 
2 Some regional hegemons were also dominant powers during the Cold War within their 
respective region and some regional organizations were formed under those hegemonies and main-
tained since then. In this study, international organizations which were formed in pre-1990s under 
those regional hegemons will be also considered. 
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Proposition 1a: Regions with a regional hegemon will have a higher number of regional organi-
zations, proportional to regional size, formed subsequent to the hegemony than regions without a 
regional hegemon.3 
Proposition 1b: Regions with two or more equal or nearly equal regional great powers will have 
higher number of regional organizations, proportional to regional size, than in regions with no 
regional hegemon or regional great powers. 
 In addition to prediction of regional organizations, I also predict that existence of a domi-
nant power, which displays superiority in terms of the set of power capabilities, will decrease the 
risk of militarized interstate dispute within the region or sub-region.4 
Proposition 2a: Regions with a regional hegemon will have lower number of MIDs, proportional 
to regional size, than regions without a regional hegemon.5 
                                                 
3 In his statistical analysis, Lemke controls region size by controlling the number of states 
in a region and argues that creation and maintenance of regional institutionalized cooperation is 
less likely in big regions. As Olson (1965) argues and Lemke puts it “the more members of the 
collective, the stronger the incentive to free ride on collective-good-providing efforts of other 
group members. The harder it is to coordinate across larger groups, and thus the greater the cost 
of providing the collective good at all” (Lemke 2010, 42).  
 
4 The time span of this study is the post-cold war period, and the main independent variable 
of this study which is ‘power status’ does not change much during this whole period. On the other 
hand, PTT is a dynamic approach in relation to power in international relations. In this study, I 
will consider this aspect of the theory and rather than looking at power transitions, I will look for 
gaps among regional hegemon or great powers and the closest competitor in their region and 
whether it affects to conflictive behavior. 
 
5 When Lemke tests PTT hypotheses, he controls region size by controlling the number of 
states within a region and argues that “regions with more state members are likely to have more 
MID initiations, other things being equal, simply because with more states there are more oppor-
tunities for conflict” (Lemke 2010, 40). 
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Proposition 2b: Regions with two or more equal or nearly equal regional great powers will have 
lower number of MIDs, proportional to regional size, than regions with no regional hegemon or 
regional great powers. 
 Lemke (1996) developed a multiple-hierarchy model in which he analyzes regional power 
hierarchies. The multiple-hierarchy model is a regional adaptation of power transition theory. In-
stead of one international hierarchy of powers as described by power transition theory, Lemke 
(2002) defines the international system as “a series of parallel power hierarchies, each of [which] 
functions similarly to the others and to the overall international power hierarchy” (48). Sub-system 
hierarchies have a local dominant power at the top of the pyramid supervising local relations to 
preserve the local status quo. The regional subsystems are associated with stability and peace as 
long as the regionally dominant power maintains its power preponderance. As in PTT, however, 
war will follow when a local dissatisfied challenger reaches power parity with the regional domi-
nant power. According to Lemke, sub-system hierarchies are subordinated to the international sys-
tem hierarchy. The dominant global power as well as global great powers in the international hi-
erarchy that can reach at least two regions can interfere with relations within sub-hierarchies. The 
interference is expected especially when “the dominant power or another great power feels 
strongly about the issues at stake in a dispute within local hierarchy” (51). The multiple hierarchy 
model hypothesizes that if global great powers do not interfere, the regional hierarchies function 
as parallel similar international systems and behave as hypothesized by the model.  
 As stated earlier, Lemke’s independent variables are demographic share, military share and 
economic share. Lemke does not take into consideration the impact of global hegemon or extra-
regional powers on the cooperative and conflictive behaviors of regional hegemon or regional great 
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powers. The American alliance system, for example, is thought to play an important role in re-
gional order and is not only a mechanism to aggregate power to counter external threat but also 
and even more importantly a mechanism to manage relations between allies (Ikenberry 2004, 621). 
Basically, however, a regional hegemon can isolate its region and can choose not to ally with the 
global hegemon, as Egypt’s President Nasser demonstrated in the 1950s and 60s in regard to the 
United States. On the other hand, with the alliance system or other entangling relations, the global 
hegemon gains an institutionalized political presence in regions, as the United States has done for 
example with Pakistan and Philippines. Assuming that a form of “double hegemony” is possible, 
in which regions can be dominated by both local and distant dominant powers, and by taking into 
consideration the point made by Ikenberry (2004) I expect to see less MIDs but more regional 
cooperation in regions where external alliances exist. 
Proposition 3a: When regional hegemon or regional great powers are allied with global hegemon 
the number of regional organizations, proportional to regional size, increases as compared to re-
gions with non-aligned regional hegemon or regional great powers. 
Proposition 3b: When regional hegemon or regional great powers are allied with global hegemon, 
the number of MIDs, proportional to regional size, decreases as compared to regions with non-
aligned regional hegemon or regional great powers. 
 As noted, I wish as well to distinguish various types of regional powers and both their 
conflict behavior and impact on regional conflict and cooperation patterns; this entails distinction 
between regions with a hegemon or dual-hegemon (in overlapped regions), regions with regional 
great powers, regions with sub-regional and limited regional powers, and regional great powers 
involved in more than one region. For example, China is an overlapped member of both Northeast 
and Southeast Asia since China is geographically and strategically involved in both regions. Russia 
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similarly plays a powerful role in Central Eurasia, Europe, as well as Northeast Asia. Iran is in-
volved in multiple contiguous regions (Middle East and Central Eurasia) as is Turkey (Middle East 
and Europe). When a regional power’s security is interdependent in more than one region’s dy-
namics through geographic proximity or contiguity (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 46), con-
flict and cooperation, which take place in these regions will affect and be affected by the state that 
we consider as an overlapped state. When we consider security interdependence between over-
lapped state and most other states in overlapped region, we expect to see fewer intraregional con-
flicts and more intraregional organizations in overlapped regions because security, economy and 
political developments in these regions will be important as these countries are geographically 
located nearby. 
Proposition 4a: The number of regional organizations, proportional to regional size, are likely to 
be higher in overlapped regions in which multi-regional hegemon or great powers are geograph-
ically and strategically connected than in regions not linked by such hegemonic overlap. 
Proposition 4b: The number of MIDs, proportional to regional size, are likely to be lower in over-
lapped regions in which multi-regional hegemon or great powers are geographically and strategi-
cally connected than in regions not linked by such hegemonic overlap. 
Methodology Model 
 A central goal of this study is to gain a better overall understanding of regional power 
behavior and impact at a time of their growing importance by exploring and deconstructing the 
concept of regional powers, with distinctions about different types of regional powers (Table 2.1).  
In addition to overall aggregate data analysis of regional conflict and institutionalized (IGO) col-
laboration, in regions of varied polarity characteristics, supplementary comparative case studies 
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will be presented to describe the behavior (such as intervention, coalition, alliances) of multi-re-
gional vs. single regional great powers, and regional powers in the presence of or apart from global 
power regional presence and alliance. 
 To evaluate propositions listed above, I will employ comparative case study analysis and 
descriptive statistical profiles analyses of each region to augment the case studies. Time span of 
this study, unlike Lemke, is the post-Cold War period. Lemke has region-year as his unit of anal-
ysis by looking at the time period from 1960 to 2000. In a cross-sectional analysis for the post-
Cold war years, this study’s unit of analysis is region because the main independent variable, which 
is ‘power status’ does not show important variation year to year within region. With the case study 
method, I aim to provide answers to my research questions and explain whether regional powers 
that are categorized according to my suggested typology act according to the logic of HST and 
how regional structures affect behaviors of regional powers in cooperation and conflict. 
    Table 2.1. Suggested Typology of Regional Powers 
Alliance 
Overlapped Mem-
berships 
Non-overlapped Memberships 
Allied with a global 
hegemon (USA) 
Turkey, Japan Brazil, Australia 
Un-aligned with a  
global hegemon 
(USA) 
Post-revolutionary 
Iran, PRC, India, 
Russia 
South Africa, Indonesia, Egypt 
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Case Study Method and Case Selection 
 In this study, I will use comparative case study analysis by adopting the method of struc-
tured and focused case comparison by Alexander L. George (1979a; 1979b), Alexander L. George 
and Andrew Bennett (2005). In their book, George and Bennett (2005) focus on the importance of 
a case-study method for social research and how case studies are designed and carried out by 
researchers. They explain the role of case studies in developing casual explanations in particular 
events if examined in detail and in comparison by the researcher. George and Bennett (2005) de-
scribe the structured focused case comparison method as follows:  
The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward. The 
method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the re-
search objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and 
standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the 
findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain 
aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and focus apply 
equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases. (67) 
 Based on this definition, this study will follow two characteristics - structured and focused- 
of the comparison method. Before I discuss how these two characteristics of this method will look 
like in this study, it will be helpful to explain four criteria that are used in case selection process 
for this study. 
 In order to further test and refine my propositions, four criteria are used for selecting cases: 
variance in terms of interest and involvement in multiple or single regions; alliances with global 
hegemon or independent; regional power capabilities including regional great powers; and the re-
gional structure (sub-regions and polarity). First, I plan to choose cases by considering whether 
regional power is interested or significantly involved in multiple regions (e.g. Iran in both MENA 
and Central Eurasia) or primarily one region (Brazil in South America), recognizing that these 
designations can be fluid and in the process of change, as for example when India extends from 
Central Eurasia to conceivably more involvement in Southeast Asia. Secondly, I plan to select 
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cases that have variance in their relationship with the global hegemon and whether they are allied 
or un-aligned with the US. For example, Turkey is allied with the US while India is not. Moreover, 
I plan to choose my cases so that they display regional power capabilities in terms of hard power 
and full regional dominance. These capabilities depend upon economic, military, demographic 
capabilities or any combination of these factors. Regional powers can vary in size and capability, 
as from China to say Israel. Finally, I plan to choose my cases by taking into consideration different 
types of regional structures and whether the region is unipolar, bipolar, or multi-polar. Regional 
powers may behave differently in what might be termed unipolar or multipolar regions, i.e., when 
they have no real regional rival, or when regional rivals exist. 
 In this study, therefore, I chose cases based on what they will illustrate and what is excep-
tional about countries in their own regions. Moreover, four criteria mentioned above helped to 
ensure the inclusion of wide variation in independent variables and involvement of cases from 
different subclasses. As a result, I chose cases from regions based on variation on power structure 
and typology that I developed, which focuses on whether a case is allied with global hegemon or 
not and whether a case has an overlapped membership or not. Since the focus of the study is the 
post-Cold War period, I chose cases in regional power hierarchies that covers the period from 1990 
to 2013. 
 I now turn to an explanation of how structured and focused characteristics of the compari-
son method apply to my study. As George and Bennett (2005) define, structured comparison fo-
cuses on general questions that are asked to each case. Based on this definition, I will ask a set of 
standardized questions to each case, which are developed to reflect focus of the study. These ques-
tions include whether regional hegemon, regional great power(s) or regional power in a given 
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region increases or decreases the probability of regional organizations or regional militarized in-
terstate disputes within a given region; whether those regional powers in regional hierarchies are 
aligned with the United States and if this alliance affects the probability of regional organizations 
and regional militarized interstate disputes; and whether regional powers’ having overlapped mem-
bership has an effect on the probability of regional organizations and regional militarized interstate 
disputes. George and Bennett (2005) also highlight that the cases that are selected to be studied 
must be focused. Accordingly “they [cases] should be undertaken with a specific research objec-
tive in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective” (70). Based on this definition, 
cases selected for this analysis are focused since its research objective mainly deals with regional 
power hierarchies and their effect on conflict and cooperation within regions while its theoretical 
focus is HST, which is a well-established system-level theory and has a good explanatory power 
to understand power hierarchies and international outcomes. 
Table 2.2. Cases Selected for Analysis 
Allied with USA 
 
Unipolar Bipolar Multipolar 
Overlapped member-
ships 
X X X 
Non-overlapped 
memberships 
Brazil X Germany 
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Un-allied with USA 
Overlapped member-
ship 
India X Iran 
Non-overlapped 
memberships 
South Africa X X 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Operationalizing Variables in Statistical Analysis and Dataset 
The dependent variables: Dependent variables include the aggregate onset of MID within 
each region. I will employ COW dataset, which is a conflict-year data set on armed conflict in 
which data are available from 1902-2010. COW defines MID as “united  historical cases of conflict 
in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly 
directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of 
another state” (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996). While all interstate wars begin as MIDs, most 
MIDs never escalate to interstate wars. My other dependent variable is total amount of interstate 
regional cooperation for each region during the post-cold war period. I will employ COW Project’s 
International Governmental Organizations dataset (IGO), which has the broadest data on intergov-
ernmental organizations. The COW dataset defines an intergovernmental organization as  (1) a 
formal entity, which must consist of at least three or more sovereign states; (2) must hold regular 
plenary sessions at least once every ten years; (3) and possess permanent secretariat and other 
important institutionalizations such as corresponding headquarters (Pevehouse et al. 2004). The 
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COW dataset has different units of analysis, which are IGO, the IGO-state, and IGO dyad. For the 
purpose of this study, I will measure only interstate regional organizations that are formed in post-
1990 during the hegemony period under study. I will employ the dataset that has IGO as unit of 
analysis. This dataset includes all intergovernmental organizations in each-year. 
The Independent Variables: In this study, the primary independent variable is the relative 
capability (Capability Ratio) based on material dimensions of power in order to determine regional 
power hierarchies.6 The empirical source for material power of countries is National Material Ca-
pability Dataset, which is collected by COW. This dataset contains annual values for military, 
industrial and demographic indicators of national power resources. In this dataset, military capac-
ity is measured by military expenditure and military personnel while distribution of industrial 
power is measured based on iron and steel production and energy consumption. Lastly, demo-
graphic capacity of states is measured based on urban population and total population. The hard 
power capability share variable utilizes the composite power index (CINC score), which is a sta-
tistical measure and average of these six sub-variables, which represent the proportional share of 
state’s military, economic and demographic capabilities of a given state relative to other states in 
the international system. In this study, capability ratio is the ratio of State A’s CINC score from 
the COW dataset to the combined CINC capabilities of all countries within given region, which 
will look like State A/A+ State B+ State C+ all other countries’ CINC score within the region. 
                                                 
6Even though only hard power measures are used in power calculations of regional powers 
and determining their place in regional hierarchy, soft power rankings of countries by New Per-
suaders which is an international ranking of soft power, are also considered. Including soft power 
rankings to hard power capabilities does not change the place of top-ranked regional powers in 
regional hierarchies. It is also important to note that some countries which are not considered as 
regional great powers based on their material capabilities appear to be strong on soft power index 
(e.g., Israel and United Arab Emirates). 
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CINC data is currently only available up to 2007. In this study, I collected data for all these six 
sub indicators and calculated nations’ share of the regional total for the period from 2007-2013.7 
In addition to consider CINC score, I will also consider breakdown of military, economic and 
demographic share of each country in each year by calculating their ratios to other countries within 
the region based on COW data set. 
 Based on propositions regarding alliance with global hegemon, another independent vari-
able is whether or not regional hegemon or great powers are allied with global hegemon, Allies. 
This variable utilizes the Formal Alliance dataset by COW. There are three types of formal alli-
ances reported in the dataset including mutual defense pacts, neutrality agreements, and ententes. 
I will consider the presence of any of the three types of alliances as indication that the alliance 
between the global hegemon and the regional hegemon or regional great powers exists. In this 
respect, I will employ a dichotomous measure of alliance and will code the presence of any type 
of three alliances as 1, and 0 otherwise.  
Overlapped Membership: I will measure overlapped membership based on contiguity (ge-
ographical location) as well as security interdependence as the designation of regions and mem-
berships. Security dynamics of one state could be interrelated to other state(s) in another region. 
As a result, a regional hegemon or regional great power can qualify for more than one region. I 
will look at military deployments of regional hegemons or regional great powers in order to deter-
mine the regions of their overlapped membership. I will access original sources such as Military 
Balance Blog (IISS Defense and Military Analysis Programme) in order to gather data for this 
                                                 
7 Datasets which are used to calculate post-2007 period are available only up to 2013 thus 
this year sets the upper boundary for the period that I collected CINC data. After collecting the 
data, I calculated each state’s regional share of military, economic and demographic power. To get 
a regional CINC score of each country, I summed three component shares and divided by three. 
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independent variable. I will employ a dichotomous measure of overlapped membership and will 
code an overlapped regional hegemon or regional great power as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I mentioned research questions of the study in detail and focused on prop-
ositions drawn from a system-level theory to test the applicability of HST at regional level. I also 
discussed methodology and the quantitative model. Then I paid specific attention to the method-
ology of comparative case studies as described by George and Bennett (2005). In order to examine 
regional power behaviors within regional their settings, I picked cases from different regional 
structures and regional power hierarchies by considering my suggested typology. In this disserta-
tion, case studies of regional hegemony are Brazil (in South America, an allied and non-overlapped 
case), South Africa (in Southern Africa, an un-allied and non-overlapped case); and India (in South 
Asia, an un-allied and overlapped case). Case studies of regional great powers are Germany (in 
Europe, an allied and non-overlapped case), and Iran (in the Middle East and North Africa, an un-
allied and overlapped case). Since, next chapter determines regional powers in regional hierar-
chies; it will give a more general scope about case studies. 
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CHAPTER 3-REGIONAL POWERS AND REGIONAL STRUCTURES IN THE  
POST-COLD WAR ERA  
Determining Regional Powers 
 In assessing the regional distribution of power and power hierarchies in the post-Cold War 
era, there are few regional powers that most scholars agree on having overarching capabilities over 
other states within their respective regions: Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa (Nolte 
2010; Lemke 2010; Nabers 2010; Jesse et al. 2012).  Determining which countries fall into the 
category of regional dominant powers is not an easy task since there is no consensus on how to 
determine and categorize these powers. In doing so, while some studies focus on solely hard power 
measures (Lemke 2010), others use both hard power and soft power measures to determine re-
gional dominance. In order to categorize regional powers, I will use three central components of 
hard power-military, economic and demographic- and calculate their relative strength within their 
respective regions for the years from 1990 to 2013. Relative military, economic and demographic 
capacity are important to identify regional powers within their own region. In this study, based on 
COW dataset, when military share of regional powers are calculated, military spending (total mil-
itary budget) and military personnel numbers (size of state armies) are used. As a result, a country’s 
military capacity depends on its relative ability to spend on military services. On the other hand, 
today, economic power is a fundamental basis of power, including military might. A country’s 
economic growth, in addition to fostering regional economic influence can allow increases in its 
military spending which in turn will affect military capacity. In other words, country’s military 
capacity depends on its economic resources and wealth. Demographic sources of power, such ur-
ban and total population are also important components of material and military strength since 
they too affect the size of the army.  
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In addition to hard power capabilities, I will use three dimensions of power by Prys (2008): 
perception (political willingness and followership), projection (projection of own values and pref-
erences), and provision (provision of public goods) in order to determine hegemony in given re-
gions. In this study, as mentioned in Chapter 1, regional hegemon, regional great power (s), re-
gional power, and limited regional power will be used to define power hierarchies within subsys-
tems, see Table 3.1.  
      Table 3.1. Types of Regional Powers in Regional Hierarchies 
Type of Power Criteria Characteristics Examples 
Regional Hegemon 
Material 
preponderance, 
Stabilizing and leading 
role 
Acceptance of leader-
ship 
Dominant influence 
and control over the 
region 
China in Northeast 
Asia, India in South 
Asia, South Africa in 
Southern Africa, and 
Brazil in South Ame-
rica. 
Regional Great    
Powers/Secondary 
Powers 
Strong relative hard 
power capability 
Relevant influence 
over the region but 
does not have predom-
inant leadership role in 
the region 
Iran and Turkey in 
MENA, Germany, 
France and United 
Kingdom in Europe. 
43 
 
 
Regional Powers Hard Power Capability 
Weak for independent 
regional politics, pro-
jects power and exerts 
influence within the 
region, relevant part-
ners of regional great 
powers and hegemon 
Spain in Europe, Can-
ada and Mexico in 
North America, Israel 
in MENA. 
Limited Regional 
Powers 
Material 
preponderance in one 
or more types of hard 
power 
or 
dominates a sub-re-
gional area 
Dominant influence 
and control over a sub-
regional area 
or 
states with considera-
ble muscle in one or 
more areas of hard 
power, such as great 
petroleum reserves. 
Saudi Arabia in 
MENA, Venezuela in 
South America. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Regional Structures 
 Regional power hierarchies reflect the polarity (structure) of any given regional area. Po-
larity in international relations refers to the distribution of power among the great powers at a given 
point in time (Waltz 1979, 97). In this study, the notion of and expectations about polarity taken 
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from the global level will be translated to the regional level. The period from 1750s until 1945 has 
been designated as multipolar in structure, which is defined as the presence of at least three actors 
with nearly equal military, economic, and cultural power to dominate the international system 
(Vasquez and Heneham, 1999). Though the phenomenon is subject to scholarly debate (Singer and 
Deutsch, 1964; Waltz 1979) history has shown that periods of multipolar distribution of power 
have larger and more severe wars (Vasquez and Henehan 1999, 179). Multipolar structure is an 
unstable system since in the first half of the 20th century the system resulted in two world wars. 
After the World War II until 1989 (the Cold War period), the international system was structured 
and functioned as bipolar, though some measures, such as economic power (GDP), it was basically 
unipolar with American dominance. In a bipolar system structure, two opposite great powers have 
the majority of economic, military and cultural influence to dominate the international system. 
During the Cold War period, the United States and the USSR, which had nearly equal amounts of 
military power in spheres of political and military influence essentially controlled the international 
system. According to Waltz (1964), a bipolar world system limits the violence in the relation of 
states and reduces the international violence (882). However, institutional cooperation is not as 
likely as in unipolar systems (Wohlforth 1999, 38). 
 With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR, the US emerged, at least initially, 
as the only global hegemon, and a new historical period in the international relations system may 
have begun. The unipolar system, which Organski identifies as the most stable, is defined as the 
presence of one superpower. Wohlforth (1999) argues that the resultant unipolar system would be 
prone to peace because the power of the US overweighs power of other great powers within inter-
national system which in turn minimizes security competition among other great powers (7). How-
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ever, other powers, including Russia and China appear to be stirring and asserting their preroga-
tives at least in regions near their borders (Eastern Europe, Middle East, South and East China 
Seas, etc.). 
 I present a list of global great powers in three periods with different structures of the inter-
national system and consequences thought by scholars to come from it in Table 3.2. 
    Table 3.2. International Structure 
Polarity Pole(s) Periods Outcome 
Multipolar 
Prussia, Ottoman Em-
pire, England, Spain, 
France, Germany, Ja-
pan, Russia 
1816-1945 
Unstable and         
Conflictual 
Bipolar USSR and USA 1946-1989 Stable and Conflictual 
Unipolar USA 1990-2016 
Stable and Prone to 
War, Asymmetric 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
An Overview of Regional Dynamics in Post-Cold War Era 
Since the focus of the study is regional powers, looking at each region to determine which 
country/countries can be classified as regional hegemon, regional great power, regional power and 
limited regional power based on three sources of power mentioned above can be a good starting 
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point.8 But before doing so, two points needed to be made clear: first, since this study deals with 
regional powers, in each regional graph, I will include countries those have relative power capa-
bilities equal to or bigger than .10 by 2013 in order to show power gap among them. However, 
there might be some exceptions. Relative power of some countries might be under .10 but still may 
appear on the graphs if these countries play important role in regional dynamics, i.e. Canada in 
North America, and Israel in MENA. Second, while this study allows for overlapped memberships 
in which one regional power can be a member of more than one region, this section does not 
consider overlapped memberships while determining relative national material capabilities. In this 
section, one country is considered a member of only one region, and graphs will not include over-
lapped memberships.  
North America: Based on our categorization of regional powers and hard power measures, 
the United States is clearly the regional hegemon of North America. Figure 3.1 shows that the 
United States regional share of hard power is steady and high until 2007. With the Great Recession 
in 2007, U.S regional relative share declined but still there is a considerable power gap between 
the U.S and other countries in the period from 2007-2013. U.S has massive regional share of mil-
itary, economic and demographic power as shown in 3.2.9 In 2013, U.S had 82 percent military 
capability, 78 percent economic capability and 59 percent of demographic capability of the region. 
There is a huge power gap between the United States and the rest of the states within the region. 
                                                 
8 While focusing on regional dynamics in different regions, I will focus on regions which 
have unipolar, bipolar or multipolar regional structures. Since focus of the study is regional pow-
ers, I will not focus on regions which are classified as nonpolar. Nonpolar region is defined by 
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) as “there is no state within the region that demonstrates a 
higher level of capacity across a number of indicators” (56). 
 
9 In order to identify Post-Cold War regional powers, I picked three different years to see 
how their power differ using this period. 2013 is the upper threshold since the data is available 
until 2013.  
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Canada’s relative power was .07 in 2013, I still include Canada in relative capability charts of 
North America because Canada plays an important role in regional dynamics. In this region, Can-
ada and Mexico can be regarded as regional powers. Especially, Mexico is a rising regional power 
compared to Canada based on three dimensions of power from 1997 to 2013. In terms of power 
structure, North America can be regarded as a unipolar region with the material preponderance 
and domination of the United States.  
Figure 3.1. Relative National Power Capabilities in North America 
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Figure 3.2. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in North America 
 
South America: Brazil’s regional hegemony based on its relative material capability com-
pared to its most powerful neighbors such as Columbia, Argentina and Venezuela is very clear in 
Figure 3.3. While there was a slight decline in Brazil’s share of military power and a slight increase 
in Columbia’s share of military power from 1997 to 2013, Brazil is still region’s dominant military 
power. In terms of economic capability, Brazil has an economic growth while other regional pow-
ers remain the same or decrease as represented in Figure 3.4. As North America, South America 
can also be regarded as unipolar with the material preponderance of Brazil, which is called as 
regional hegemon in this study. As mentioned in previous paragraph, countries those qualify .10 
and up in their relative capability are included in graphs. Venezuela is another exception to this 
rule because based on limited regional power definition, Venezuela qualifies with its dominance 
of oil reserves as limited regional power. Today, Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil 
reserves. 
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Figure 3.3. Relative National Power Capabilities in South America 
 
Figure 3.4. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in South America 
 
Europe: Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy can be defined as regional great pow-
ers by having roughly equal shares of material capability. Europe does not have a regional 
hegemon since none of these regional powers have the ability to dominate or influence the region 
alone.  Figure 3.5 shows relative power position of the four states within their region. In 2013, all 
four states had relatively the same standings in their region. Germany had .15 percent of relative 
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power capability. The closest power to Germany in Europe is France by having .13 percent of 
relative power capability. Both United Kingdom and Italy had .11 percent of relative power capa-
bility of the region in 2013. As Figure 3.6 depicts, by 2013, France has the strongest share of 
military power in the region with a slight decrease from 1997 to 2013. Germany, on the other hand 
is the strongest regional power in economic and demographic dimensions. Germany’s economic 
growth and decline is irregular during the period of 1997-2003. The type of regional polarity of 
Europe during the Post-Cold War era can be defined as multipolar.10   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Contemporary Russia, like the Soviet Union, is both geographically, politically, and eco-
nomically involved in Europe. Although territorially Russia is more Asian than European, Russia 
has a unique position as a transcontinental country which significantly influences Russian foreign 
policy. As Ali (2012) puts it “geography, history, politics and economics render Russia both Asian 
and European; neither continent can escape this mega-state’s existential influence” (100). Russia 
strategically focuses on its immediate neighborhood to restore its influence over time and to do so 
specifically meddles in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe. Recently, Russia tried to achieve 
some degree of control by invading eastern Ukraine by claiming that Russian government has the 
responsibility to defend the rights of Russian minorities abroad. Russia also asserts influence eco-
nomically by relying on energy politics since Central and Eastern European countries such as Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, and Ukraine heavily depend on Russian natural gas (Grygiel 2009). Russia has a 
significant regional influence, specifically in Eastern Europe; however, the role that Russia has 
chosen was more of a competitive one which led to greater tension as in examples of Ukraine and 
Crimea. 
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Figure 3.5. Relative National Power Capabilities in Europe 
 
Figure 3.6. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Europe 
 
Central Eurasia: In this study, Russia is considered as a Central Eurasian country, and 
based on that configuration, Russia occupies an unchallenged position of power in the region by 
having .80 percent of relative power capability. In Figure 3.7, I include Kazakhstan, which has 
only .05 percent relative power capability of the region to show the power disparity between Russia 
and the state that is closest to it in relative capability standing. Today, Russia dominates Central 
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Eurasia by having 83 percent share of military power, 86 percent share of economic power, and 
69 percent share of demographic power as shown in Figure 3.8. This region has high structural 
inequality, which creates an atmosphere for Russia to exercise its regional hegemony in Central 
Eurasia. This subsystem can be defined as unipolar in post-Cold War era.  
Figure 3.7. Relative National Power Capabilities in Central Eurasia 
 
Figure 3.8. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Central Eurasia 
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West Africa: As Figure 3.9 shows, Nigeria’s national power growth since the end of the 
Cold War and the power discrepancy between Nigeria vis-a-vis other countries in the region show 
that Nigeria has an unchallenged regional standing. As in the case with Central Eurasia, I include 
Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon (both have .07 percent of relative power capability in 2013) in relative 
power capability graph of West Africa to show power gap in the region. Nigeria is the strongest 
country with the highest share of military, economic and demographic power in West Africa. 
While Nigeria’s military share of power had a sharp decrease from 1997 to 2007, it experienced a 
slight increase from 2007 to 2013. On the other hand, with a slow increase, economic growth of 
Nigeria reached a peak of 80 percent relative to its region as shown in 3.10. Even though Nigeria 
confronts internal and external challenges, still it has the ability to exercise considerable influence 
over its neighbors and provide public goods, such as maintenance of peace and order in the region. 
West Africa can be regarded as a unipolar region with regional hegemony of Nigeria. 
 Figure 3.9. Relative National Power Capabilities in West Africa 
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Figure 3.10. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in West Africa 
 
Southern Africa: As Figure 3.11 depicts, South Africa has been experiencing unstable 
growth and decline in its relative share of regional power since the end of the Cold War. In the 
early 1990s, there was a large power gap between the strongest and the rest of the states while this 
gap steadily narrowed in the period from 1990 to 2007, but since 2007, while South Africa has 
been experiencing a steady relative power growth, Democratic Republic of Congo, which is the 
closest power to South Africa has been experiencing a steady relative power decline. Data in Fig-
ure 3.12 reveal growth and decline in different hard power resources of the two countries. Today, 
South Africa’s economic dominance over its neighbors is evident by having 77 percent of relative 
economic power. However, there is a slow and then a sharp decline in its relative military capabil-
ity in the period of 1997-2013. By 2013, South Africa has only 23 percent of relative military 
power while Democratic Republic of Congo has 15 percent of relative military power. In terms of 
demographic capability, South Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo have somewhat similar 
demographic share. At this point, it is important to note that as mentioned earlier, relative power 
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calculations are based on hard power measures, which include only raw statistics. However, con-
sidering raw statistics alone and determining regional power hierarchies based on only hard power 
measures may lead to flaws. Southern Africa needs to be examined carefully because even though 
Democratic Republic of Congo is the closest power to South Africa’s relative power capability 
statistically, internal challenges such as civil war that DRC faces prevents DRC to be a rival of 
South Africa. Regional power structure of South African region can be defined as unipolar with 
the dominance of South Africa. 
Figure 3.11. Relative National Power Capabilities in Southern Africa 
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Figure 3.12. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Southern Africa 
 
Middle East and North Africa: As Europe, the MENA region can also be regarded as a 
multipolar region as depicted in 3.13. Based on their relative power position within the subsystem, 
four MENA powers can be regarded as regional powers each by having relative power capability 
bigger than 10 percent: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As in some other regions mentioned 
above, Israel is also an exception to be included in regional graphs. Even though Israel’s relative 
capability is not equal to or bigger than 10 percent in any four periods used in the graphs, and its 
relative power is only 04 percent in 2013, Israel is still included in graphs since it is a very im-
portant power in regional politics. MENA region is a multipolar region; however, in contrast to 
Europe, MENA region has an unbalanced distribution of material power sources. Even though 
Saudi Arabia has a slight increase then a sharp decrease in its military share in the period of 1997-
2013, still has the largest share of military power. Saudi Arabia has 22 percent of relative military 
power while Turkey, Iran and Egypt each have roughly 12 percent of relative military power of 
the region. In terms of economic capability, Turkey has an increasing economic growth and has 
32 percent of relative economic power in the region and does not have a significant gap relative to 
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other regional powers in the region. Demographic share of regional powers in MENA region shows 
that all regional powers except Saudi Arabia have similar relative demographic share roughly 18 
percent while Saudi Arabia has only 08 percent if relative demographic share as shown in Figure 
3.14. 
Figure 3.13. Relative National Power Capabilities in MENA 
 
Figure 3.14. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in MENA 
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South Asia: When one compares relative share of countries within the region, one sees that 
there is a significant power gap between India vis-a-vis other countries in the region. Figure 3.15 
includes only two countries since only India by having 79 percent of relative power capability and 
Pakistan by having 11 percent of relative power capability qualify to appear on regional distribu-
tion of power chart. As Figure 3.16 shows, India is the dominant power in South Asia in all three 
sources of power and has 70 percent and above of relative share in all three dimensions in com-
parison to Pakistan, which can be considered as a regional power. India as both regional and global 
power receives increasing attention in academic circle. India’s leadership within the region, its 
active role in regional organizations and relationship with its neighbors qualifies India as a regional 
hegemon. Pakistan as a regional power is also important in South Asian regional dynamics since 
its relationship with its long standing rival India shapes the future of region’s security.  
Figure 3.15. Relative National Power Capabilities in South Asia 
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Figure 3.16. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in South Asia 
 
Northeast Asia: Northeast Asia is an important region for this study since it has experi-
enced both bipolar and unipolar regional structures during the post-Cold War period. China and 
Japan have important roles in region’s dynamics since the end of the Cold War. Relative power 
gap between China and Japan was small in the early post-Cold War years, and regional power 
structure of this period can be regarded as bipolar since China and Japan were two regional great 
powers vis-a-vis other states in the region until 2001. Figure 3.17 depicts relative capability of 
China and Japan since 1990 and China’s rise to regional hegemony in the post-Cold War period. 
Especially since 2001, power gap between China and Japan has been increasing steadily.11 As 
Figure 3.18 shows, today, China is incomparably stronger than it was in the late 20th century, and 
it is the regional hegemon of Northeast Asia by having 61 percent of military share, 79 percent of 
                                                 
11 A regional structure turns from bipolar to unipolar when to conditions are met within the 
given region: three power dimensions (military economic, and demographic) of the primary re-
gional power is higher than the secondary regional power; and the primary power’s CINC is at 
least two times of the secondary power. 
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economic share, and 84 percent of demographic share. Current Northeast Asian power structure 
can be regarded as unipolar.12 
Figure 3.17. Relative National Power Capabilities in Northeast Asia 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 As a Central Eurasian country, Russia is not only engaged in Europe but also Northeast 
Asia’s security environment is an important focus for Russian foreign policy. Geographic location, 
security and economy are factors that make Russia an overlapped member of Europe and Northeast 
Asia. While Russia’s engagement in Europe’s security dynamics has a historical background, Rus-
sia’s focus on Northeast Asia has been inconsistent and only recently, after a decline in its security 
influence in the region, Russia’s interest as well as strategic re-engagement in the region began to 
increase significantly. The re-engagement attempt is explained by Cosh (2014) as “Moscow seems 
to have assessed that the region’s [Northeast Asia] rich natural resources offer viable opportunities 
for sustained economic development, particularly in the context that the continuing rise of China 
and its steadily-increasing military capabilities warrant a greater focus by Russia on the Far East” 
(4). In order to improve its standing and regional influence, Russia has been paying attention to 
security cooperation with key regional actors. Especially China is significantly important for Rus-
sia in terms of security since Russia shares a land border with China, and a peaceful relationship 
between Russia and China ensures border security (Buszynski 2002). Economic engagement with 
the region such as increasing regional trade is also important for Russia in order to assert its influ-
ence over the region. Russia has attempted to develop its relationship with other Northeast Asian 
countries including Japan and the Koreas. 
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Figure 3.18. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Northeast Asia 
 
Southeast Asia: As figure 3.19 indicates Indonesia has 33 percent of relative power. Vi-
etnam follows Indonesia by having 20 percent of relative power, and Philippines is the third coun-
try that appears on the chart since it has 10 percent of relative power capability in the region. Figure 
3.20 depicts that the power trajectory of the region shows that Indonesia has had remarkably steady 
economic growth since the late 1990s. Even though there are ups and downs in military and de-
mographic power of Indonesia, still Indonesia holds the greatest share of hard power capabilities 
in the region since the end of the Cold War. Vietnam, which has the closest share of military and 
economic power in the region, is a rising power in comparison to its share of power in 2007. Based 
on definition of power hierarchy, Indonesia can be regarded as a regional great power while Vi-
etnam resembles almost a regional power.13 
                                                 
13 Two regional hegemons compete for economic and strategic benefits in the Southeast 
Asia and are considered as overlapped members of the region: China and India.  
For China, Southeast Asia is important for its security environment since China has both 
land and sea connections with the region. With the end of the Cold War, Chinese-Southeast Asian 
ties developed and improved greatly especially through bilateral and multilateral institutionalized 
regional mechanisms, namely Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With the end of 
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Figure 3.19. Relative National Power Capabilities in Southeast Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the Cold War, China started to engage in security dialogues, and was invited to join ASEAN Re-
gional Forum (ARF) which was formed in 1994 to deal with Southeast Asian security issues. China 
became a consultative partner of the ARF. The increase in dialogue and cooperation made China 
an important power for ASEAN’s economic and political development and weakened Western 
influence on region’s affairs (To 2001). Through series of policy initiatives, active participation in 
regional dialogues, improved economic and trade relations, China has been trying to refurbish its 
image among ASEAN countries and to convince them of its peaceful and benign intentions in its 
political, economic, and security relations with the region,  
A peaceful regional order in Southeast Asia is also important for India since India also has 
both land and sea borders with Southeast Asia and also engaged in Southeast Asia with its Look 
East Policy which focused on economic engagement with ASEAN countries in the 1990s. With 
the changing distribution of power after the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
which was India’s main trading partner, India re-engaged with the region to strengthen its eco-
nomic ties with Southeast Asian countries. In terms of defense and security, India is involved in 
regional dialogue mechanisms and attempts to exercise its political influence through these mech-
anisms (Blank, Moroney, Rabasa and Lin 2015). As China, India also works to maintain regional 
order and stability. 
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Figure 3.20. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Southeast Asia 
 
Oceania: As in North America and Central Eurasia, the power discrepancy in Oceania also 
makes the region unipolar. Figure 3.21 which shows the power gap between Australia and New 
Zealand clearly depicts the regional hegemony of Australia. Australia does not have any substan-
tial threat to its power status in the region since the closest power to Australia is New Zealand. 
Figure 3.22 shows represents that Australia has 86 percent of military share, 84 percent of eco-
nomic share and 71 percent of demographic share in 2013 while New Zealand’s share of power in 
all three dimensions are below 15 percent in 2013. 
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Figure 3.21. Relative National Power Capabilities in Oceania 
 
 
Figure 3.22. Regional Shares of Hard Power Sources in Oceania 
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Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I determined regional power hierarchies in each region based on three hard 
power resources- military, economic, and demographic. In addition to material capabilities, idea-
tional power resources (willingness, leadership as well as provision of public goods) help to dis-
tinguish between regional hegemons and materially preponderant powers. Based on this study’s 
conceptualization of regional hegemonic power, all eight unipolar regions (North America, South 
America, Central Eurasia, West Africa, Southern Africa, South Asia, Northeast Asia and Oceania) 
have a regional hegemon, which has the ability and will to dominate its region. Three regions 
(Europe, MENA, and Southeast Asia), which have more than two regional great powers are cate-
gorized as multipolar regions. Two regions (Central Africa and Horn of Africa), which have no 
regional hegemon or great powers are categorized as nonpolar regions. In addition to these group-
ings, there is only one region designated as bipolar from 1990 to 2004: Northeast Asia. After 2004, 
Northeast Asia became unipolar with the dominance of China. It is also important to note that since 
the aim of this section is to determine regional power hierarchies, this section considered each 
regional power as a member of only one region based on the designation of regions and member-
ships by Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012). The case study section will consider overlapped 
memberships and alliances and how they affect behaviors of regional power in cooperation and 
conflict in regional settings. 
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CHAPTER 4-RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 This study is a region-level analysis and focuses on how regional hegemons or regional 
great powers affect conflict and cooperation in their regional settings. As it is represented in Chap-
ter 3 in detail, thirteen regions are analyzed based on this study’s conceptualization of region. Eight 
of these regions are unipolar regions; based on conceptualization of regional hegemons, all unipo-
lar regions have a regional hegemon: North America, South America, Central Eurasia, West Af-
rica, Southern Africa, South Asia, Northeast Asia and Oceania while three regions are classified 
as multipolar with at least three regional great powers: Europe, Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), and Southeast Asia. In addition to these regions, there are two nonpolar regions in which 
“there is not a clear enough concentration of power to classify any state as a regional pole (Stewart-
Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 59): Central Africa and Horn of Africa, which will only be mentioned 
in this chapter since the focus of this study is the effect of regional hegemonic and great powers. 
However, I will refer to these regional groupings while I am presenting the findings and evaluating 
propositions. 
This study takes into account the effect of regional size (number of countries) on number 
of intraregional organizations and militarized interstates disputes since regions with a proportion-
ally larger number of countries (i.e. Europe with forty three countries and MENA with twenty one 
countries) may have more IGOs and/or MIDs than others regardless of the effect of hegemonic 
structure. Thus, two results are presented for each proposition for each region: total number of 
IGOs and MIDs, and IGOs per country and MIDs per country. 
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, propositions are mainly built on HST which deals with 
the relationship between distribution of power and international outcomes (cooperation and con-
flict). This study is an attempt to show whether system-level HST is applicable to regional-level 
67 
 
 
analysis in understanding and accounting for cooperative and conflictive behaviors in the aggre-
gate and also specifically of regional powers themselves. The first set of region-level propositions 
(1a and1b) and the second set of propositions (2a and 2b) are similar to what HST proposes for the 
relationship between the existence of global hegemons and prevalence of international cooperation 
and conflict. Proposition 1a states that regions with a regional hegemon are more likely to have 
higher number of regional organizations than regions without a regional hegemon taking into ac-
count regional size. This proposition compares unipolar hegemonic regions to all other type of 
regions (multipolar regions and nonpolar regions). Related to this proposition, proposition 1b pro-
poses that regions with two or more regional great powers are more likely to have more regional 
organizations than regions with no regional great powers or regional hegemons.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, I employed the COW Project’s International Governmental 
Organizations dataset for the period from 1990 to 2005. As Lemke (2010) also did, I constructed 
a region-year dataset for regional intergovernmental organizations based on regions and their 
memberships that I have assigned in Chapter 1. All global international organizations are elimi-
nated and only intraregional organizations are considered.   
Figure 4.1 represents total number of IGOs while Figure 4.2 shows the result of proposi-
tions based on the data gathered from the COW dataset on IGOs by controlling for regional size. 
Figure 4.2 shows that, as proposed, the eight unipolar regions with a regional hegemon (North 
America, South America, Central Eurasia, West Africa, South Africa, South Asia, Northeast Asia 
and Oceania) have more intraregional organizations than the three multipolar regions (Europe, 
MENA and Southeast Asia) and nonpolar regions since the end of the Cold War. Indeed the non-
polar regions (Central Africa and Horn of Africa) did not have any intraregional organizations 
during post-Cold War period. It can, therefore, be concluded that region-level propositions of 1a 
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and 1b are supported by the results. It is important to note that there is not much difference between 
unipolar and multipolar regions in terms of the number of IGOs. One of the factors that affected 
the result and led to a high number of intraregional organizations in multipolar regions could be 
Europe. Europe is a unique and advanced model for regional integration and cooperation, and is a 
multipolar region with forty-three countries, which has developed twenty-three regional organiza-
tions in total during the Post-Cold War Era. Europe’s uniqueness will be explained in detail in the 
case study section. Still it is noteworthy that despite the density of IGOs in multipolar Europe, 
unipolar hegemonic regions still have higher total and proportional number of IGOs. 
Figure 4.1. Total Intraregional Organizations by Region Structure 
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Figure 4.2. Intraregional Organizations per Country by Region Structure 
 
The second set of region-level propositions deals with the distribution of power and prev-
alence of intraregional conflicts. Proposition 2a states that regions with a regional hegemon will 
have fewer intraregional MIDs than regions without a regional hegemon and compares regions 
with a regional hegemon to all others. Proposition 2b proposes that regions with two or more re-
gional great powers will have fewer intraregional conflicts than regions without a regional 
hegemon or regional great power. To test these propositions, I employed the COW dataset for the 
period from 1990 to 2010 and constructed a region-year dataset for this dependent variable since 
the MID dataset is also not in the form of aggregate regional data.  
 Figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicate the relationship between regional distribution of power and 
intraregional MIDs. For this analysis, I identify eight unipolar regions with a regional hegemon. 
Based on Figure 4.4, there is essentially no difference between unipolar and multipolar regions’ 
proportional number of intraregional MIDs; if anything, contrary to the hypothesis, multipolar 
regions are slightly less conflictual than unipolar ones. It is true, though that regions with greater 
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power concentration tend to be less conflictual, at least as measured by militarized disputes. As 
proposed in Proposition 2b, I expected to see fewer intraregional MIDs in multipolar regions (Eu-
rope, MENA and Southeast Asia) than in nonpolar regions (Central Africa and Horn of Africa). 
As expected, nonpolar regions have the proportionally highest number of MIDs during the post-
Cold War Period, controlling regional size. Hence the proposition positing a marked stabilizing 
effect of hegemony on regional conflict appear to be borne out at least when controlling for re-
gional size. 
Propositions, which test the applicability of HST to region-level show how the relationship 
between the distribution of power and the existence of preponderant power within the region af-
fects the amount of regional cooperation and conflict during the Post-Cold War period. Region 
level adaptation of HST propositions about cooperation are supported by the results.  
Figure 4.3. Total Intraregional MIDs by Region Structure 
 
 
 
 
0
44
88
132
176
220
Unipolar Multipolar Nonpolar
Total MIDs Post-Cold War
Total MIDs Post-Cold…
71 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Total Intraregional MIDs per Country by Region Structure 
 
The third set of region-level propositions are related to the research question, “Is there any 
power above these regional actors, such as extra-regional or global powers or allies that affects 
their behavior patterns in predictable ways?” Here, I consider the impact of global hegemons on 
cooperative and conflictive behaviors of regional hegemons or regional great powers. For the pur-
pose of this question, I classify regions with regional hegemons as ‘allied with USA’ or not. Clas-
sifying regions with more than one regional great power as ‘allied with USA or not’ can be prob-
lematic because these regions have more than one regional great power and while one of them 
might be allied with the US others may not (i.e. Turkey is allied with the US while present day 
Iran is not). In order to overcome this problem, I will consider a multipolar region ‘allied with the 
US’ if any great power in a region is allied. 
Proposition 3a predicts that regions where external alliances with hegemons exist (South 
America, Europe, MENA, Southeast Asia and Oceania) have more intraregional organizations as 
compared to regions with non-aligned regional hegemon (Central Eurasia, West Africa, Southern 
Africa, South Asia, and Northeast Asia) or regional great powers (none). Proposition 3b states that 
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regions with an aligned regional hegemon or regional great power have less intraregional conflicts 
than regions where such alliances do not exist. The Formal Alliance dataset by COW was em-
ployed to test these propositions. 
 Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show divergent results for the relationship between alliance with the 
US and number of intraregional organizations. Figure 4.5 does not consider regional size and sup-
ports proposition 3a while Figure 4.6 controls for regional size and as opposed to what is proposed, 
regions, which are un-allied with the US have a proportionally higher number of regional organi-
zations than others. As opposed to what is proposed in 3a, regions un-allied with the US (Central 
Eurasia, Southern Africa, South Asia, and Northeast Asia) had more intraregional organizations 
than regions with regional hegemons or regional great powers allied with the US (South America, 
Oceania with a regional hegemon allied with USA; and Europe, MENA and Southeast Asia with 
at least one regional great power allied with USA). Based on the result we can conclude that, 
alliance ties with the US do not have a positive effect on the number of intraregional organizations 
in unipolar hegemonic regions and multipolar regions.  
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Figure 4.5. Total Intraregional Organizations by Alliance 
 
Figure 4.6. Intraregional Organizations per Country by Alliance 
 
 Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show results for the relationship between alliance with a global 
hegemon and mean number of intraregional MIDs. Here, there are also differences between two 
figures since for Figure 4.7, which essentially shows no difference in conflict levels, does not 
consider regional size while Figure 4.8 does. Since results are interpreted based on controlling 
regional size, as expected, regions with a regional hegemon allied with the US and regions with at 
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least one regional great power allied with USA had proportionally fewer intraregional MIDs than 
regions with regional hegemon and regional great powers un-allied with the US, which supports 
proposition 3b, see Figure 4.8. 
Figure 4.7. Total Intraregional MIDs by Alliance 
 
Figure 4.8. Intraregional MIDs per Country by Alliance 
 
 
0
26
51
77
102
128
153
179
204
Allied Un-Allied
Total MIDs Post-Cold War
Total MIDs Post-Cold War
0.
0.75
1.5
2.25
3.
Allied Un-Allied
MIDs Per Country Post-Cold War
MIDs Per Country Post-Cold War
75 
 
 
To sort out specific effects of US alliance on regional polarity, in contrast to what has been 
done for the third set of propositions related to alliance and the existence of intraregional cooper-
ation, here I distinguish between region type (allied and un-allied) based on regional polarity. Fig-
ures 4.9 and 4.10 present results for regional alliances by polarity and show how these regional 
factors interact to shape interregional cooperation and conflict among countries. Figure 4.9 shows 
that allied unipolar hegemonic regions have lower number of IGOs than un-allied unipolar hege-
monic regions and allied multipolar regions. There is also no essential difference between un-allied 
unipolar hegemonic regions’ and allied multipolar regions’ proportional number of intraregional 
IGOs while allied multipolar regions are slightly more cooperative than un-allied unipolar regions. 
As a result, US alliance does not really increase cooperative interactions among countries in a 
given region rather region polarity plays more important role in cooperative behaviors of regional 
powers. 
Figure 4.9. Intraregional Organizations per Country by Polarity and Alliance 
 
Figure 4.10 presents results for the relationship between regional alliances by polarity and 
intraregional MIDs. Based on the results, allied unipolar hegemonic regions have proportionally 
lower number of intraregional MIDs than allied multipolar regions and un-allied unipolar regions. 
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Here, it is important to distinguish between allied unipolar hegemonic regions from un-allied uni-
polar hegemonic regions. Even though the region structure is unipolar, alliance ties affect the num-
ber of intraregional conflicts within a given region. As a result, while alliance with the US makes 
a difference in overall patterns of conflict, it does not really make a difference in cooperative be-
haviors of regional powers. 
Figure 4.10. Intraregional MIDs per Country by Polarity and Alliance 
 
The fourth set propositions are drawn from the question, “Do regional hegemons and great 
powers with significant interests and involvements in more than one region (i.e. India, China or 
Russia) have different regional impacts on intraregional outcomes (cooperation and conflict) than 
powers confined to a region (e.g., Brazil and South Africa)?” For this research question, I look at 
whether amount of cooperation or conflict is high or low in overlapped regions, i.e., where regional 
hegemons or regional great powers have overlapped memberships. Proposition 4a states that re-
gions in which regional hegemons or regional great powers have overlapped memberships (South 
America, Europe, Central Eurasia, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia) have more intraregional 
organizations than in regions not linked by such overlap. Proposition 4b states that the number of 
MIDs is expected to be lower in overlapped regions than in regions not linked by such overlap.  
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 Figure 4.11 and 4.12 present the relationship between overlapped regions and the number 
of intraregional organizations. As expected, overlapped regions had proportionally more intrare-
gional organizations than non-overlapped regions during the post-Cold War period, and results 
based on the dataset support proposition 4a, see Figure 4.10. 
Figure 4.11. Total Intraregional Organizations by Overlapped Membership 
 
Figure 4.12. Intraregional Organizations per Country by Overlapped Membership 
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Figure 4.13 and 4.14 show the relationship between overlapped regions and intraregional 
MIDs. As expected, overlapped regions (South America, Europe, Central Eurasia, Northeast Asia, 
and Southeast Asia) had fewer intraregional MIDs than non-overlapped regions (all others), which 
supports proposition 4b. Based on these results, it can be concluded that overlapped memberships 
of regional hegemon and/or regional great powers reduce conflictive behaviors within overlapped 
regions. 
Figure 4.13. Total Intraregional MIDs by Overlapped Membership 
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Figure 4.14. Intraregional MIDs per Country by Overlapped Membership 
 
As alliance variable, I also analyze overlapped membership by region structure to show 
whether overlapped membership makes a difference in overall patterns of regional cooperation 
and conflict. In order to sort out any specific effect of overlapped membership, I distinguish among 
unipolar/overlapped, unipolar/non-overlapped, multipolar/overlapped, and multipolar/non-over-
lapped regions. Figure 4.15 shows that unipolar/overlapped regions and multipolar /overlapped 
regions have proportionally higher number of intraregional organizations than unipolar/non-over-
lapped and multipolar/non-overlapped regions. It can be concluded that overlapped membership 
makes a difference in overall patterns of cooperation and increases number of intraregional organ-
izations within a given region. 
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Figure 4.15. Intraregional IGOs per Country by Polarity and Overlapped Membership 
 
Figure 4.16 depicts results for the relationship between overlapped membership by polarity 
and intraregional MIDs. From these results, multipolar/non-overlapped regions have proportion-
ally the highest number of intraregional MIDs while multipolar/overlapped regions have propor-
tionally the least number of intraregional MIDs. However, unipolar/overlapped regions have more 
intraregional MIDs than unipolar non-overlapped regions. It can be concluded that even though 
overlapped membership makes a difference in conflictive behaviors and decreases conflictive be-
haviors of regional powers in overlapped regions, still it does not make a strong difference as in 
conflictive behaviors. 
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Figure 4.16 Intraregional MIDs per Country by Polarity and Overlapped Membership 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I tested and analyzed the main general propositions of this study and the 
results of testing of the each proposition by taking into account regional size. The first set of prop-
ositions, which are region-level adaptations of HST and deal with the relationship between the 
existence of regional hegemon or great powers and intraregional cooperation are supported by the 
results. Accordingly, regions with a regional hegemon have the largest number of intraregional 
organizations while regions with no regional hegemon or great powers have the least number of 
regional organizations. The second set of propositions, which are also region-level adaptations of 
HST and deal with the relationship between the existence of regional hegemon or great powers 
and intraregional MIDs are partially supported by the results. As opposed to expectation, in prop-
osition 2a, regions with a hegemon had proportionally more MIDs than multipolar regions. As a 
result, proposition 2a is not supported. However, regions without a regional hegemon or great 
power(s) had the most MIDs and based on that, proposition 2b is supported. It can be concluded 
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that the region-level adaptation of HST is partially supported by the results. The third set of prop-
ositions, which deal with the relationship between external global alliance and intraregional coop-
eration and conflict are also partially supported by the results. As opposed to what is expected in 
proposition 3a, results show that regional cooperation is lower in regions where external alliance 
exists while as expected, regional conflict is less in such regions. Lastly, the relationship between 
overlapped regional hegemonic or great power memberships and intraregional conflict and coop-
eration are supported by the results. The next chapter will provide details and explanations, pre-
senting more nuances for these results based on case studies. 
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CHAPTER 5-SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF REGIONAL HEGEMON AND  
REGIONAL GREAT POWERS 
Regional Hegemons 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, case studies for regional hegemons have been selected from 
unipolar regional structures based on whether they are aligned with the global hegemon and 
whether they are involved in a single region or multiple regions. Based on the typology presented 
in Chapter 2, Brazil (an allied and non-overlapped case), South Africa (an un-allied and non-over-
lapped case) and India (an unallied and overlapped case) are the regional hegemons selected for 
this study. For all three cases, I will provide a general information about each regional hegemon’s 
place in the region and how it qualifies as a regional hegemon in terms of hard power capabilities 
as well as three dimensions of power as proposed by Prys (2008): perception, projection, and pro-
vision. I will focus on similar issue areas of regional conflict and cooperation, such as the involve-
ment of regional hegemons in interstate or intra-state conflicts and their roles in intraregional se-
curity or economic cooperation during the post-Cold War period.14 Examples include whether a 
regional hegemon played a disruptive or suppressive role in a given conflict or whether a regional 
hegemon led the formation of regional organizations or played no role in the formation or sustain-
ment of regional organizations. 
Brazil’s Hegemony in South America 
  Based on the definition of regional hegemony adopted by this study, Brazil is considered 
                                                 
14This case study section examines strategies and behaviors of regional hegemons/great 
powers in both inter-regional and intra-state conflicts. At this point it is important to note that those 
intra-state conflicts, in some ways, inevitably have involved other regional countries. Since those 
countries have had an interest in the outcome of those conflicts, they took action in those intra-
state conflicts. These intra-state conflicts not only involve the internal dynamics of a country but 
also involve regional actors. 
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as a regional hegemon in South America. In terms of material power, Brazil is South America’s 
largest country based on its military, economic, and demographic shares. In terms of ideational 
power as proposed by Prys, Brazil assumes a hegemonic role in the region by accepting burdens 
of hegemony such as the provision of regional public goods. Brazil’s foreign policy, which reflects 
its willingness to act as the regional leader, highlights Brazil’s priority in the region: to create 
prosperous and stable South America (Flemes 2009, 167). Moreover, the mediation services of-
fered by Brazil are accepted by states like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, which in-
dicates that Brazil is perceived to have a special role in the region. Brazil also meets the require-
ments of the projection and provision dimensions of power. Since the end of the Cold War, Brazil 
has actively participated in the formation, development and sustainment of regional organizations 
such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Union of Southern American Nations 
(UNASUR), and the South American Defense Council (CDS) in UNASUR. Brazil has been adopt-
ing cooperative strategies and wielding its influence through these regional organizations. For Bra-
zil, regional institutions are important since those institutions can serve as power bases for Brazil 
to project power by structuring interactions and determining agendas. Especially under President 
Lula da Silva, Brazil has increasingly engaged in regional politics. It has been actively trying to 
engage with its neighbors and in regional politics such as being involved in conflict management 
in the Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict, providing mediation services between Ecuador, Venezuela 
and Columbia, and playing a central role and backing democracy in the Honduras crisis. By doing 
so, Brazil has shown its hegemonic aspirations, its capability as a regional stabilizer and its will-
ingness to lead the region. 
Brazil in regional conflict and cooperation 
  From 1995 to 1998, Brazil played an active role in the process resolving the territorial 
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dispute between Ecuador and Peru and took the lead in mediating the crisis. A long-standing border 
dispute between Ecuador and Peru, which originated in Spanish Colonial times and led a conflict 
between these two neighboring countries in 1941, reignited in 1995. South America has a colonial 
past, and most conflicts occur in this region because of territory issues since there were no specific 
methods those were applied by Spain when it divided the territory (Simmons 1999, 4). As with 
most other conflicts within the region, the Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict also has its roots in this 
boundary dispute, which dates back to the 19th century. 
  The Ecuador-Peru border dispute was thought to have been settled with the 1942 Rio de 
Janeiro Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries (known as the Rio Protocol), which was 
signed by Ecuador and Peru with the diplomatic efforts of a group of friendly nations: The United 
States, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. The Rio Protocol defined the border between Peru and Ecua-
dor. The treaty was signed by both parties and four friendly nations “as guarantors that the Protocol 
would be faithfully executed…” (as quoted in Palmer 1997, 109). 
  However, the resolution of the conflict by the four mediating states in 1942 did not last 
long, and in 1960, the Ecuadorian government completely rejected the Rio Protocol, stating that 
the Protocol unfairly favored Peru and was accepted by Ecuador under the pressure from the US. 
From 1960 to 1995, Ecuador made several diplomatic and military attempts to establish its pres-
ence in a contested region in the Upper Cenepa River Valley. In 1991, Ecuador redeployed its 
military units into the remote Upper Cinema jungle, on the Peruvian side of the Rio Protocol line, 
and constructed small base camps and helicopter zones (Palmer 1997, 119). Peru did not turn its 
attention to its borders until January 1995 and neglected to patrol this border area adequately. In 
January 1995, Peru moved its army patrols along the Cenepa River to reestablish a presence, and 
on January 26, 1995, another border conflict erupted between Ecuador and Peru. The conflict 
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lasted nineteen days. Despite its short duration, the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru 
“resulted in somewhere between 200 and 1,500 casualties, the loss of nine aircraft on the Peruvian 
side and two on Ecuador’s, and estimated cost to both sides of up to one billion dollars” (Simmons 
1999, p. 12). Both Ecuador and Peru did not want the conflict to escalate beyond Cenepa nor did 
they want to give up their positions. The four Guarantors of the Rio Protocol became actively 
engaged in looking for the dispute settlement between these two countries. They met in Brazil and 
conducted negotiations for weeks. A peacekeeping process was composed of three stages (military, 
procedural, and substantive) and began at the meeting in Brazil (Palmer 1997, 122). On February 
17, 1995, the Peace Declaration at the Itamaraty Palace (Itamaraty Accord) was signed by Ecuador, 
Peru and the representatives of the four Guarantors at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. The President 
of Ecuador, Duran Ballin, agreed to recognize the Rio Protocol as a basis for a solution to the 
conflict (Simmons 1999, 19).  
  The peace process provided opportunities for Brazil to exercise its leadership in the region 
and to clear doubts of regional powers regarding to its regional role capabilities. Among the Four 
Guarantors, Brazil especially played the role of lead Guarantor in resolving the conflict between 
Ecuador and Peru. The territorial dispute of the 1940s between Ecuador and Peru led to regional 
instability and tensions for decades in South America. The 1995 Ecuador-Peru dispute was also a 
threat to regional stability since it posed dangers for regional trade and security. As the regional 
hegemon of South America, working with other guarantors, Brazil took the lead in mediating and 
settling the 1995 Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Brazil facilitated communication between the two 
parties because the settlement of the border dispute was crucial for regional stability. Later, in 
October, 1998 Brazil hosted the presidents of Ecuador and Peru. In this meeting, the presidents of 
two countries as well as the Four Guarantors signed the Presidential Act of Brasilia to definitively 
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resolve the remaining differences of the border dispute which also ended the peacekeeping opera-
tions in the disputed areas (Biato 2016, 621-622).  
  As mentioned in Chapter 1, regional hegemons may use different strategies to influence 
secondary powers in their own regions. Some regional hegemons may adopt a coercive-power 
based strategy while others may adopt a cooperative strategy by investing and participating in 
regional organizations. Since the end of the Cold War, intraregional interactions in military, eco-
nomic, and cultural spheres among South American countries have been marked by cooperative 
attitudes. During this period, Brazil has become more involved multilaterally, especially in re-
gional defense and security issues (Flemes 2009, 168). As was first defined in Chapter 1, Pedersen 
(2002) proposes four possible strategies which are available to regional powers, and one of these 
hegemonic strategies of leadership is co-operative hegemony, which involves engagement in co-
operative arrangements. Regional hegemons may choose to pursue the strategy of regional insti-
tutionalization and want to share their power through institutions when the benefits of power shar-
ing are higher than the benefits of not sharing. Brazil’s post-Cold War foreign policy can be de-
fined by the adoption of cooperative hegemony since Brazil has pursued an institutionalist strategy 
in its foreign relations with its neighbors and has become the main institution builder within the 
region.   
  As political instability and security challenges have risen in South America, Brazil has 
taken the lead and proposed to create South American Defense Council (CDS), a NATO-like de-
fense alliance among South American countries. The goal of the formation of such an organization 
was to promote and reorganize regional defense cooperation and craft a peace zone or security 
community in South America (Vivares 2014, 46). The territorial dispute between Ecuador and 
Colombia in 2008 definitively demonstrated the need for such a regional cooperation to maintain 
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regional security. CDS was established in late 2008 as a part of the UNASUR, and the organization 
has similar objectives to the conflict resolution mechanisms of the Organizations of American 
States (OAS). The construction of CDS also aimed to exclude the US from this defense coopera-
tion and diminish the US role in South American security affairs “as it [CDS] was promoting not 
only militarization of the Colombian crisis, but also the adoption of destabilizing norms that di-
verged from the mainstream interpretations of international law favored by the legalistic diplo-
matic culture of South America” (Vivares 2014, 46). 
CDS, as a collective security and defense project, aims to promote cooperation among UNASUR  
members in defense and security issues which includes “the coordination on joint defense policies, 
the exchange of armed forces personnel, the joint participation on United Nations peace operations, 
among others” (Villa and Viana 2010, 103). According to Vivares (2014), CDS can be seen as a 
vehicle for Brazil to promote stability in its sphere of influence with its role as a regional stabilizer. 
By proposing and leading the creation of CDS, and being the dominant player in CDS, Brazil 
proved its willingness to lead the region and to consolidate its dominant status in the region (45).  
In addition to its leadership in institution-building and regionalism efforts, Brazil has also 
sought to use cooperative rather than coercive means in its relations with its neighbors since “the 
more the regional power makes use of coercive means, the greater the likelihood that this buy-in 
will be the result of reluctant acceptance” (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 78). As Burges 
(2009) also highlighted, Brazil does not impose its interests on secondary states within the region. 
Rather, it follows a foreign policy route which is about coordination, consultation, and discussion 
(54). As the above-mentioned cases of conflict and cooperation illustrate, Brazil plays the role of 
leader, mediator and coordinator within the region, as expected by secondary powers and other 
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countries in the region. Columbia, Argentina, and Venezuela are important South American re-
gional powers, and these regional powers do not attempt to counter Brazil by increasing their ca-
pabilities or establishing new internal or external alliances (Schenoni 2015, 6). In order to reduce 
regional contestation and to be accepted as a regional hegemon, Brazil has pursued a multilateral 
strategy in its foreign relations. It involves neighboring countries in the process of forming a re-
gional order, increases incentives for its neighbors to participate in the subsystem and avoids to 
show any hegemonic intention (Teixeira 2012, 126). By doing this, Brazil reduces the sense of 
threat to its neighboring countries. 
South Africa’s Hegemony in Southern Africa 
  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the era of the rise of 
liberal values such as democracy and human rights as well as interstate cooperation significantly 
influenced and shaped South African domestic and foreign policies. South Africa held its first free 
elections in 1994, and Nelson Mandela was elected as the first president of the post-apartheid era. 
Mandela’s newly elected government aimed to form a democratic and free society in domestic 
politics and adopted a multilateralist foreign policy strategy which reflected the rhetoric of the 
post-Cold War era (Becker 2013, 247).  
  South Africa’s role in Southern Africa has been discussed by many scholars, and most 
describe South Africa as a regional hegemon (Habib 2009; Prys 2009; Bischoff 2010; Nolte 2010; 
Geldenhuys 2010; Tjemolane, Neethling and Schoeman 2012). Since Nelson Mandela’s rise to 
power in 1994, South Africa has been playing a regional leader role by being the most powerful 
military and economic actor in Southern African politics. Thabo Mbeki is an important figure in 
South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy since he was an active deputy president under Mandela 
from 1994 to 1999 and then became the second President of South Africa from 1999 to 2008. 
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Especially after becoming president, Mbeki expanded the role of South Africa in Southern Africa, 
and with his vision of an “African Renaissance”, Mbeki aimed to stabilize, reconstruct and rede-
velop the region during his term of office. Louw (2000) defines African Renaissance “as an effort 
to remove the sources of conflict, restore its self-esteem and turn it [the region] into a zone of 
economic prosperity, peace and stability” (1). Both Mandela and Mbeki believed that South Africa 
has an important role in reaching these aims in the region. Moreover, the country’s initiatives such 
as the reform of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Renaissance 
program reflect its claim and self-perception of being a leader in Africa. 
  Since 1994, the priorities of South African foreign policy have been economic develop-
ment, human rights, democracy, peace, security, stability, and multilateralism, which involve po-
litical partnerships and regional leadership (Habib 2009, 143; Tjemolane, Neethling and Schoeman 
2012, 87). During its apartheid years, especially after the formation of SADC in 1980 which aimed 
to reduce the economic interdependence of Southern African countries on South Africa, South 
Africa sought to destabilize its neighbors and prevent them from forming any organization against 
it. During this period, South Africa also engaged in interventions against its neighbors, such as 
involvement in southern Angola (Saunders and Nagar 2013, 31). However, with the end of the 
apartheid era and with the first democratic elections of 1994, South Africa engaged with its neigh-
bors by making it priority to strengthen relations.   
 South Africa in regional conflict and cooperation 
  Since 1994, South Africa has been providing leadership in multilateral settings and playing 
active roles in the formation and maintenance of regional agreements and organizations such as 
the maintenance and development of SADC and South African Customs Union (SACU) (Burgess 
2012, 207-208). 
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  SADC, as an intraregional organization, was formed in 1992, and South Africa was ac-
cepted as a new member in 1994 after moving from apartheid to majority rule.15 By being the 
region’s most powerful military and economic power, South Africa became an important member 
of SADC soon after its membership in the organization, and since then, South Africa has been 
playing a critical leadership role in the organization. However, member countries in SADC such 
as Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were cautious about the role of South Africa because of 
its military and economic aggression during the apartheid-era, and its aggressive past put post-
apartheid South Africa’s acceptability and legitimacy in question (Matlosa 1997, 121-122). The 
newly elected government of post-apartheid South Africa was also aware of the conflictual image 
of South Africa and acted as a Big Brother rather than a regional hegemon in order to assert its 
influence in the region and to promote cooperation among member states of SADC (Saunders and 
Nagar 2013, 32). In regional platforms, South Africa stated that it would build conditions for a 
collective leadership and rely on the notion of collective leadership on regional matters. In 1996, 
Mbeki highlighted South Africa’s rejection of hegemonic relations in its interaction with Southern 
Africa and expressed that  
The Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South Africa in terms of 
their own development. They expect that we interact with them as a partner and ally not as 
a regional super power, so that what we achieve, in terms of political, security and eco-
nomic relations, is balanced and mutually beneficial. (Mbeki 1996) 
  South Africa has preferred to deal with regional conflicts through the use of regional or-
ganizations, mainly SADC, and SADC as the most important and developed regional organization 
in Southern Africa has been the first responder to conflicts in the region. The SADC Organ for 
                                                 
15  SADC was formerly Southern African Development Co-Coordinating Conference 
(SADCC). The reason for the transformation of SADCC into SADC was to deepen the economic 
integration of Southern Africa. Today, SADC not only focuses on economic issues, but it also has 
a peace and security-oriented agenda. 
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Politics, Defence and Security (the Organ) is responsible for promoting peace and security within 
the SADC region with its conflict management and conflict prevention capacities including a re-
gional peacekeeping center as well as election monitoring and mediating inter and intrastate dis-
putes (Albuquerque and Wiklund 2015, 1). The Organ was established in 1996; however, it did 
not become active until 2001 when an extraordinary SADC summit was held, and the inclusion of 
the Organ under the control of SADC was approved. This summit not only approved the inclusion 
of the Organ, but it also restructured SADC institutions since SADC had a decentralized structure 
in which “most of its projects were national projects with limited regional impact” (Prys 2012, 53). 
South Africa was the leader of this reform process and strongly supported those progressive 
measures. 
  In the post-Cold War period, South Africa used its financial and military resources to sta-
bilize the region, including peace and security interventions. Zondi (2012) claims that “South Af-
rica’s stabilization agenda has three key pillars: mediation, post-conflict development and peace-
keeping” (17). As a responsible regional power, South Africa was involved in negotiations in mul-
tiple countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. It was also involved in conflict res-
olution in Southern Africa such as intervening in Lesotho in 1998 to help stabilize a domestic 
crisis. The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho led to enormous controversies. The South African 
government claimed that the aim of the intervention was to prevent a military coup and restore 
democracy; however, the use of force in conflict management caused harm to South Africa’s image 
as a regional peacemaker (de Conning 2000). At this point, providing a brief historical overview 
of the Lesotho crisis, then examining South Africa’s involvement and role in this crisis, will be 
helpful in understanding South Africa’s regional foreign policy in its own region. 
  Since its independence in 1965, Lesotho has had political instability, and the country has 
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confronted political tension in the aftermath of the highly disputed parliamentary elections in 1998. 
The May 1998 election results, which claimed the party Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) 
as victorious, were repudiated by the Basutoland Congress Party, the Basotho National Party and 
the Marematlou Freedom Party. Following the disputed victory of LCD, opposition political par-
ties mobilized their supporters to occupy the capital, Maseru (Prys 2012, 109-110). As the region’s 
largest military and economic power, South Africa took the lead and invited Botswana and Zim-
babwe to form a mediation to settle the dispute. During this time period, opposition groups staged 
protests and demanded the resignation of the prime minister of the LCD and the monarch to dis-
solve the government (Southall and Fox 1999, 670). As mass demonstrations intensified and civil 
disorder increased, the Lesotho government lost control of the crisis. On September 16, 1998, the 
newly elected Lesotho prime minister, Pakalitha Mosisili requested SADC military assistance to 
help in maintaining political stability and preventing a military coup in Lesotho by claiming that 
“we have a coup on our hands. The only intervention I can and do request urgently is of a military 
nature” (as quoted in Nathan 2012, 82). After this request, South Africa and Botswana decided to 
launch a joint military operation called Operation Boleas (Prys 2012, 110). On September 22, 
1998, troops from the South African National Defence Forces (SANDF) entered Lesotho to restore 
law and order, and on September 23, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) joined the invasion to 
take control of the capital Maseru. However, SANDF met with unanticipated resistance from sec-
tions of the Lesotho army and supporters of opposition parties. The political turmoil and tension 
in Lesotho continued for weeks and resulted in the deaths of soldiers from Lesotho and South 
Africa, and much of Maseru was destroyed. Violence began to subside with the disarmament of 
the mutineers and after the rival parties reached a peace agreement. An all-party Interim Political 
Authority (IPA) was formed by members of all political parties to pave the way for a new election 
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(Selinyane 2006, 71). 
  The Lesotho crisis was settled after a South African-led military intervention, which was 
important for South Africa since it was the first military intervention of the post-apartheid regime 
in a conflict beyond its borders. Since its first election in 1994, South Africa had been looking for 
peaceful solutions or dialogue to deal with regional conflicts. However, different from other inter-
ventions, South Africa used its coercive power to restore security in Lesotho; however, there are 
some controversies regarding South Africa’s armed intervention in the Lesotho crisis in terms of 
legitimacy of the intervention and South Africa’s motivations for the intervention. On the one 
hand, critics claim that South Africa took unilateral action by not consulting the SADC before 
intervening in Lesotho, which violated SADC’s commitment to multilateralism. On the other hand, 
the South African officials claimed that the action was taken under the SADC auspices. The South 
African officials claimed that 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa were mandated to act on behalf of SADC to restore 
the democratically elected government. After intensive negotiations and the threat of mil-
itary intervention by SADC forces, the democratically elected government was restored to 
power and the soldiers returned to their barracks. (as quoted in Tavares 2001, 158)  
 
There have also been conflicting views regarding South Africa’s intervention with regard 
to whether realist or liberal principles led to the military intervention. On the one hand, critics 
claim that South Africa’s strategic national interests motivated the military intervention, mainly to 
defend a water resource. On the other hand, South African officials claimed that South Africa 
intervened in the crisis for humanitarian reasons to restore stability in the country and to rescue 
Lesotho from a coup (Prys 2012, 113-114). On September 22, 1998, acting South African Presi-
dent Mangosuthu Buthelezi made a speech in the South African Parliament saying “the aim of the 
intervention is to restore stability as soon and as quickly as possible and withdraw… as soon as 
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that has been achieved” (Irish Times, 23 September 1998). de Coning (2000) explains the objec-
tives of the South African intervention in Lesotho crisis as “to prevent a military coup, to disarm 
the mutineers and to create a safe environment for the diplomatic initiative to find a peaceful so-
lution to the political crisis in Lesotho” (39). Indeed, the South Africa-led operation succeeded in 
achieving the desired results and led to the creation of a stable environment in Lesotho as well as 
restored law and order which enabled negotiations between the rival parties. 
As the preponderant regional power, South Africa played an active participant role in resolving a 
regional conflict by responding to the Lesotho Prime Minister’s request for help. Selinyane (2006) 
explains South Africa’s role in the Lesotho crisis as follows 
South Africa is unequivocally committed to creating peace and stability on the continent. 
Such a project can only materialize under the leadership of a hegemonic state that not only 
stands ready to enforce it, including through deployment of force, but also ploughs in its 
resources to back up this ideal (79).  
 
 However, the use of coercive power and the military action which was taken in the name of SADC 
without appropriate decision-making procedures led to the description of the intervention as “a 
loss of innocence” since it announced “the arrival of a very different South Africa; Big Brother is 
bashful no longer” (Fabricius 1998, 14).  
  As mentioned earlier, apartheid South Africa was an aggressive regional hegemon which 
attempted to destabilize its neighbors such as Angola, Botswana, and Zimbabwe both politically 
and economically by fomenting civil war and political unrest. However, post-apartheid South Af-
rican presidents have been highlighting the notion of collective leadership on regional issues not 
to be perceived as a regional hegemon which wants to control or dominate its neighbors. Despite 
efforts for a collective leadership, South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho has led its neigh-
bors to question its cooperative and anti-hegemonic approach.  
  Overall, while the intervention in Lesotho was military in nature, and it is postulated that 
96 
 
 
South Africa’s intervention was a unilateral action, South Africa still was able to provide a regional 
public good by intervening in Lesotho to prevent a military coup and restore democracy. Moreo-
ver, South Africa showed its ability as well as its readiness to play a leading role and use its re-
sources to secure political stability in the region (Prys 2012, 116). South Africa’s intervention in 
Lesotho was a success since it was able to create stability and peace in the region. The priorities 
of South African foreign policy are still human rights and democracy but South Africa has started 
to engage with its neighbors with greater caution. The Mbeki period of South African foreign 
policy mostly focused on political and economic stability for prosperity in the region and South 
Africa’s own success. South Africa started to take part in peacekeeping activities and deployed its 
troops in Southern African countries which are in conflict situations to achieve regional peace. 
 India’s Hegemony in South Asia 
  Since the beginning of the 1990s, India has started to have growing importance and pres-
ence in regional and international scenes because of its rapid and continued economic growth after 
the 1991 economic reforms. Apart from its economic power, India is also the dominant power in 
South Asia in terms of defense capacities in addition to its physical and demographic size. In terms 
of hard power capabilities, with its dominant military as well as economic and demographic power, 
India clearly has the capacity to dominate the region. In addition to hard power capabilities, ana-
lyzing ideational indicators of regional hegemony (perception, projection and provision) based on 
the typology developed by Prys and adopted by this study to identify regional powers will give a 
clear determination of India’s power status in South Asia and what India means for the region.  
  With its dominant material capabilities, India has been playing a leading role in the region 
since the end of the Cold War. It is willing and ready to accept the burdens of hegemony. For 
example, India has been providing development assistance to its neighboring countries (Prys 2008, 
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8). India’s hegemony is accepted by most of its neighbors, such as Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, and the Maldives, which have some sort of political and economic reliance on India 
(Khan 2008, 29). However, India’s regional hegemony has been contested by Pakistan since In-
dia’s independence in 1947. Pakistan has been openly challenging India’s supremacy, which has 
led to crises and wars between these two biggest powers in the region. After independence, Paki-
stan and India’s ongoing rivalry revolved around the unresolved status of Kashmir. (Buzan 2002, 
2-3). Over time, Pakistan has pursued different strategies to oppose India’s regional hegemony. 
Blarel and Ebert (2014) state that “Pakistan’s behavioral repertoire can be ranged along a contin-
uum that alternated from open resistance to India’s hegemony to (reluctant) acquiescence of the 
asymmetric structure of the existing regional system” (224). They define the period from 1947 to 
1971 as one of the greatest periods of political and military resistance to Indian regional hegemony 
while the period from 1971 to the late 1980s was one of acquiescence to India’s regional position. 
However, in the late 1980’s, Pakistan started to pursue the strategy of indirect resistance to Indian 
regional hegemony (224). Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought four wars and had several 
severe crises. In addition to military rivalry, nuclear and missile rivalries started between the 
hegemon and the challenger with the latter’s missile development activities in the mid-1980s 
(Buzan 2002, 8). In the post-Cold War period, the rivalry between the two largest states led to 
continuous political tensions and instability in the region. With nuclear weapon tests of India and 
Pakistan on May 1998, security concerns increased in the region. Even though India’s hegemonic 
status is still contested by Pakistan, India has now been accepted as the regional hegemon by its 
other neighbors. 
  In terms of the projection dimension which deals with how regional hegemons exercise 
power over their neighboring countries and project their interests and values onto their neighbors, 
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India chose to exercise its power through unilateral and bilateral means. Multilateral forums have 
also been used by India, but its multilateral relations with its neighbors are limited to economic 
issues. In 2004, the Indian Prime Minister Singh described India’s foreign policy as “cooperative 
pluralism” (Sinha 2015, 17). In terms of an economic policy approach, India participated in re-
gional agreements and multilateral organizations including the South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA). In terms of security, on the other hand, India has preferred to secure bilateral relation-
ships with neighboring countries, which has led to the lack of any multilateral security arrangement 
in the region. Indeed, India is a member of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC); however, it has not sought to resolve regional security problems through SAARC. 
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) explain the reason for India’s lack of interest in the resolution 
of security issues through SAARC as follows  
India’s agreement to join SAARC was predicated upon the idea that bilateral issues (even 
critical ones to regional stability, such as the Kashmir dispute) or any security related issues 
would not be within the domain of SAARC. Rather, the organization would address coor-
dination in the areas of agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology 
and health and population activities. (200) 
 
  While South Asia is viewed as a region of political instability and tensions, India has a 
paramount interest in maintaining stability and security there and “it [India] does aspire to act as 
the security manager in the region…” (Ayoob 2000, 27). This desire was reflected in I. K. Gujral’s 
Inaugural Address in January, 1997, entitled “Security Concerns in Asia in the Early 21st Cen-
tury”. As the Minister of External Affairs, Gujral formulated a set of policies in this speech by 
emphasizing a conflict-free cooperative order in South Asia. With this new foreign policy, the aim 
was to achieve better relations with India’s neighbors by reducing tensions and increasing cooper-
ation between and among them (Sabur 2001, 143-144). The main principles of the Gujral Doctrine 
are:   
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(1) as the largest nation in South Asia, India must show a big heart. With neighbors, India 
must not ask for reciprocity, but should give all that it can in good faith and trust; (2) no 
South Asian country would allow its territory to be used against the interest of another 
country; (3) no country would interfere in the internal affairs of another; (4) countries of 
South Asia must settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. (Chatterjee 
2010, 220) 
 
  Ayoob (2000) claims that “[the] policy of non-reciprocity is an important step in legitimiz-
ing India’s preeminent status in the region by demonstrating its willingness and capacity to act as 
the benevolent provider of public goods in South Asia” (30). The Gujral doctrine helped to im-
prove India’s relations with its neighbors and showed benevolent and integrating aims of India as 
the dominant regional power since India behaved as a non-interfering benevolent hegemon.  
India in regional conflict and cooperation 
  The absence of capable regional security organizations to manage security issues in South 
Asia and India’s outstanding position in the region led it to step in the long-standing civil war in 
the region. The Sri Lankan civil war was a long-lasting ethnic-based civil war which started in the 
beginning of 1980s and ended in 2009 with a violent military victory over the Tamil insurgency 
group. In the Sri Lankan civil war, the insurgency group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), fought against the Sinhalese majority state to establish an independent Tamil state called 
Tamil Eelam (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 117-118). Since the beginning of the civil war 
in 1983, there have been several on and off conflict periods between majority and minority groups. 
Indeed, expectations for a long-lasting peace heightened with the Ceasefire Agreement which fol-
lowed the declaration of a cease-fire in 2001. However, the peaceful atmosphere did not last long 
when hostilities were renewed in November 2005, which led to the “Fourth Eelam War” in July 
2006. Prior to 1991, India was involved in the Sri Lankan civil war and made attempts to mediate 
between ethnic majority and minority groups. With the failure of these conflict management ef-
forts, India entered into an accord with Sri Lanka called the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July 1987 
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to establish peace in Sri Lanka (Manoharan 2011, 228). The Accord was an important attempt 
since it was the first major peace initiative in the long history of the Sri Lankan ethnic issue. As 
per the peace accord, India sent the India Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka to monitor the 
ceasefire and supervise the disarmament of LTTE. The Indian military also carried out operations 
against LTTE during the peacekeeping operation. However, LTTE refused to disarm, and it soon 
attacked the IPKF. India abandoned peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka, and Indian forces 
fought LTTE for three years, which resulted in over 1,100 casualties in Indian forces and their 
withdrawal of from the island (Destradi 2012a, 65). Following the end of the war between LTTE 
and the Indian forces, the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a LTTE suicide bomber 
in 1991 led to India’s adoption of a passive approach to the Sri Lankan ethnic turmoil. Destradi 
(2012b) explains the reasons for India’s hands-off policy in the Sri Lankan civil from 1991 to 2006 
through historical and domestic factors. As she puts it,  
regarding the former [historical factors], the figure of India’s peacemaking efforts in the 
1980s and its banning of the LTTE after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 
1991 made it politically difficult for India to act as an effective conflict manager because 
it could not have any direct contacts to the LTTE. Domestically, India could not openly 
support the Sri Lankan state’s war efforts because of pressure exerted on the central gov-
ernment by regional Tamil parties in Tamil Nadu. (597) 
 
 The Fourth Eelam War between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE broke out in 2006, and 
India kept abiding by its noninterference policy until the violence escalated in Sri Lanka in 2007. 
Indian military forces did not actively engage in the final military conflict between the Sri Lankan 
forces and LTTE, but it supported Sri Lankan forces in 2008-2009 by providing military supplies 
to Sri Lanka, sharing intelligence against the LTTE and training Sri Lankan security personnel to 
defeat LTTE (596). After over three decades of the armed conflict, the Sri Lankan civil war ended 
in May 2009 with the Sri Lankan Army’s gaining control over all LTTE-controlled territories and 
the death of the LTTE leader, which led to dismantlement of the group. 
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 With the military defeat of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan ethnic issue’s armed wing came to an end. 
Since ethnic issues were critical components of the India- Sri Lanka relationship, at the end of the 
war the bilateral relationship between the two countries took on a new dimension. As Manoharan 
(2011) puts it “… for the first time in the past three decades, India-Sri Lanka relations are being 
conducted without the militant group in the picture” (230).  
  As the regional hegemon with the responsibility to promote peace and security in the re-
gion, India involved itself in the Sri Lankan civil war. However, India’s foreign policy to address 
the crisis and its use the military to stabilize the intra-state order in Sri Lanka has been criticized 
by many foreign government officials and scholars. First of all, in terms of its early involvement 
in the ethnic issue, India showed assertive efforts in dealing with a regional security-related issue. 
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) define India’s conflict management efforts in the Sri Lankan 
ethnic turmoil as “individualized, sporadic, and indecisive” (200). Moreover, since the region lacks 
effective multilateral security organizations, India acted unilaterally in conflict management. 
  Moreover, India has been the most significant external actor in the Sri Lankan ethnic tur-
moil since Sri Lanka is vital for Indian national security and interests. India shares borders, eco-
nomic interests and ethnic ties with Sri Lanka. On the regional level, India sought to mitigate and 
eliminate a threat to regional stability since security dynamics at the regional level are significantly 
affected by intra-state tensions and political instabilities. In addition to these factors, India’s mili-
tary and political power and its position as the regional hegemon raised expectations regarding 
India’s role in conflict management in the Sri Lankan ethnic issue (Destradi, 2012b, 599). In con-
trast to the expectations, India failed to show a coherent and mature response to the ethnic turmoil 
in its immediate neighbor. Even in 2000, when Sri Lanka appealed to its neighboring countries for 
support in its Second Battle of Elephant Pass which resulted from LTTE’s reoccupation of the 
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strategic Elephant Pass camp, India refused to provide military assistance and kept implementing 
its noninterference policy (Prys 2012, 163). Despite its strategic security as well as economic in-
terests and regional status, India had been acting as a bystander since 1991 probably because of its 
failed efforts in the past when its efforts to restore peace resulted in the escalation of violence. 
With its failure of intervention to find a political solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic issue, India 
showed that it was unable to bring peace in Sri Lanka when it acted alone. 
 While the Sri Lankan case study involves behavior and the on-and-off engagement of India in a 
South Asian intra-state crisis, the above-mentioned regional cooperation case demonstrates India’s 
role in economic multilateral initiatives in the region. Since independence in 1947, political ten-
sions between India and Pakistan have led to a decline in South Asian trade shares. The lack of 
trust among neighboring countries because of the troubled relations among them has prevented 
those countries from developing export promotion strategies and has kept trade levels low (Batra 
2007, 3878). Low levels of intraregional cooperation started to change in the post-Cold War era 
with Nepal and Bangladesh’s transition to democracy and a few other South Asian countries’ lib-
eralizing their domestic trade regimes by the early 1990s (Prys 2012, 145).  
  India’s role in economic integration in South Asia is important for its neighbors because 
of its predominant economic capability and geographical location. Despite political tensions, South 
Asian countries have been able to take steps toward economic integration, and regional economic 
cooperation improved relatively significantly in the post-Cold War period. India has signed bilat-
eral free trade agreements with Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. In addition to strengthening bilateral 
links, India has also taken several measures to facilitate intraregional trade among South Asian 
countries since the liberalization of its economy. One of those initiatives was the creation of a 
regional free trade agreement called South Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA), which is an 
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intra-SAARC economic cooperation. SAFTA was formulated during the course of SAARC nego-
tiations and ratified in January 2006 by India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka. The agreement aimed the reduction of regional tariffs and turning South Asia into 
a free trade area (Batra 2007, 3880). Despite these efforts and implementation of SAFTA, intra-
SAARC trade levels are still considered low and limited, partly because the smaller states lack 
sufficient productivity and buying power to stimulate trade.  
  According to some scholars, SAFTA has failed to achieve the expected results due to its 
narrow scope since it focused only on tariff reductions and excluded investment or financial aid 
and restrictions within the agreement (Karim 2014, 309) while others argue that the failure of the 
economic integration in the region is a consequence of political tensions between India and Paki-
stan which are the largest regional economies (Khan, Shaheen and Yusuf 2009, 159). Indeed, both 
factors played important roles in the ineffectiveness of SAFTA. At the SAARC summit in Bhutan 
in 2010, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan highlighted a fundamental problem by stating that “We 
have created institutions for regional cooperation, but we have not yet empowered them adequately 
to enable them to be more proactive” (as quoted in Malone, 2011, 105). The SAARC members 
developed bilateral trade agreements prior to the formation of SAFTA, and there are also some 
other trade agreements in progress. India’s trade relations within the region are mostly based on 
these bilateral trade agreements.  
In addition to problems with SAFTA itself in terms of its scope and effectiveness, the link 
between security and economic relations is also important to mention. India has focused on the 
promotion of economic interests in its relations with neighboring countries, and security initiatives 
have always remained limited in India’s regional agenda. However, security and the economy are 
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interdependent, and as Dent (2016) puts it, a “regional security arrangement can bring greater sta-
bility and trust amongst a regional community of nations, without which economic regionalism 
may be very difficult to achieve” (23). India has pursued a unilateralist foreign policy and devel-
oped bilateral relationships with its neighbors with respect to regional security issues. 
A Comparison of Regional Hegemons: Brazil, South Africa and India 
  Based on how this study conceptualizes regional hegemony, Brazil in South America, 
South Africa in Southern Africa and India in South Asia are classified as regional hegemons. In 
addition to material preponderance, this study looks at the influence in regional governance, the 
ability and willingness to provide leadership, and the provision of public goods in order to classify 
a country as a regional hegemon. This section will compare the behaviors of regional hegemons 
in their sphere of influence by focusing on historical experiences of the regions under study as well 
as the regional strategic settings and their effects on the behaviors of regional hegemons in regional 
conflict and cooperation. Moreover, the implementation of security and stability by regional 
hegemons, the relationship between regional hegemons and external powers, and overlapped mem-
berships of regional hegemons will be the focus of comparison.  
  In comparing the behaviors of regional hegemons, this study considers that the cases under 
study have different historical experiences, such as concerning colonialism (Prys 2010, 9). In all 
three cases, the legacy of colonial rule has affected the stability of the regional order after inde-
pendence. In all three regions, colonial legacies still have effects on territorial claims and ethnic 
conflicts. Historical legacies also affect regional institutionalization as shown in the cases. For 
example, in South America, neighboring countries have common historic experiences such as a 
colonial past, military dictatorships and the following processes of democratization. These histor-
ical experiences have helped to delineate the region and strengthened the regional bond among 
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South American countries (Flemes 2009, 169). In Southern Africa, historical commonality across 
SADC members has also strengthened regional cooperation even though these countries have cul-
tural, language and ethnic differences. Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015) explain the relationship 
between shared historical legacy and regional cooperation as follows: “the joint struggle for inde-
pendence and common opposition to apartheid has resulted in a sense of brotherhood among 
SADC members, which in many ways defines the nature of regional cooperation” (1). Ethnic wars 
in Southern Africa are related to racial issues since most countries in the region were British col-
onies, and British colonialism was replaced with racist dominance in most countries, such as South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. In South Asia, the British Empire left a colonial legacy of a border dispute 
which has been unresolved since 1947. The source of the unresolved conflict between India and 
Pakistan is arbitrarily drawn borders in Kashmir. In this region, historical legacy negatively af-
fected regional integration, and the unresolved conflict led to regional instability and the lack of 
trust among its neighbors toward India’s benevolent aspirations.  
  Regional settings within which three regional hegemons operate also differ greatly. As 
mentioned in brief assessments of the behaviors of regional hegemons, while India asserts its in-
fluence over its smaller neighboring states and has relatively good relations with them, it also 
confronts a challenger, Pakistan. South Asia hosts a strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan 
which has led to instability and insecurity in the region. India and Pakistan have engaged in several 
armed conflicts since 1947, which has led to the expansion of military capabilities of both countries 
and the lack of advanced regional integration. Even though there is a wide power gap between 
India and Pakistan, both states are nuclear powers which further complicates the establishment of 
a secure regional order. Since India does not want any crisis to escalate to nuclear war, India’s 
responses to Pakistan’s rivalry are limited. This long-standing rivalry leads to the lack of trust 
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among neighboring countries, now extending all the way to Afghanistan, and an insecure regional 
order, combining to result in ineffective regional cooperation which in turn limits India’s role as a 
stabilizer. On the other hand, in the regions dominated by Brazil and South Africa, there are no 
immediate threats to their security or regional hegemonic status, though Argentina contains the 
potential for future development along these lines. As a result, security and military policies pri-
oritize regional stability by the formation of security cooperation with neighboring countries. In 
contrast to South Asian countries, South American and South African countries strengthen the 
defense capabilities of their regions through security cooperation instead of strengthening their 
own military capabilities against their neighbors. Brazil’s and South Africa’s historical back-
grounds also affect their foreign policy priorities. For example, South Africa is concerned about 
apartheid’s legacy of ethnic conflicts and their spillover effects. As a result, South Africa has pri-
oritized conflict management and resolution in its neighboring countries and has been playing a 
very active role in peacekeeping and security operations to prevent political instability in the re-
gion. Even though there is no actual conventional threat against South Africa by its neighboring 
states, the presence of regional inter-state and intrastate conflicts have led South Africa to shape 
its foreign policy strategies accordingly and prioritize conflict mediation and peacekeeping when 
dealing with regional security issues (Flemes and Vaz, 2011, 16). 
 In contrast to South Asia and Southern Africa, South America is a relatively peaceful and 
politically stable region. As mentioned in the case above, Brazil also provides relative stability 
through regional conflict mediation, conflict prevention and security cooperation initiatives 
(Flemes and Wehner 2015, 167). Despite the differences in regional settings, Brazil and South 
Africa have prioritized regional cooperation, multilateralism and regional security as foreign pol-
icy strategies, and both regional hegemons are involved in international organizations to promote 
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peace and security in their regions. India, on the other hand, follows a multilateral route in its 
overlapping region and has more developed relations in extra-regional multilateral platforms 
which will be mentioned below. 
  These brief case studies show that these three states followed different routes in regional 
cooperative initiatives and conflict resolution. Both Brazil and South Africa played active roles in 
the conflict management of their neighbors and showed their ability and willingness to assert in-
fluence through military and non-military means. On the other hand, India also engaged in conflict 
resolution process in Sri Lanka and highlighted its desire for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. 
However, India’s support for the Sri Lankan government’s military efforts showed a disposition 
to dealing with the crisis through both negotiation and force, revealing India’s preference for sta-
bility over peace (Destradi 2012a, 84). Resort to the military instrument showed India’s inability 
to broker a peaceful resolution process. Moreover, India’s on-and-off engagement in resolving the 
crisis showed the lack of ability to influence security dynamics in its immediate vicinity. In terms 
of multilateral initiatives and regional cooperation, both Brazil and South Africa are actively en-
gaged in their neighborhoods by forming new regional organizations and developing the existent 
ones; however, India has not really developed cooperative initiatives with a focus on the South 
Asian complex, and it has been relatively ineffective in advancing a regional security order.  
 Even though India has taken some steps to facilitate regional integration, these initiatives have 
been limited to economic terms, specifically intra-regional trade. According to Stewart-Ingersoll 
and Frazier (2012), two characteristics of Indian foreign policy have led to the lack of influence 
and focus on regional security orders. First, India’s foreign policy focus is external rather than 
regional since it is aimed at a global recognition with the confidence that it already possesses a 
hegemonic position in South Asia. Second, India prefers to pursue the route of bilateralism over 
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multilateralism in its relations with neighboring countries. India adopted both bilateral and multi-
lateral approaches in its economic relationship while preferring bilateral relations on security is-
sues (91-92). 
  It is also important to mention that both Brazil and South Africa are aware of their neigh-
boring countries’ concerns about their bid for hegemony, which in turn have affected both coun-
tries’ foreign policy instruments in their relations with their neighbors. Brazil avoided showing 
any hegemonic intention because it is aware that its neighbors have fear of hegemonic exploitation 
which could lead to a coordinated attack against Brazil. Because of the apartheid regime’s aggres-
sive hegemonic ambitions within the region, post-apartheid South Africa also rejected any hege-
monic interactions in its relations with the region and prioritized partnership with the rest of the 
region. Both Brazil and South Africa adopted multilateral approaches to reduce these fears and 
worked within multilateral institutions to strengthen their regional influence (Stewart-Ingersoll and 
Frazier, 2012). South Africa and Brazil can be classified as cooperative and benevolent hegemons. 
At this point it is important to note that today South Africa under Jacob Zuma has not really 
changed its foreign policy preferences and still increasingly engages with the region. On the other 
hand, Brazil’s new foreign policy under Michel Temer signals a change in Brazil’s foreign policy 
strategy by its focus on bilateral rather than multilateral relations with South American countries 
which will be discussed in the next chapter under similarities and differences between global and 
regional hegemonic strategies.  
 Regional dynamics and the position of regional hegemon are different in South Asia compared to 
the other two regions. India’s relationship with Pakistan has led to the lack of trust of India’s 
hegemonic ambitions among its neighbors. Based on its dominant hard power capabilities, with 
exception of Pakistan, the application of India’s hegemonic intentions towards its neighboring 
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countries is easy for India, but still both India’s unwillingness to pursue a multilateral approach in 
its foreign policy and neighboring countries’ fear and insecurity about India’s hegemonic status 
with the power asymmetry hinder the formation and development of cooperative activities in the 
region. In contrast to the other two regional hegemons, India has favored unilateralism in address-
ing regional problems and failed to create regional consensus on these problems.  
  In light of HST, Brazil and South Africa have been playing a stabilizer role, providing 
public goods and having the capability and will for the hegemonic role. Both countries are able to 
provide security and economic goods for regional stability. However, HST is not that applicable 
to South Asia mainly because of Pakistan-India tensions and nuclear status which prevent the re-
gional hegemon from ensuring stability in the region. Brazil and South Africa interfered in inter-
state and intra-state crises and provided the public good of regional stability through assuming the 
role of mediators and seeking to find political viable solutions in those crises. Even though India 
is the predominant power in the region, it has not brought neighboring countries together to de-
velop a cooperative approach and provide security management initiatives for common security 
concerns such as ethnic conflicts, insurgencies and terrorism (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 
90). India has been the central player in regional dynamics; however, it has failed to address the 
management of security mechanisms for a stable regional order, and its inflexibility regarding 
negotiating the Kashmir issue has retarded any prospects for meaningful regional integration. 
  Regional hierarchies are subordinate to the global hierarchy; hence, they cannot be studied 
in isolation. Whether there are any effects of external influences on the dynamics of a given re-
gional subsystem and what limits or opportunities those effects pose on the behavior of regional 
hegemons are important to mention in order to understand regional subsystems. Stewart -Ingersoll 
and Frazier (2012) identify three ways in which extra-regional great powers can possibly involve 
110 
 
 
in regional dynamics.  
First, they [extra-regional great powers] can have little or no involvement in the RSC [Re-
gional Security Complexes]. In this case the security order can be adequately explained by 
internal RSC dynamics alone…Second, extra-regional great powers can more actively in-
volve themselves within the RSC by seeking to influence the behavior of regional states in 
terms of foreign policy… The third type of influence that extra-regional actors have upon 
regional security dynamics comes in the form of more direct intervention, either through 
substantial support to regional members or through actual military penetration. (223) 
 
 Of course, one must also note that extra-regional powers can be drawn into and become mired in 
the vortex of regional politics, often without a full understanding of the complex local forces in 
play as was the case in the US involvement in Iraq.  
  When we take into consideration the interaction between extra-regional great powers and 
regional hegemons in their regions, South Asia is the region that has, at least in the post-Cold War 
context, experienced the strongest external interference by global great powers. As stated in the 
above-mentioned Gujral doctrine, India defined South Asia as its sphere of influence and opposed 
any external interference in the region’s affairs. Despite its concerns about external interference, 
especially in the aftermath of the Cold War period, developments in the region such as India’s 
economic liberalization, Pakistan and India’s nuclearization, and Afghanistan’s role in the 9/11 
attacks increased the US interests in the region. Today, Pakistan is still formally allied with the 
US, and India has bilateral security and defense ties with the US, while China plays an impinging 
role from the East.  
  During the Cold War period, Pakistan was allied with the US, and the US supported Paki-
stan with military assistance, even while drawing the line on becoming directly involved in the 
India-Pakistani dispute. Because of US and Chinese support for Pakistan during the Cold War, 
India forged defense ties with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union, which became an important 
source of economic and military assistance for India (Mazumdar 2011, 167). With the collapse of 
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the Soviet Union, India lost a significant economic and military supplier and reoriented its foreign 
policy once again, developing closer ties with the West, and in the 2000s, India and the US coop-
erated as well on counterterrorism and regional security issues (168). Especially with the Next 
Step in Strategic Partnership Initiative in 2005, India-US bilateral relationships and strategic part-
nerships expanded. The US became involved in South Asia by taking on counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 
147). Moreover, the lack of a security cooperation agreement in the region and the ineffectiveness 
of the existing ones have put enormous economic and military burdens on India in regional conflict 
management. The involvement of external powers in the region’s security affairs has therefore 
been articulated by Indian policymakers. With the policy of “security multilateralism”, India has 
aimed to take initiatives for the regional multilateral security process by including external powers 
in South Asian security-related issues (Dash 2008, 107). 
Only Brazil, among the cases under study, has a formal alliance with the US; however, the 
OAS pact has not markedly increased US interference in Brazil’s sphere of influence since 1990 
although Washington did become more assertive during President Chavez’s tenure in Venezuela 
and in combatting Colombian drug cartels. Indeed, the US role in South America has declined 
significantly in recent years (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 142). Teixeira (2012) explains 
Brazil’s success in reducing US penetration in South America by claiming that  
it [Brazil] has reduced the benefits of subsystem change by acting as a “sub-hegemonic 
state” or a “hegemonic stabilizer” at the regional level, thus preempting the role that could 
potentially be played by the United States, and consequently reducing the opportunities 
and incentives for US interference. (38-39).  
 
 As in the above-mentioned Brazilian regional cooperation case, with new security arrangements 
such as the South American Security Council (CDS), Brazil aimed to limit the US influence on 
regional dynamics and to address regional crises without US interference, which could enable the 
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establishment of its leadership in the region. In this case, Brazil saw the US as a threat to its re-
gional autonomy; hence, it sought to decrease the US penetration in the region through a security 
organization as well as the MERCOSUR trade pact. Indeed, the US supported the formation of a 
regional organization under Brazilian leadership by stating that “We welcome efforts by Brazil 
and our other regional partners to establish economic and security mechanisms such as the South 
American Defense Council” (as quoted in Brown 2013, 45).  
Relations with the US as an alliance partner still remain important for Brazil, and they 
interact through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The US and Brazil have strong bilateral rela-
tions on a wide range of security and economic issues, such as a civilian nuclear cooperation in 
the 1990s, the cooperation in Organization of American States (OAS) as well as negotiations in 
free trade agreements (Flemes 2009, 165). Until recently, defense ties between two countries were 
not as strong as economic ones; however, with the Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 
2010, Brazil and the US enhanced cooperation on defense issues which resulted from overlapping 
national and regional security interests including terrorism. In the long-term, the defense agree-
ment could help Brazil fulfill its goals to overcome regional and global threats. Moreover, as an 
alliance partner, Brazil’s defense cooperation with the US helps Brazil modernize its armed forces, 
which can in turn facilitate management of regional challenges and maintain a more stable regional 
order (Downes 2012, 2). 
  Brazil’s regional hegemonic strategies including non-intervention, defense of peace and 
peaceful settlement of conflicts, which also shape its interactions with the US and affect its deci-
sions on international issues. For example, in 2010, Brazil criticized sanctions against Iran’s nu-
clear program, and Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Brazil’s representative to the United Nations said 
“We do not see sanctions as an effective instrument in this case,” (MacFarquhar, 2010), and then 
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added that “[the sanctions] will most probably lead to the suffering of the people of Iran and will 
play into the hands of people on all sides who do not want dialogue to prevail” (as quoted in Brown 
2013, 44). As a holder of a temporary Security Council seat, Brazil voted against the sanctions on 
Iran. In this circumstance, Brazil applied its regional strategic logic, which supports benevolent 
rather than coercive strategy on the decision for the US promoted sanctions regime. 
 In comparison with South Asia and South America, Southern Africa enjoys relatively higher au-
tonomy in regional politics since South Africa is relatively freer in its sphere of influence and does 
not really confront significant external involvement in regional dynamics. Southern Africa is not 
a US priority compared to other regions including Europe, Central Eurasia and the Middle East. 
Rather than security and economic interests, the US has humanitarian interests in Southern Africa 
including the promotion of democracy and human rights. The US interacts with the region through 
dialogue forums under SADC; however, there is still no strong institutional link between Southern 
African countries and the US (Frazier 2003, 277-278). The US does not interfere in regional con-
flicts or peacekeeping operations and limits its military exposure in the region while “SADC mem-
bers largely seek U.S. diplomatic support and material resources for the goals and objectives set 
by the region, rather than by Washington” (280). Relatively low engagement of the US in regional 
dynamics, as compared to other parts of Africa where Washington has tried to build an “Africa 
Corps” to combat terrorism, increases South Africa’s role as a key player in regional dynamics 
and its role as the regional stabilizer. The US and South Africa have important bilateral relations, 
especially on economic issues. Today, South Africa is the major trading partner of the United 
States in the region.  
  Usually the main focus of regional powers is their own regional subsystem; however, some 
regional powers may have overlapped memberships in other regions in which their security and 
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economic interests are interdependent. Brazil and South Africa do not have such overlapped mem-
berships in other regions while India is linked to Southeast Asia with economic and security inter-
ests. With its “Look East Policy”, which was initiated by Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao in 
the early 1990s, India has engaged Southeast Asia, and since then, India has expanded its military 
and economic ties with the region. The absence of any bilateral security tensions between India 
and Southeast Asian countries, and potential common concerns about Chinese hegemony, have 
also helped India strengthen its influence in the region. India is involved in regional affairs, espe-
cially through regional multilateral mechanisms, such as ASEAN. India became ASEAN’s official 
dialogue partner in 1992 and full dialogue partner in 1995, and became member of ASEAN Re-
gional Forum in 1996 (Pardesi, 2010). China is also present in Southeast Asia as an overlapped 
member, so India to an extent balances China. Moreover, India’s economical engagement with 
ASEAN has also strengthened India’s position as a key player in the region. India has sought to 
gain an economic foothold and more influence in Southeast Asia. As a result, New Delhi decided 
to pursue an FTA with ASEAN and signed it in 2009 (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 199). 
India preferred to engage with its Southeast Asian neighbors through multilateral terms and devel-
oped its ties through regional organizations while unilateralism has dominated its foreign policy 
with its South Asian neighbors in its sphere of dominance.  
  As mentioned in the cases under study, non-overlapped regional hegemons Brazil and 
South Africa are focused on their own regions and have high concentration and attention on their 
regional dynamics. On the other hand, India, as an overlapped member of Southeast Asia, is en-
gaged in extra-regional multilateral forums not only in economic but also security-based arrange-
ments. India has been seeking to enhance its economic and security ties through a multilateralist 
foreign policy in its overlapped region and has developed stronger relations through cooperative 
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mechanisms with Southeast Asian countries rather than with its South Asian neighbors. India’s 
efforts to engage in extra-regional multilateral institutions and initiatives also show its aim of 
global recognition rather than a regional one.  
Regional Great Powers 
  The previous section explored and compared the behavior of regional hegemons in their 
regional settings. As mentioned earlier, this study looks at material power capabilities and idea-
tional power resources (such as willingness, ability, leadership, and provision of public goods) to 
identify regional hegemons. This section of the chapter focuses on regional great powers and ex-
amines their behaviors in regional conflict and cooperation. As stated in previous chapters, coun-
tries are considered as regional great powers when they have significant hard power capabilities 
relative to other countries in their regions, but because they are not the only major powers within 
their regions, regional great powers are unable to dominate the region hegemonically.  
With its focus on regional great powers, this section will follow the same procedure in the 
selection and examination of case studies as has been done in previous section on regional 
hegemons. Regional great powers are selected from multipolar regional structures by taking into 
consideration alliance and overlapped membership factors. Based on the typology presented in 
Chapter 2, Germany (an allied but non-overlapped case) and Iran (an un-allied and overlapped 
case) are selected case studies to be examined. In this section, I will provide basic information 
about hard power capabilities regional great powers and their positions in their regions. Next, I 
will examine the behavior of regional great powers in terms of regional conflict and cooperation 
by exploring what role selected regional great powers have played in intraregional conflict and 
cooperation. Lastly, I will make a comparison between Germany and Iran in terms of their foreign 
policy strategies, how they interact with the global hegemon and their interests in other regions. 
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Germany in Europe 
  The Big Four of Europe consists of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, which 
are the most powerful European countries with significant hard power capabilities. Moreover, 
those countries are interconnected through economic and political institutions. Unified in 1990, 
Germany has continued to be an important regional player, having Europe’s largest army (admit-
tedly with a constitutional restriction on the use of force) and economy, and its position in the post-
Cold War Europe can be described as a regional great power which is strong based on its hard 
power capabilities but limited in ability and willingness to shape the regional dynamics alone. 
Since the unification and in the immediate post-Cold War period, regional threats to Germany’s 
security have also disappeared, and Germany has become partners with its old enemies in regional 
integration and the promotion of regional security (Lantis 2002, 3-4). Today, Germany is able to 
convert its hard power capabilities into influence over its neighbors; however, there is an important 
dividing line between hegemony and influence. As also stated and described in the section on 
regional hegemony case studies, hegemony requires a combination of material preponderance and 
leadership among other hegemonic features including the willingness and ability to lead, playing 
the role of stabilizer, and provision of public goods. Germany fulfills the latter role, but its moti-
vation to lead has been circumscribed to a degree by its wartime past. Thus, while regional great 
powers have some sort of influence in their regional spheres, they are not unrivaled in their regions 
and do not possess sufficient hard power to intimidate their regional rivals to wholly dominate 
their sphere of influence. With the existence of regional great powers with relatively similar hard 
power capabilities, Europe can be described as a multipolar region, and in this regional structure, 
Germany is an influential if not entirely predominant power. Germany, with other regional great 
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powers is able to structure European security and economic systems, particularly relying on mul-
tilateral institutions to do so. Germany has been active in regional dynamics and involved in com-
promise and mediation activities in regional issues; ultimately Germany also to a large extent eco-
nomically fuels and funds the European Union. 
 Germany in regional cooperation and conflict 
  Germany has been a key actor in European integration by being the promoter of regional 
cooperation and integration. Its role alongside France in the establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951, and its active engagement in the organization underlined Ger-
many’s willingness to act with other countries. Germany’s NATO status was also enshrined in 
1955, conditional upon US dominance. Since 1990, German unification has not led to a dramatic 
change in foreign policy strategy. Germany is still a significant proponent of multilateralism and 
multilateral principles with its aim to deepen and enlarge regional organizations (Baumann 2002, 
14-16). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Helmut Kohl, who served as Chancellor of Germany from 
1982 to 1998, continued to pursue deeper integration in Europe. In the immediate post-Cold War 
period, Germany supported two integrative initiatives -the Single European Act of 1986, which 
aimed to create a “Europe without frontiers”, and the Maastricht treaty of 1991, which aimed to 
create a monetary union, and to a lesser extent, political integration- (Erb 2003, 111).16 These are 
discussed in detail below. 
  With the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War, there was an important 
increase in Germany’s relative and absolute power. The increase in German power led to a slow 
increase in the willingness to exercise military force in multilateral combinations, and a concern 
among neighboring countries that Germany was going to focus on becoming a great power and 
                                                 
16 The Maastricht Treaty is officially known as the Treaty of European Union. 
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embrace an independent foreign policy which might end its efforts for deeper European integration 
(Erb 2003, 116). In contrast to these expectations, Germany showed its commitment to deeper 
European integration and continued its integration efforts with its economic and foreign policy 
integration initiatives. One of the most important examples for the new Germany’s continued focus 
on deeper European integration was the Maastricht Treaty, which Germany signed in December 
1991, along with other members of the European Community. With the ratification of the treaty in 
1993, the European Community became the European Union, which was a significant step in Eu-
ropean economic and political unity. The treaty established a new European structure which is 
based on three pillars. “The first pillar was monetary union…Pillar two created the Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP), integrating foreign policy collaboration into the institutional 
framework of the EU. The third pillar is Justice and Home Affairs policy, addressed issues involv-
ing cross-national law enforcement, immigration, and other legal matters that might complicate 
moves to political union” (Erb 2003, 118-119). With the second and third pillars, the aim was to 
create not merely an economic but also a political union. With the ratification of the treaty, Ger-
many did not only agree on to giving up on its monetary sovereignty but also was ready to bind its 
security and foreign policy to a wider political union. However, hopes for a “Single European Act” 
to follow were dashed by global economic downturns, as well as weaker economies in smaller EU 
members and some states’ fear of German dominance, and the EU has fallen on harder times due 
to failure to produce a single fiscal policy to accompany its common monetary policy. In addition 
to challenges in the East, the reemergence of Russian assertiveness in places such as Ukraine has 
presented quandaries for German policy. 
  Germany has participated in multilateral operations to preserve regional peace and security, 
and it has advocated multilateral peace operations under the leadership of regional organizations. 
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With the outbreak of wars for independence in the Balkans, Europe faced its first security crisis of 
the post-Cold War period, and the civil war in European Community’s sphere of influence became 
a test of whether the organization members would be able to handle the problem. The right to self-
determination led to a violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav civil war started 
when Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence from Yugoslavia. Slovenia’s declara-
tion of independence did not have much resistance from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) which 
sought to keep Yugoslavia together (Kaylvas and Sambanis 2005, 193). The Slovenian war lasted 
ten days, and with the withdrawal of the Federal army from Slovenia, Slovenia declared its de 
facto independence. However, Croatia had a much more intense war in which JNA put up much 
more resistance than in Slovenia. The war in Croatia lasted for six months in which external actors 
including the United Nations intervened in the war with its peacekeeping forces. The war in Cro-
atia ended in 1992, with a cease-fire agreement between Croatian and Serbian negotiators. Both 
Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were recognized by the European Commu-
nity countries (Lantis 2002, 82-86). The arguably premature recognition of the republics of Slove-
nia and Croatia by European Community countries triggered the war in multi-ethnic Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1992. The Bosnian War (1992-1995) broke out between Serb-controlled JNA and 
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the Bosnian referendum for in-
dependence in February, 1992 and the recognition of Bosnia by the United States and the European 
countries in April. With the escalation of violence, the United Nations, NATO and the EU inter-
vened in the war with peacekeeping activities (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005, 193).  
  Germany played an important role in the civilian implementation process of the Bosnian 
War such as the provision of humanitarian aid and the acceptance of refugees; however, Germany 
did not militarily engage in the war until 1994. In 1994, the German government decided on out-
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of-area deployments of German troops to militarily engage in the war in former Yugoslavia. Uni-
fied Germany was cautious about taking part in military missions abroad; however, with the Bos-
nian war, a new era began for the Bundeswehr (the unified armed forces of Germany). Germany 
deployed its troops abroad for the first time and then extended beyond Europe for the first time to 
a role in Afghanistan. The Bundeswehr did not act unilaterally in Bosnia; rather, it participated in 
NATO-led multinational peace operations including the Implementation of Force (IFOR) which 
aimed to implement peace, and later in the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which aimed to stabilize 
the peace (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006, 70-74). The German engagement in peace enforcement and 
later in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia showed its readiness and willingness to solve regional 
crisis together with its allies. 
The civil war in Bosnia created a strategic dilemma for Germany. First of all, the lasting 
peace in Bosnia would be important for a secure and stable Europe. As a result, Germany felt the 
need to engage in peace missions with other countries and deployed its troops abroad. Moreover, 
a significant increase in Germany’s economic and military power after the unification increased 
its responsibility and the expectations of its partners in terms of contributing regional crisis man-
agement and promoting regional stability (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006). The German military engage-
ment in Bosnia increased its role in regional and international security structures and led to the 
adoption of a more active foreign policy in regional crises. 
Iran in the Middle East and North Africa 
  Based on the hard power capabilities of regional powers, the Middle East and North Africa 
have a multipolar regional structure in which Iran is one of the regional great powers along with 
Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Iran possesses necessary ma-
terial resources in order to be recognized as a regional great power but it is not strong enough to 
121 
 
 
shape and manage the regional order alone since it is not superior to the other actors of MENA. 
Moreover, Iran has so far proved incapable of maintaining regional stability and security though 
it has played a key role in containing ISIS and al Qaeda in Iraq and has extended its “axis” of 
collaboration to Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. The MENA region has been characterized by political 
and security instability, and in this unstable and conflict-prone neighborhood, Iran has become 
embroiled in a region-wide “cold war” with Saudi Arabia for influence among Arab states and in 
Islamic circles, as well as with Israel for security purposes. 
  As a regional great power, Tehran has sought to assert a greater influence over its neigh-
boring countries, especially weaker ones, and to expand its relations with them. Iran has also aimed 
to become a key political and economic player in the region.17 In terms of external influence, it 
has sought to limit US presence and influence on regional dynamics (Bahgat, 2007, 6-7). In order 
to achieve its goals, Iran has relied on coercive power including the threat to use of force, political 
and economic sanctions, and interventions. The strange dynamics of the US-Iran relationship in-
clude a sanctions regime, a six-country nuclear arms control agreement, collaborative fighting for 
the Iraqi regime, a basic agreement on opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan, and continuing mutual 
suspicion and harassment.  
MENA’s highly conflictive regional setting breeds mistrust among regional powers, and 
those regional powers attempt to guarantee their security, as in the arms race. As a result, Iran also 
puts greater emphasis on its military power capabilities given the unstable regional setting, the 
                                                 
17 Especially after Khomeini’s death in 1989, Iran’s revolutionary ambitions were reduced, 
and its foreign policy shifted from idealistic to material foreign policy. The immediate post-revo-
lution Iran policy prioritized its soft power and was based on the ideology of velayat-e-faqih (rule 
of the jurisprudent) which aimed to unite Islam and spread this ideology to other Muslim societies. 
With Khomeini’s replacement as Supreme Leader by Ali Khamenei, Iran has put greater emphasis 
on a more material foreign policy, which prioritizes economic reconstruction and national interests 
(Juneau and Razavi 2013). 
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lack of regional cooperation, and poor relations with its neighbors. However, since the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, Iran’s role 
and influence have been expanded significantly (Bahgat 2007, 5). 
 Iran in regional cooperation and conflict 
  In comparison to Europe and Southeast Asia, regional institutions and their effects on re-
gional dynamics are underdeveloped in MENA, and despite lip service to the Arab League, Gulf 
Cooperation Council, and Council of Islamic Cooperation, the MENA region countries do not 
make much effort to develop and empower regional institutions (Beck 2014, 6). The regional se-
curity dilemma leads to mistrust and rivalry among regional powers and creates obstacles for an 
effective regional integration. Beck (2014) defines the regional system of MENA as a “contracert 
of power” (18). Accordingly, the relationships among regional great powers are defined by com-
petition and use of force. As a result, those countries have failed to cooperate with each other and 
to constitute a power of concert. In the MENA region, regional multipolarity seems to have bred 
regional instability. 
  The MENA region has active regional organizations; however, today, Iran is not a member 
of any regional security or economic organizations, including Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
The GCC member states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates, but Iran is excluded from this security architecture. As a non-Arab state, its problematic 
relations with regional powers including armed conflicts, and political discrepancies as well as 
territorial disputes have led to a lack of cooperation in its bilateral and multilateral relationships 
with its neighbors. Iran’s isolation from intraregional organizations has increased its security con-
cerns, which in turn has led to armament build up and the development of a nuclear power program. 
Indeed, at different periods of time, Iran has attempted to rebuild close relations with the GCC 
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countries. The relationship between Iran and the GCC dramatically improved during the presi-
dency of Khatemi (1997-2005); however, with Ahmedinejad’s rise to power in 2005, relations 
between the two cooled because of Iranian foreign policy strategies (Bahgat 2007, 11). Even dur-
ing the close relations, the GCC countries had always been fearful of Iran’s potential for regional 
leadership and uncomfortable with Iran’s growing influence in the region which heightened with 
Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. 
  Iran and the MENA countries, especially the GCC countries have had different positions 
on regional conflicts, and with the recent upheavals in the MENA region, such as the so-called 
Arab Spring, the relationship between the two entered a new, more complex phase (Zweiri 2016, 
8). Especially the political confrontation and geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have highly influenced regional dynamics due to their positions on current regional conflicts in 
Syria and Yemen. For example, rather than working together to defuse the on-going Syrian con-
flict, Iran sided with the Syrian regime led by President Bashar al-Assad, and Saudi Arabia as a 
very important member of the GCC backed the Syrian rebels. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have 
attempted to influence the internal dynamics of their neighboring country, and their opposing 
stances on Syria have led to a deepening of the conflict.  
A wave of mass protests, described as the ‘Arab Spring’, began on December 18, 2010 in 
Tunisia after a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire to protest the injustices of the status quo 
(Ajami 2012, 56-57). Tunisian rebels adopted the political slogan of “the people want to bring 
down the regime” (Abulof 2015, 672). Later, this slogan echoed across Arab lands and became 
associated with the Arab Spring. Tunisian people called for the restoration of the suspended con-
stitution and sought to throw out the authoritarian and corrupt regime (672-673). The political 
unrest and mass protests spread to Egypt, Libya, and Syria among other MENA countries. While 
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in some countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen the governments were overthrown, 
Syria descended into a conflict in which mass protests turned into a bloody civil war with the 
refusal of political transition by the Syrian government. The Syrian civil war destabilized an al-
ready conflict-prone region with on-going effects remaining, including refugee problems and ter-
rorism (Habets 2016, 83).  
The Iranian role in the Syrian civil war can be examined on the grounds of the reasons for 
Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and how this involvement has affected regional dynam-
ics. As Sadjadpour (2014) puts it, “for Tehran, the Syrian conflict is not simply about who controls 
Damascus. It is the epicenter of a broader ideological, sectarian, and geopolitical struggle against 
a diverse array of adversaries, including radical Sunni jihadists, Arab Gulf states, Israel, and the 
United States” (1). In other words, Iranian intervention in the Syrian civil war and its military and 
financial support for the Assad regime was not solely support due to an alliance between the two 
but also a strategic decision in which Iran has prioritized the protection of its national interests. 
Since the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, Iran and Syria have been strategic allies, and Assad’s holding 
power is vital for Iran’s regional interests since Syria has been Tehran’s only consistent ally and 
point of influence in the Arab world. Moreover, the United States and Israel have been the mutual 
fear of Iran and Syria, which also sustains the strategic alliance between two (Sadjadpour, 2014). 
Due to these facts, Iran became involved in the Syrian civil war to prevent its strategic partner 
from collapsing and to ensure the Assad regime’s continuation of power. As Hokayem (2014) puts 
it, “for Iran, the fall of the Assad regime would have amounted to a strategic setback and a limita-
tion of its Levantine reach” (71). Moreover, the geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
and their regional ambitions have also led to the involvement of both countries in the civil war, 
which has significantly influenced Syrian internal dynamics. Overall, Iran’s military and financial 
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assistance for the Assad regime and the GCC states’ support for the fragmented rebellion have 
affected the duration of the civil war, and the involvement of external players in the Syrian conflict 
with different interests have been an obstacle for a political solution in Syria (Hokayem 2014, 40-
42).  
A Comparison of Regional Great Powers: Germany and Iran 
  Germany and Iran are the selected regional great power cases in this study based on their 
relative hard power capabilities within their regional settings. These cases show the important dif-
ferences in terms of their regional settings which in turn affect their foreign policy strategies in 
regional conflict and cooperation. As mentioned earlier, case studies are selected based on their 
alliance with the global hegemon and their membership in another region. Germany is an allied 
and non-overlapped regional great power while Iran is an un-allied and overlapped regional great 
power. At the end of this section, alliance and overlapped membership factors will be taken into 
consideration to better understand how these features of regional great powers affect their behav-
iors in their own regions and nearby regions. 
  The regional strategic settings of Germany and Iran are significantly different and have 
effects on the engagement of regional great powers in regional cooperative initiatives and conflict 
resolution. Regional settings have also shaped regional great powers’ foreign policy strategies and 
their relations with neighboring countries.  
  Germany has the advantages of being a member of a relatively stable, economically devel-
oped and peaceful region. Based on the report released in 2016 by the Global Peace Index, the 
world’s most peaceful region is Europe while the least peaceful region is MENA. Stability and 
security in Europe has led to a high level of trust among neighboring countries, which in turn has 
led to the engagement of regional powers in regional organizations. In such a peaceful regional 
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setting, Germany has been the proponent of multilateral action as well as the collective partner of 
both regional great powers and the global hegemon. Moreover, the Federal of Germany has had 
the reputation of having an aggressive nature, and unified Germany has been aware of its neigh-
bors’ concerns about its aggressive acts during the Cold War. Hence unified Germany has sought 
to reassure its neighbors that it does not have assertive intentions. Germany has aimed to ease the 
concerns of its neighbors by supporting integration as well as being a proponent of antimilitarism 
and the use of force only as a last resort to protect its partners and promote regional security. 
Germany has avoided unilateralist foreign policy strategies and acted together with its neighbors, 
mainly through multilateral forums (Sakaki 2011, 3-4). Today, multilateralism, limitation in using 
military force and intra-regional trade are central elements of German foreign policy. 
  On the other hand, the MENA region is one of the most conflict-prone regions in which 
the number of regional and intra-state crises are high while the number of cooperative initiatives 
are very low. In recent years, the MENA region has mostly experienced intra-state conflicts. How-
ever, intra-state conflict and violence in MENA have spillover effects which lead to regional in-
stability. The region’s conflict-prone structure has led to the weakness in trust among neighboring 
countries. Today, there are various intraregional organizations in MENA; however, those organi-
zations mainly consist of Gulf region countries and do not encompass other regional countries. 
Moreover, the existing regional organizations are relatively ineffective in promoting stability and 
security. There has been no significant effort for the formation or development of regional coop-
eration to promote regional stability. Iran is not a member of any intraregional organizations, and 
its problematic relations with many of its neighbors is an obstacle for regional cooperative initia-
tives. Moreover, the lack of inclusive multilateral regional security forums on regional challenges 
is also an important obstacle for Iran’s regional integration.  
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Both Germany and Iran interfered in regional crises; however, their role and strategies in 
those crises show important differences. Germany participated in the Bosnia mission of regional 
and international organizations by contributing troops to the NATO operations and played an ac-
tive role in peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities. On the other hand, Iran intervened in 
a domestic struggle for power and positioned itself with the Assad regime and thereby Russia in 
Syria, but fought alongside US-led forces in Iraq against ISIS. Gulf states including Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar also were involved in Syria, supporting opposition groups, and took sides in Iraq, 
Yemen, and elsewhere as well. The lack of cooperative actions among external players to find a 
peaceful solution for the Syrian civil war and their positioning and behaviors towards the conflict-
ing parties in Syria intensified the war. Iran has prioritized its national interests over regional se-
curity and stability.  
  In its relations with neighboring countries, Germany, which certainly also promotes its 
interests even as it builds multilateral institutions, has been using nonmaterial means of power 
including ideas, persuasion, deference, and consensus. Germany has sought to solve regional dis-
putes and conflicts through diplomatic and economic channels. Iran, on the other hand, has been 
relying mainly on the projection of hard power (usually military action). With its assertive foreign 
policy strategies, Iran has been a coercive power in MENA. In contrast to Germany, Iran adopted 
unilateralist foreign policy strategies and employed hard power tools to deal with regional threats 
and security challenges. 
  Alliance factors and external influence in regional dynamics have shaped regional politics 
in both Europe and MENA. Germany has enjoyed a strong relationship with the US which Ger-
many sees as vital in fostering peace and stability in the region. For Germany, the US has been a 
very important actor in European security dynamics since it has been “the ultimate guarantor of 
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security in Europe” (Sasaki 2011, 62). The Bosnian crisis is a good example of US-Europe coop-
eration in tackling security challenges in the region (Dorff 1998, 62). Rather than excluding the 
external player from regional dynamics, Germany has engaged the US in dealing with threats and 
challenges those Europe has been facing. 
  Regional great powers of the MENA region have also had strong relations with the US, 
and Iran followed that pattern until 1979. During the Cold War, the US sought to have good rela-
tions with regional great powers in MENA. However, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 ruptured US-
Iranian relations (Beck 2014, 9). Today, Iran is no longer allied with the US but the American role 
in MENA is important to understand regional politics. The US has been the leading external actor 
in Middle Eastern regional security dynamics. The MENA region does not have a regional 
hegemon, so it is more prone to global penetration than regions with regional hegemons, although 
penetrating outsiders are often engulfed in the pressures and priorities of their regional clients, 
such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. In this region, there is no regional hegemon to provide public 
goods, and the US has inserted itself in regional dynamics by claiming to deliver public goods, 
such as peace, democracy and security. As during the Cold War period, the US has an important 
amount of military presence and often takes military steps in dealing with regional crises (Bowman 
2008, 81), although Washington’s reputation for “even-handedness” has been eroded by an ever 
growing alignment with Israel. 
Iran has always claimed that the US is one of the most important reasons behind the re-
gional instability and has sought to defy US influence in the region. Hence, Iran has called for a 
regional security arrangement to consist of only regional states and exclude extra regional powers. 
However, Iran’s rising power has been an important concern for its neighbors, and to prevent Iran’s 
domination in the region, the MENA countries refused such security system proposals (Bahgat 
129 
 
 
2007, 6). As stated above, Iran does not have a formal alliance with the US. Its interactions with 
the global hegemon have been among the greatest challenges in its foreign policy as Iran and the 
US have had bitter relations since 1979. There have been attempts from both sides to reduce ten-
sions at different periods of time. For example, Iranian President Khatami called for a dialogue of 
civilizations rather than a clash of civilizations; however, the initiative did not work. Similarly, in 
2009, Obama made speeches relating to a dialogue between Iran and the US, which was rejected 
by the Iranian regime (Davies, 2013). Some developments in Iran’s national security strategy have 
also worsened the relationship between these two countries. For example, Iranian development of 
nuclear weapons technology has been one of the greatest concerns of the global hegemon. Even 
though Iran claims that it develops its nuclear capabilities for only domestic purposes, the US has 
difficulties in reaching a clear understanding of the motivations for the program (Bradley, 2008). 
Further, its other regional clients, Israel and Saudi Arabia influence US approaches on these and 
other questions related to Tehran. 
  As mentioned previously, some regional hegemons/great powers may have interests in 
more than one region in which their security is also interdependent. While Germany is a non-
overlapped case and does not have such security interdependence with other regions, Iran is an 
overlapped member of Central Eurasia. As Eyvazov (2009) has stated “geography, history, and 
ethnic and confessional affiliation tie Iran to Central Eurasia” (19). Central Eurasia is important 
for Iran’s security policies. One of the reasons of the close security interdependence of Iran with 
states in Central Eurasia is Iran’s having a sea border with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
and Russia: the Caspian Sea. The strategic importance of the sea lies in the fact that it contains 
large volumes of oil and natural gas reserves, which also leads to political and economic problems 
among the five bordering states mentioned above on how to divide the energy resources (20).  
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 Throughout its history, the Soviet Union has been a threat to Iran’s national security due to the 
expansionist policies of the former (Tarock 1997, 207). With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
the relationship between Russia as the current regional hegemon of Central Eurasia and Iran as 
Central Eurasia’s overlapped member has been somewhat more cooperative if not fully trusting. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the two countries have been interacting in a cooperative manner 
and developing strategic coordination to reach their mutual interests in Central Eurasia, such as 
common security concerns and economic interests in the Caspian Sea (207-208).  
  Iran has been involved in Central Eurasian disputes including the 1988 Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the civil war in Tajikistan in 1994. Iran has been 
cooperating with Russia on the solution of regional crises, which both Iran and Russia have treated 
as a threat to their national security and regional influence. For example, Iran has been involved 
in the Tajikistan conflict with Russia for a peaceful settlement and has mediated between Tajiki-
stan’s President Rakhmonov, and Nuri, the leader of Tajikistan’s Islamic movement. The Russian-
Iranian cooperation efforts to settle the Tajik conflict resulted with a peace agreement in 1995 
which was signed by the parties to the Tajik conflict, and it ended the dispute politically rather 
than militarily (Olimov 2016, 49). Iran’s successful mediation efforts are welcomed by Central 
Eurasian countries since Iran has provided a negotiated settlement with Russia for a regional sta-
bility threat. Iran has been also interacting with other Central Eurasian countries in a more coop-
erative manner: these interactions have been limited to bilateral relations, but cooperation among 
these countries has not led to any multilateral regional arrangements. Iran’s role in its overlapped 
region can be defined as a cooperative and stabilizing. 
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Conclusion 
  In this chapter, selected case studies were examined. The first section of this chapter cov-
ered regional hegemons: Brazil, South Africa, and India while the second part analyzed regional 
great powers: Germany and Iran. Each case study involved examination of the position of the case 
in the regional hierarchy and its behaviors in regional conflict and cooperation. Behaviors of re-
gional hegemons and regional great powers were examined and analyzed separately with a focus 
on their foreign policy strategies in regional conflict and cooperation. In the last part of each sec-
tion, the characteristics of regions, alignment with the global hegemon and overlapped member-
ship were analyzed and compared. The brief assessment of case studies on regional hegemons 
showed that the key factors explaining variations in their behaviors are geopolitical conditions, 
material conditions of regional hegemons, and whether they are involved in another region. The 
brief assessment of case studies on regional great powers showed that geopolitical conditions and 
their involvement in another region are also key factors in understanding variations in behaviors 
and strategies of regional great powers. The next chapter is the concluding chapter of the study, 
which will present summary of the study and findings. It will also provide a detailed discussion on 
the similarities and differences between the strategies and behaviors of global and regional 
hegemons as an attempt to answer the overarching question of the study: are there similarities in 
behaviors and motivations of regional hegemons and global hegemon(s) in comparable situations, 
such as conflict and cooperation? The next chapter will conclude with suggestions for future re-
search. 
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CHAPTER 6-CONCLUSION 
Summary of the Study 
 In applying HST to the regional level in this study, I examined the relationship between 
the distribution of power and regional outcomes (conflict and cooperation) by developing regional-
level propositions. Building on Lemke’s (2010) study in which he also develops regional-level 
propositions but does not explain much about regional powers’ behaviors in regional cooperation 
and crisis or conflict situations, the purpose of my study was to analyze regions comprehensively 
by examining the behaviors and strategies of various types of regional hegemons/great powers 
within their respective regions and conditions which affect their strategies and behaviors. In addi-
tion to the comparison of regional hegemons/great powers to one another, this study aimed to 
explore the similarities and differences between the behaviors and strategies of regional and global 
hegemons. 
 This study consisted of three parts. The first part of the study identified regional powers 
and classified countries as regional hegemons, regional great powers, regional powers, and limited 
regional powers based on their hard power capabilities- military, economic and demographic- and 
calculated their relative strength in given regions from 1990 to 2013. In addition to hard power 
capabilities, this study adopted three dimensions of power proposed by Miriam Prys (2008) to 
determine regional hegemons: perception, projection, and provision (chapter 3). The second part 
dealt with a regional-level application of HST and tested regional-level HST propositions by ana-
lyzing analysis of aggregate data (chapter 4). The final part examined selected case studies and 
aimed to provide comprehensive answers to the set of questions proposed in chapter 2 (chapter 5). 
 The methodology adopted by this study is a combination of the aggregate data analysis and 
the method of structured and focused case comparison proposed by George and Bennett (2005). 
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With the analysis of aggregate data, regional-level propositions which were mainly built on HST 
were tested and presented. With the case study method, this study aimed to offer an in-depth anal-
ysis of the behaviors and strategies of different types of regional hegemons/great powers in com-
parable situations. 
Summary of Findings 
The Aggregate Data Analysis 
 By applying system-level HST propositions to the region level, the findings of the aggre-
gate data analysis show that region-level HST propositions were supported in terms of the rela-
tionship between the existence of a regional hegemon and regional outcome (cooperation and con-
flict). The aggregate data analysis on regional cooperation shows that regions with a regional 
hegemon/great power experienced the highest number of intraregional organizations while regions 
without a regional hegemon/great powers have the fewest number of intraregional organizations. 
Moreover, regions with a regional hegemon/great power had a lower number of intraregional con-
flicts than regions without a regional hegemon/great power. These region-level findings on the 
relationship between the existence of a regional hegemon and regional outcome are compatible 
with system-level HST. Moreover, in contrast to general expectations on multipolar regions, I 
found that multipolar regions did not show significant differences from unipolar regions with a 
regional hegemon in terms of the number of intraregional MIDs and IGOs they had.  
 Different from Lemke’s study, this study tested for the impact of the alliance between the 
global hegemon and regional hegemons/great powers on regional cooperation and conflict. Build-
ing on Ikenberry’s (2004) argument on the American alliance system and its effects on conflict 
and cooperation, I expected to see a low number of intraregional MIDs and a high number of 
intraregional conflict in regions where external alliances exist. To some extent, my findings are at 
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odds with Ikenberry (2004). As opposed to what was expected, the findings suggest that regional 
cooperation is low in unipolar and multipolar regions where an external alliance exists. On the 
other hand, as expected, the results showed a low number of intraregional conflicts in such regions. 
Lastly, the study added another independent variable to previous studies by testing the relationship 
between overlapped memberships and regional outcomes. Based on the results, overlapped regions 
have more intraregional organizations and fewer intraregional MIDs. These findings are consistent 
with my propositions and expectations. 
 The aggregate data analysis was the evaluation of the raw statistics to test my propositions. 
Moreover, this method enabled me to test whether HST is applicable to the regional level and 
provided general answers for what intraregional dynamics work. As stated earlier, this research 
was intended to expand Lemke’s (2010) study beyond testing HST and find potentially useful 
answers to a set of questions to understand the motivations, strategies and behaviors of regional 
hegemons/great powers in their regional settings. At this point, the case study section enabled me 
to do a comprehensive research on the strategies as well as the behaviors of regional 
hegemons/great powers and factors which affect their choices. 
The Cases: Brazil, South Africa, and India as Regional Hegemons  
 The existing literature on regional powers, except a few works that focus on regional power 
strategies and behaviors, are primarily single-case studies and do not offer a comprehensive and 
comparative examination of regional power behavior. In contrast, my study focused on three dif-
ferent types of regional hegemons and compared their behaviors to one another by asking a similar 
set of questions in each case. Moreover, the assessment of Brazil, South Africa, and India enabled 
me to draw some conclusions regarding similarities and differences among these three different 
types of regional hegemons and address limitations in such a comparative study. 
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 Based on the findings in Chapter 5, regional conditions and the material capabilities of 
regional hegemons affected their strategy choices, behaviors and dominance patterns. On the other 
hand, while the overlapped membership factor affected the behaviors of regional hegemons, the 
alliance factor does not seem to have a significant effect on their behaviors and choices. 
 As I demonstrated in my cases on Brazil and South Africa, cooperative hegemony as a 
foreign policy strategy has been adopted by these two different types of regional hegemons. For-
eign policy strategies adopted by both regional hegemons show relatively a high degree of institu-
tionalization, and these regional hegemons wield influence over regional institutions which serve 
as power bases for them. The relatively peaceful regional settings of South America and Southern 
Africa have enabled regional hegemons to advance regional order through new or existent security 
and economic regional organizations, which has way to cooperative unipolarity. Moreover, based 
on CINC score of Brazil, which was presented in Chapter 3, Brazil’s share of regional hard power 
is 51 percent and South Africa’s share of regional hard power is 42 percent. While Brazil and 
South Africa are the regional hegemons of their respective regions, there are secondary regional 
powers in their spheres of influence which have significant impacts on the regional dynamics. Both 
regional hegemons have been relatively successful in converting their hard power capabilities to 
actual influence; however, it is important to note that they have not been free of obstacles in their 
exercise of power. Both Brazil’s and South Africa’s shares of power in their regional settings are 
relatively lower than India’s share of power in South Asia. As a result, both Brazil and South 
Africa have not been able to exercise their power in unilateral terms and thus have adopted a mul-
tilateral strategy.18 While there are similarities in their regional conditions and hard power share 
                                                 
18 Furthermore, Brazil may run into some soft power limitations due to its constraining 
culture (Portuguese) in relation to its Spanish speaking neighbors. 
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within their respective regions, Brazil is also an allied but non-overlapped regional hegemon while 
South Africa is an un-allied and non-overlapped regional hegemon, though it does wield some 
influence throughout African continent, as seen for example in its participation in Liberian peace 
talks in the late 1990s. However, though Brazil has a major power regional ally (the US), it often 
works to offset allied dominance, as the alliance factor does not seem to affect the behaviors of 
these regional hegemons. Indeed, both regional hegemons have sought to limit global penetration 
and influence in regional dynamics through the formation of regional organizations. 
 India, on the other hand, has followed a unilateral hegemonic strategy with its low degree 
of institutionalization and its choice of the exercise of power through unilateral and bilateral 
means. The relatively unstable regional setting of South Asia and the existence of a challenger to 
India’s security have led New Delhi to adopt a unilateralist strategy on many occasions and show 
less interest in regional cooperation. Moreover, unlike Brazil and South Africa, the power gap 
between India and its most powerful neighbor/rival, Pakistan, is considerably high. Based on CINC 
score, India’s share of regional hard power capability is 75 percent, and it has been able to achieve 
its goals through unilateral terms; hence, it did not bind its sovereignty or decision-making to 
regional organizations, specifically on security issues. India is an un-allied but also an overlapped 
regional hegemon. While again alliance does not play a major role here, the overlapped member-
ship factor affects India’s strategies and choices in its own region and its overlapped region. India 
is an overlapped member of the Southeast Asian region and increasingly involved in Southeast 
Asian affairs though multilateral organizations.  
While regional environments and power disparities go a long way to explain the varied regional 
hegemonic behavior I have noted, it is also possible that idiosyncratic leadership factors, i.e., 
agency, also plays a role. If Brazil’s center leftist regimes of recent years give way, as the recent 
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presidential impeachment might indicate, the degree of its regional multilateralism could diminish. 
If a shift away from the ANC in South Africa occurs, a similar change in foreign policy orientation 
might also occur. As we know from other contexts, including the global, however, there is always 
a tendency for foreign policy “culture” to persist from leader to leader because of geo-politics, 
power levels, and persistent national interests.   
As noted below comparison of global hegemonic behaviors and post-Cold War regional 
hegemonic behaviors show similarities, but especially so for India. Among all three cases, India’s 
behaviors show more similarities with global hegemonic strategies than the other two due to the 
facts of India’s regional setting and relative hard power capability. Yet global hegemons have 
tended also to promote multilateral institutions and systemic norm building as well. 
The Cases: Germany and Iran as Regional Great Powers 
 Through the cases of Germany and Iran, I examined the regional foreign policy strategies 
of two different types of regional great powers. The case analysis of these regional great powers, 
which operate under two different regional settings enabled me to explore their foreign policy 
strategies, behaviors and motivations. Consistent with the findings which were presented in the 
section on regional hegemons, the strategic choices and behaviors of regional great powers are 
highly influenced by their geo-political conditions and overlapped memberships. Again, while the 
alliance factor influences the behaviors of regional great powers, these states’ material capabilities 
do not have a preponderant impact on their foreign policy choices since they operate under multi-
polar regional structures in which there are more than great two powers with relatively the same 
share of hard power capabilities. 
 As a member of a relatively peaceful and stable region, Germany has enjoyed the ad-
vantages of cooperation, and in building trust following a disastrous war experience it has followed 
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a multilateralist foreign policy strategy. In contrast, as a member of relatively conflictive and un-
stable region, Iran did not join intraregional organizations but instead followed a unilateral and 
bilateral route. The alliance factor plays a significant role in both regional dynamics. For Germany, 
its alliance with US is crucial for regional security and stability. Germany has sought to engage 
the US in regional dynamics and has collaborated with the US to address regional threats and 
challenges. On the other hand, Iran does not have a formal alliance with the US and has sought to 
exclude it from regional dynamics. Iran is an overlapped member of Central Eurasia which has a 
great importance for Iran’s security policies as well as its role in mediating regional crises with 
Russian cooperation. 
A Discussion on the Global and Regional Hegemonic Strategies 
  In order to answer the overarching question of this dissertation, this section will briefly 
review global hegemonic strategies and discuss the similarities and differences between global and 
regional hegemonic strategies and behaviors.  
  As reviewed in the first chapter of this study, scholars have offered various global and 
regional hegemonic strategies which have been adopted by global and regional hegemons to exert 
their influence over other countries. Based on the literature, global and regional hegemons may 
assert control over other states through coercive or benevolent leadership by adopting unilateral or 
multilateral strategies including trade, military or economic alliances, and international/intrare-
gional institutions. Even though regional hegemons operate under an international hierarchy, and 
external interference in regional dynamics is always possible, still there are some similarities be-
tween global and regional hegemonic strategies. At this point, it is useful to briefly assess British, 
Soviet and US hegemonies to draw some conclusions about similarities and differences between 
global and regional hegemonic strategies. 
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 Studies of British hegemony have mainly focused on international political economy and 
how British hegemony has imposed order on the international economic system. According to 
Kindleberger (1973), during its era of global hegemony in the nineteenth century, Britain followed 
an international economic openness strategy based on the policy of free trade in which Germany, 
the US and France joined. In order to exert influence over other countries and alter their actions 
and policies, Britain used its trade dominance and international market power as a strategy of trade 
policy. Britain assumed responsibility for the regulation and management of the international eco-
nomic infrastructure and provided public good by carrying the entire burden. During its hegemonic 
period, Britain was able to provide a secure and stable international political order in which inter-
national economic activities took place.  
Moreover, Britain created institutions which constrained its freedom of action but at the same time 
served its interests. Britain’s institutional strategies led to the creation of the Concert of Europe, 
and the League of Nation (Ikenberry 2001a, 41; Nye 2002, 554). Telo (2016) highlights the weak-
ness of British multilateralism by proposing domestic and international reasons for it. Accordingly, 
the relationship between the imperial tradition of Britain and its rising multilateralism reflects a 
domestic ideological contradiction. Moreover, he argues, the Concert system under British hegem-
ony also had limits in maintaining international multilateral stability since “it could prevent neither 
the economic conflicts nor the violent blunders of European imperialism, nor the two World Wars” 
(24). 
  With the creation of the new polarity after World War II, the world’s two superpowers, the 
US and the Soviet Union, became the major players in world politics. The presence of the Soviet 
threat, which was militarily equal but economically far behind, shaped US behavior and highly 
affected its foreign policy strategies. During the Cold War, like Britain, the US dominated the 
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international economic system and played a leading role in international economic liberalization; 
however, their bases of economic hegemony differed greatly. Lake (1991) compares nineteenth 
century British hegemonic strategies to Cold-War American hegemonic strategies. Accordingly, 
while the US, he argues, has never controlled international trade to the same extent as Britain, but 
Britain has never had as large a share of world product as the US. As a result, Britain used its 
dominance of international trade while the US relied on its relatively greater domestic market 
power and used inducements and threats to influence choices and actions of foreign governments. 
(111-112). Lake (1991) also emphasizes free trade order built under British and American hegem-
onies by mentioning how military and security issues have been linked with trade treaties. Accord-
ingly, British leadership constructed a free trade order by including colonies, allies and antagonists 
and arguably benefiting all participants. Due perhaps to over-stretching in the long term, this sys-
tem undermined the strength of the United Kingdom. With American hegemony, on the other hand, 
major US trading partners were also its allies, and in this order, American allies were the main 
recipients of the benefits derived from the specialization and the international division of labor. 
Thus, the US was fortifying its security needs and preventing its challengers from emerging (115-
116).  
During the Cold War, American hegemony had a highly-institutionalized character, and 
multilateralism became an important feature of American foreign policy to solve international is-
sues and promote peace and stability in the world (Clark 2011, 124). The security concerns of the 
US during the Cold War led the US to adopt cooperative strategies with its European allies to 
overcome the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Despite differences and disagreements among 
European countries and the US, the existence of a common challenge to their security facilitated 
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cooperation among countries (Lieber 1997). During this period, US policymakers encouraged in-
ternational security arrangements, such as UN and NATO, and facilitated multilateral economic 
institutions. According to Skidmore (2011) the US provided public goods through multilateral 
institutions while enjoying privileges, such as relative freedom of action compared with other 
states. Since the end of World War II, the US has dominated its alliances and coalitions militarily 
which coalition participants have come to accept. 
In this bipolar international structure, the US has exercised both coercive power including 
the use of force, threat and sanction, and benevolent power including rewarding, convincing, and 
co-opting in order to influence choices of foreign countries. The US responded to the Soviet-Com-
munist threat and international instability by military means including intervening or supporting 
military interventions in the regions, such as MENA and Latin America as well as fighting wars 
in Korea (1950-1953) and Vietnam (1965-1973) to prevent the expansion of communism. Even 
though UN forces have played a minimal role in world events, and UN peacekeeping operations 
were not chosen to deal with intra-state conflicts and international crises during the Cold War due 
to the rivalry between Eastern and Western blocs which made the Security Council unable to de-
cide on a common policy, still the US has supported UN peacekeeping operations financially and 
militarily (Kertcher 2012, 612-613). 
  Strategies of the Soviet Union and the US have not shown much differences in their strug-
gle for global influence. Soviet hegemony also aimed to contain its rival without a war and isolate 
its Eastern alliances from Western influence (Jesse et al. 2012, 34-35). To do so, like the US, the 
Soviet Union used international institutions to assert control over other countries within its respec-
tive camp. Jesse et al. (2012) argue that Moscow used two main institutions to sustain its hegemony 
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over Eastern European countries: (1) militarily, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO, or War-
saw Pact) which was a military alliance bloc; and (2) the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon, or CMEA) which was an economic organization of the bloc (35). The Warsaw Pact 
was an international collective defense pact; however, it was dominated and used by the Soviet 
Union primarily for its political objectives. As Kramer (1984-1985) puts it:  
The Warsaw Pact provided the Soviet Union with a valuable means of containing the ‘re-
nationalization’ of the East European armed forces which began to accelerate after 1956; 
the symbolic concession to East European national feelings embodies in the Pact’s for-
mation helped to preclude the eruption of nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiments in most of 
the East European countries. (as quoted in Jesse et al. 2012, 35-36) 
 
Like the US, the Soviet Union intervened in the internal politics of other countries and stepped 
into Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as Afghanistan as an attempt to expand its political mil-
itary influence or deny the opponent influence throughout the world as well as in its local regional 
sphere of influence (Gibbs, 1987). 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc at the beginning of the 1990s brought about a new interna-
tional order, and the US emerged as the sole power in the unipolar international system structure. 
With the end of the Cold War, which removed an external threat to US security, the US became 
much freer in its foreign policy strategies. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the US kept 
following its institution-building agenda under both Bush and Clinton administrations. The US 
defined its foreign policy as one of multilateralism but also had the freedom to use coercive power 
to preserve its interests when necessary as was the case in the Persian Gulf War (January 15-
February 28, 1991).19 Following the end of the Cold War, the US built and expanded regional and 
                                                 
19 In 1991, US-led coalition of states staged a military intervention against Iraq as a re-
sponse to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. With this military intervention, the US sought to protect its 
global interests since MENA is strategically and economically important for the US. In decision-
making process, President Bush relied on Security Council Resolution 678 “which authorized us-
ing all necessary means to evict Iraq from Kuwait” (Quigley 1992, 1).  
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global institutions across security and economic areas including institutions such as the expansion 
of NATO along with the creation of NAFTA and WTO (Ikenberry 2001a, 233). The US worked 
with multilateral institutions to resolve disputes in Somalia and joined the Bosnia peacekeeping 
mission in the 1990s (Corbetta and Dixon 2004, 5).   
Unilateralism has also been used as a foreign policy strategy by American policymakers. Since the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the US has favored a more unilateral form of hegemony 
in dealing with security issues. Unilaterally pursued US foreign policies such as the rejection of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the rejection to participate in the International Criminal Courts and the inva-
sion of Iraq without the UN authorization revealed the US tendency on unilateral approach (Flemes 
2010, 96). Moreover, the 9/11 attacks led the US to engage in military, political and cultural oper-
ations all over the world without territorial or temporal limits (Suri 2009, 627). Ikenberry (2001a) 
argues that the Bush administration’s willingness to act alone following 9/11 and unwillingness to 
accept institutional constraints in the war on terrorism was a ‘strategic wrong turn’ and as he puts 
it “[it] has done so much damage to the country’s international position- its prestige, credibility, 
security partnerships and goodwill of other countries-“  (7). Like Ikenberry, Nye (2002) also argues 
that the US should act multilaterally during the current period in which it faces security threats and 
foreign policy issues such as terrorism, world trade, the environment and cultural extremism. Ac-
cording to Nye, the US can use multilateral approaches such as alliances, coalitions, transitional 
organizations and regional security organizations; however, Washington should not rule out uni-
lateral action in all situations and should occasionally use a unilateral approach in situations in 
which multilateral arrangements are not good for US interests. 
  Indeed, US foreign policy strategies were more definite under the presence of an external 
threat during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, US presidents used a combination of 
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different strategies in their foreign policy choices, and as He (2010) puts it “no one theory or 
strategy can fully explain the US policy under unipolarity after the Cold War” (1126). Hemmer 
and Katzenstein (2002) argue that US policymakers use a multilateral approach when norms and 
a shared sense of culture are similar while they favor bilateralism in the absence of norms and 
shared culture (598). They refer to the United States’ favoring multilateralism in Europe in terms 
of NATO and bilateralism in Asia in terms of SEATO. They argue that since the US and Europe 
have a strong sense of collective identity, U.S policymakers have favored multilateralism in this 
region to achieve their goals while they have favored bilateralism in East Asia because “US poli-
cymakers saw their potential Asian allies … as part of an alien, and in important ways, inferior 
community” (575). According to them, the US uses mainly bilateral diplomacy, in which two states 
interact with each other directly, because multilateral diplomacy is very difficult to accomplish 
since it requires a strong sense of collective identity among states. Ikenberry, in his Liberalism and 
Empire (2004), also argues that the US prefers to operate within bilateral frameworks with coun-
tries which cooperate with the US and accept its leadership. These countries, in turn, receive spe-
cial bilateral security and economic favors. The US prefers to build bilateral security relations in 
places where it is dominant and does not need to give up its policy autonomy as was the case in 
East Asia (628). One of the most recent examples can be the Obama administration’s adoption of 
a multilateral approach and engagement in multilateral negotiations to bring Iran to the negotiation 
table (Hastedt 2015, 282). The US worked with a diverse group of states to restraint Iran’s pursuit 
of a nuclear weapon program. Faced with powerful economic sanctions, Iran agreed on restrictions 
on its nuclear program and intensive inspections in an agreement signed with world powers in July 
2015. Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken claimed that  
without our partners, we could never have built or maintained a sanctions regime powerful 
enough to help Iran to the negotiating table or knitted together an understanding strong 
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enough to verifiably and comprehensively ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is, and will 
remain, exclusively for peaceful purposes. (CFR Events) 
 
Given all the arguments and examples above, it can be concluded that its position in the 
international hierarchy gives freedom to the US to maneuver freely in its foreign policy strategies.  
 Even though the international system was demarcated into distinct blocs and none of the 
cases under study have such regional systems, the global strategic setting of the Cold War and the 
current South Asian regional setting still show some similarities in terms of having two powerful 
countries with nuclear capabilities and their limits to respond each other’s threats due to the fear 
of nuclear escalation. The existence of a threat shapes state behaviors and constrains foreign policy 
choices as demonstrated in US-Soviet relations during the Cold War period. As previously men-
tioned, India also faces a threat in its unipolar regional structure which limits its actions, choices 
and responses to Pakistan. Regardless of unequal hard power capabilities of India and Pakistan 
(and the rest of the region), today Pakistan is India’s principal rival in the region. The US response 
to Soviet threat was a policy of containment which aimed at preventing the spread of communism 
and Soviet influence by military intervention or support as well as the development of multilateral 
security organizations. In comparison, India has responded to Pakistani threat by bilateral security 
initiatives and external connections. Moreover, like the international system during the Cold War 
period, the current existence of a rivalry in the South Asian regional system leads to instability of 
the regional order. During the Cold War, the US was able to form institutions and exercise its 
power through those organizations. India, on the other hand, has preferred to exercise its power 
without reliance on such regional organizations which are already underdeveloped due to the in-
secure political environment of the region. India has neither promoted the formation of security 
organizations nor actively engaged in the existing ones. It has been interacting with its neighbors, 
for better or worse, through bilateral security and economic initiatives.  
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  As mentioned in the cases under study, both Brazil and South Africa have followed a mul-
tilateral route in their relations with neighboring countries. On the other hand, while India has 
preferred a unilateral route in its foreign policy related to security issues in South Asia, it has 
exercised multilateralism outside the region in UN peacekeeping missions and in Non-aligned 
Movement. At this point, it is important to note that both Brazil and South Africa lack the capa-
bilities to achieve their goals unilaterally. In their spheres of influence, both countries need the 
support of their neighbors to achieve their foreign policy goals since countries within their own 
regions have a relatively more significant level of influence on regional dynamics. Hence, Brazil 
and South Africa have used their resources to sustain and enforce regional institutions which led 
to effectiveness of those regional organizations. On the other hand, with its relatively high material 
capabilities, India is a natural hegemon in its region, and most of the other countries, except Paki-
stan, lack the capability to influence regional dynamics. As a powerful regional hegemon, India 
has the advantage to choose from different foreign policy strategies. As the case with the post-
Cold War US, the power disparity between India and the rest of the region makes unilateral options 
available for India and reduces incentives to act multilaterally. As a result, India usually considers 
unilateralism as a viable route to make foreign policy decisions and does not prefer to constrain its 
power in multilateral forums or bind its decision-making to intraregional organizations. India only 
chooses to work through multilateral forums when the benefits of acting in coalition outweigh the 
costs of going it alone.  
  Analyzing individual level of foreign policy decision making can also highlight the simi-
larities and differences between global and regional hegemonic strategies and how heads of state 
or government orient their foreign policy behaviors. At both the global and regional levels, among 
various factors including system level (polarity, polarization, geopolitics), domestic level (military 
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and economic capabilities, government type), and organizational level (bureaucratic politics), lead-
ers’ personalities and perspectives may also affect foreign policy behavior and tendencies.20 Shift 
in US foreign policy strategies under different presidents can be given as an example for how 
presidents’ personal characteristics impact their foreign policy orientations. As mentioned above, 
US hegemonic strategies showed basic continuity under George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George 
Bush, and Barack Obama in the main strands of US foreign policy, and during their presidential 
terms, the US followed a basically multilateral liberalist doctrine in its relations with other coun-
tries, though with occasional unilateral moves as well. George W. Bush’s extreme American ex-
ceptionalism, which posited that the US was strong enough to set the rules and acted alone, his 
self-perceived strength and his belief in American freedom of action are important individual level 
factors which played roles in the move towards unilateralist decisions, as in the Iraq invasion, 
albeit with some allied cooperation.  
Even more stridently, Donald Trump signals a shift from his immediate predecessor 
Obama’s focus on multilateralism. During the presidential campaign and in his inaugural address, 
Trump emphasized his unilateral “America First”, tendencies. During the campaign, Trump also 
challenged institutionalism by defining NATO as “obsolete” and giving speeches favoring disso-
lution of the European Union. After taking office, Trump’s decisions have manifested that his 
campaign rhetoric translated into action, especially in unilateral action on airstrikes in Syria and 
speeches on actions to eliminate the nuclear threat from North Korea ‘with or without China’. In 
                                                 
20 The individual level of foreign policy decision making assumes that the personal char-
acteristics of political leaders affect their governments’ foreign policy behavior. Four personal 
characteristics, which include beliefs (e.g., nationalism, belief in one’s own ability to control 
events), motives (e.g., the need for power, affiliation, approval), decision style (e.g., openness to 
new information, preference for certain level of risk) and, interpersonal style (e.g., excessive sus-
piciousness, manipulative behavior) are considered as the factors which have the most impact on 
a government’s foreign policy behavior in individual level (Hermann 1980, 8-10). 
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the US case, hegemonism exists in power terms; however, foreign policy orientations have shown 
differences with respect to multilateral and unilateral tendencies, even as Russia reemerged as a 
power to be taken seriously in MENA, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.  
  Today, the unexpected leadership in Brazil brings about the question of whether such a 
direction change can also occur, for example in Brazilian foreign policy. As mentioned under the 
case study section, Brazil has been using a multilateral means of foreign policy to achieve its re-
gional projection of power. Beginning with the 1990s, multilateralism has been keeping its central 
in Brazilian foreign policy and has shown more or less continuity under Lula (2003-2011) and his 
immediate successor, Rousseff (2011-2016). As Vice President of Brazil under Rousseff, Michel 
Temer took office after Rousseff’s impeachment and removal in 2016. Temer’s foreign policy 
goals, at least in the early going, have emphasized the need for a change in Brazilian policy and 
have reflected some tendency toward bilateralism with a focus on free trade agreements and pri-
oritizing economic relations with the US and European Union. After almost a year of the new 
government, Brazil has scaled down its regional integration and signaled its intentions towards 
international partnerships. Especially the diplomatic isolation of Venezuela and its suspension 
from Mercosur in December, 2016 foreshadow damage to Brazil’s regional integration efforts un-
der previous governments. Based on speeches which emphasize a strategic change under Temer’s 
presidency and actions which take a bilateral route, there is a reason to believe that Brazil may 
shift its foreign policy strategy. Under previous governments, Brazil chose to act multilaterally to 
assert its influence over its neighbors and to avoid the concerns of neighboring countries regarding 
Brazil’s hegemonic aspirations. Even though it still remains to be seen if Brazil will be able to 
change its direction as freely as the global hegemon, Brazil’s orienting itself unilaterally in the 
regional context would lead to an increased concern among its neighbors with regard to Brazilian 
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hegemonic ambitions. A shift from cooperative hegemony (medium-level of realist elements and 
a high degree of institutionalism) towards unilateral hegemony (strong realist elements and a low 
degree of institutionalism) would also threaten Brazil’s success in promoting its interests in the 
region and strengthening its regional influence. In the future, Brazil could also revive its interests 
in gaining a permanent UN Security Council seat and spreading its influence to the global and 
extra-regional level, much as India has under its Hindu Nationalist Party administration. 
  Comparisons of global and regional foreign policy strategies are difficult for many reasons. 
First of all, even though the current international system, for now still under American hegemony, 
and the three regions in which the three cases under study operate have unipolar systemic struc-
tures, regional hegemons still have some restrictions. As stated previously, unlike global 
hegemons, regional hegemons have to operate under an international hierarchy, and external in-
terference in regional dynamics is always possible while the global hegemon does not face such a 
threat although it confronts significant global (Russia and China) and local (North Korea and Iran) 
challenges and resistance in some of its regional interventions, as in Southeast Asia and MENA. 
Interference or engagement of the global major powers in the region may create constraints and 
opportunities for the regional powers as well as secondary and tertiary states. Global penetration 
shapes regional order and threatens the autonomy of regional hegemons. Hence, external interfer-
ence in regional dynamics is not desired by regional hegemons. However today, as Buzan (2004) 
argues, the global hegemon has a security role in all regions, which is observed in the three cases 
under study at different levels. The global hegemon is present in South America and South Asia 
with its security and economic interests, and to an extent in Southern Africa with its humanitarian 
interests. Moreover, since those regional hegemons have to operate under both international and 
regional hierarchies, regional hegemons have to establish some kind of harmony between the two 
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spheres, which also affects regional dynamics and limits their control and influence over their 
regions (Prys 2010, 482). Regional hegemons also do not generally have the economic clout and 
resources of the global hegemon and therefore are somewhat more limited in building unrivaled 
economic and trade dominance even on the regional levels. Nevertheless, India and China are both 
rising on this score. 
Conclusions 
 The observed pattern in the motivations, strategies and behaviors of regional 
hegemon/great power case studies can be classified based on their regional conditions and material 
capabilities, the alliance factor, and overlapped membership. 
 Based on the findings, it seems reasonable to conclude that when a region is relatively 
unstable and insecure and a regional hegemon is relatively more dominant in its sphere of influence 
in comparison to other regional hegemons, the regional hegemon tends to pursue a unilateralist 
hegemonic strategy. On the other hand, when a region is relatively more stable and peaceful, free 
of regional threats to the regional hegemon, and the regional hegemon lacks the capability to 
achieve its goals unilaterally, the regional hegemon pursues a multilateralist and institutionalist 
foreign policy strategy. These conditionalities do not seem to apply in the same way for global 
hegemons. 
Alliance factors do not have much influence on the foreign policy choices of regional 
hegemons. Even though regional hegemons have some sort of interaction as well as bilateral and 
in some cases multilateral relations with the global hegemon, allied or not, regional hegemons seek 
to limit external influence on regional dynamics in order to establish their leadership in their re-
spective regions. The factor of overlapped membership influences the foreign policy choices and 
focus of a regional hegemon. While non-overlapped regional hegemons have more focus on their 
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own regions with their high concentration on regional dynamics, overlapped hegemons, on the 
other hand, not only attempt to increase influence within their region, but also seek to engage 
actively in the overlapped region. Indeed, an overlapped regional hegemon tries to develop 
stronger relations with countries in its overlapped region to influence the dynamics of the over-
lapped region. 
 Based on the assessment of regional great powers, it also seems reasonable to conclude 
that when such as power operates in a relatively peaceful and stable regional setting, regional great 
power follows a multilateralist foreign policy strategy while when a regional great power is a 
member of a conflict-prone and insecure region, it can be expected to follow a unilateralist foreign 
policy strategy. Due to the multipolar regional structure, relative material capabilities do not influ-
ence the behaviors or strategies of regional great powers as much as they influence the behaviors 
of regional hegemons.  
The evaluation of the alliance factor shows that alliance with the global hegemon influ-
ences regional great power strategies. If a regional great power is allied with the global hegemon, 
the regional great power allows external penetration in regional dynamics while an un-allied re-
gional great power seeks to limit external involvement. The overlapped membership factor, on the 
other hand follows the pattern of regional hegemons and affects the choices and strategies of re-
gional hegemons both in its own region and its overlapped region. 
 The findings on the comparison between global and regional hegemonic behaviors suggests 
that while there are similarities between regional and global hegemonic strategies and behaviors, 
differences in global and regional structures and conditions pose limitations on such a comparison. 
Despite of restrictions and limitations, we witness similarities in global and regional hegemonic 
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behaviors and foreign policy strategies when there are similarities in systemic/regional conditions 
and dominance patterns of regional and global hegemons. 
 Lastly, the study appears to partially support the applicability of HST to a regional-level 
analysis to understand the conflictive and cooperative behaviors of regional powers. Regional con-
ditions seem to have a significant effect on the relationship between the existence of a regional 
hegemon and the stability of the regional order. Still, it seems reasonable to conclude that even 
though some of them are more successful in doing so than others, regional hegemons and regional 
great powers, with some exceptions, appear to have paramount interest in promoting stability and 
providing public goods in their regions. 
Agenda for Future Research 
 This study offers several possible avenues for future research. One path for further study 
would be the investigation of China’s regional hegemony and its comparison with Russia’s re-
gional hegemony. The power capabilities and influences of these regional hegemons are beyond 
their regions.  
 This research examined unipolar and multipolar regional orders since the focus of the study 
was regional hegemons and regional great powers. Moreover, cases under study were selected 
from different types of regional hegemons and regional great powers based on the typology devel-
oped by the study. Further study can fill in some deficiencies of my study by taking two paths. 
First of all, Northeast Asia’s bipolar regional structure from 1990-2001 and unipolar regional 
structure since 2001 can be analyzed as two distinct periods. China’s relationship with Japan in 
bipolar regional structure and Japan’s responses to China’s hegemony could be examined compre-
hensively. Moreover, both Russia and China are un-allied but overlapped cases, and the analysis 
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of their relationship with the global hegemon would give new insights to test the alliance factor 
more in depth and provide further test for the generalizability of the findings on the alliance factor.   
 Even though this study analyzed the relationship between India and its challenger Pakistan 
briefly, a more in-depth study might examine and compare the relationship between a regional 
hegemon and its challenger in different regions. Future study might test the effects of the alliance 
factor by taking into consideration the challenger’s alliance with the global hegemon and its effects 
on regional dynamics. Japan in Northeast Asia and Pakistan in South Asia are important secondary 
states which influence regional dynamics. Even though both countries have alliances with the 
global hegemon, their degree of alliance and their benefits from it differ greatly. In my study, I 
have addressed only the effect of a regional hegemon’s alliance with the global hegemon; however, 
the case study section revealed that a challenger’s alliance with the global hegemon also needs to 
be explored in future studies. 
 Besides regional hegemons and regional great powers, the strategies and behaviors of lim-
ited regional powers also deserve attention since the literature does not focus on such countries as 
limited regional powers. Of the potential cases, Venezuela is an important one since it dominates 
oil reserves in South America. Venezuela’s relationship with the regional hegemon and regional 
great powers as well as its responses to Brazilian economic hegemony could be investigated. As 
such, analyzing the Venezuelan case could provide new insights on the strategies and behaviors of 
regional hegemons in dealing with a limited regional power. Since my focus is regional hegemons 
and regional great powers, I did not explore behaviors and strategies of limited regional powers 
but primarily concentrated on the behaviors of regional hegemons in conflictive and cooperative 
situations. 
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 Lastly, studying the similarities and differences in global and regional hegemons’ strategies 
and behaviors with a focus on a specific period would provide advantages to the researcher in 
drawing more general conclusions. This study addressed the similarities and differences between 
the strategies and behaviors of global and regional hegemons and covered three different periods 
of global hegemonic behaviors while the case study section focused on post-Cold War period to 
assess regional hegemonic behavior. I should stress that this comparison posed limitations and 
difficulties, especially because of the Cold War Period’s systemic conditions. Therefore, future 
research would benefit more from comparing global and regional hegemonic strategies with a fo-
cus on a specific period. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
REGIONAL POWER POLITICS: THE BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS OF            
REGIONAL POWERS IN SETTINGS OF CONFLICT AND COALITION  
by 
CAGLA MAVRUK CAVLAK 
August 2017 
Advisor: Dr. Frederic S. Pearson 
Major: Political Science 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
 After the Cold War, International Relations has seen a resurgence of interest in the study 
of regional powers. Scholars have been paying increasing attention to regional powers as important 
actors in world politics and studying their foreign policy, but few if any studies have discussed the 
behaviors of regional power comprehensively and comparatively. The purpose of this study is to 
gain a better understanding of regional power foreign policy strategies and behaviors by analyzing 
them comprehensively and comparatively. Unlike previous studies on cooperation and conflict 
within regions, this study focuses on the reasons for the strategic tendencies and motivations of 
regional hegemons and great powers and their effects on regional cooperation and conflict. More-
over, departing from Hegemonic Stability Theory, this study also aims to explore similarities and 
differences between regional and global hegemonic foreign policy strategies. With its focus on the 
post-Cold War period, this study uses an overall aggregate data analysis of regional cooperation 
and conflict to test region-level adaptation of HST propositions. This study also uses the method 
of structured and focused case comparison to present an in-depth analysis of different types of 
regional powers including Brazil (an allied and non-overlapped case), South Africa (an un-allied 
and non-overlapped case), India (an un-allied and overlapped case), Germany (an allied and non-
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overlapped case), and Iran (an un-allied and overlapped case). The aggregate data analysis sup-
ported region-level adaption of HST propositions which revealed that HST is applicable to re-
gional-level. Consistent with the aggregate data analysis, the comparative case study method illus-
trates that even though regional conditions, material capabilities, and the overlapped membership 
factor affect foreign policy strategies and behaviors of a regional hegemon, regional hegemony 
plays a stabilizing role with its intervention in regional conflicts and promotion of regional coop-
eration. 
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